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ABSTRACT
FAMILY STRUCTURE, STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH
INSURANCE PROGRAM (SCHIP) AND CHILD OUTCOMES

By

Minghua Li

University o f New Hampshire, September, 2006

This dissertation consists o f three separate but interrelated essays that investigate
how family structure and public policy are linked to children’s health and developmental
outcomes. Each essay employs two or three waves o f the National Survey of America’s
Families (NSAF) as the primary data source. The first essay broadly investigates how
family structure, including the less typical non-traditional families such as single father
and grandparent households, are related to a wide array o f child outcomes with a focus on
the interplay o f parent-child gender. The results from this study show that children in
single-father families have better health status than children living in all other nontraditional families. Adding economic resources and inputs appears to mitigate the
adverse effect o f poverty associated with non-traditional families, but does not eliminate
such negative impact.

The second essay investigates how the State Children’s Health Insurance
Programs (SCHIP), which are designed to provide coverage for uninsured children with
family income too high to qualify for Medicaid but not high enough to secure private
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insurance, affect coverage, medical care utilization and child health outcomes. I find
strong and consistent evidence that the number o f publicly insured children increases;
however, the number o f privately insured children also declines suggesting significant
crowd-out. As a result, there are no consistent findings that SCHIP increased the overall
number o f insured children. The results also indicate that SCHIP programs encourage
medical care utilization such as well-child care visits and doctor visits. Nevertheless,
there is little evidence on the effectiveness o f SCHIP with respect to improving children’s
health outcomes.

The third essay contributes to the sparse existing literature on two different fronts.
First, it empirically investigates the impact o f welfare reform on the formation of
grandparent-headed households, while at the same time taking into account the interplay
of other contemporary public programs such as state kinship care policies and SCHIP.
Second, this essay explores the motivations underlying grandparent caregiving behaviors
and offers insights to such behaviors from an economist’s perspective. I do not find
evidence that welfare reform encourages grandparent household formation. However,
there is strong evidence that kinship care policies encourage grandparent caregiving
behaviors.
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INTRODUCTION

There was early and widespread interest in the well-being o f children, as children
are viewed as America’s most valuable resource for the future. The Children’s Charter,
as one of the first explicit statements of the national goals for children and youth, was
provided in 1930, at the onset o f the Great Depression. The Children’s Charter lays out
the national goals for the children o f America:1

I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

VI.

For every child spiritual and moral training to help him to stand firm under the
pressure o f life
For every child understanding and guarding of his personality as his most
precious right
For every child a home and that love and security which a home provides; and
for that child who must receive foster care, the nearest substitutes for his own
home
For every child full preparation for his birth, his mother receiving prenatal,
natal, and postnatal care, and the establishment o f such protective measures as
will make childbearing safer
For every child health protection from birth through adolescence, including:
periodical health examinations and, where needed, care o f specialists and
hospital treatments; regular dental examination and care of the teeth;
protective and preventive measures against communicable diseases; the
insuring o f pure food, milk and pure water
For every child from birth through adolescence, promotion o f health,
including health instruction and a health program, wholesome physical and
mental creation, with teachers and leaders adequately trained

The well-being o f American children is also essential to the pursuit of happiness
by many American families. Most families strive to raise their children in a secure and
stimulating environment by providing economic and social resources needed for their

1 U.S. Department o f Health and Human Services (1991), C hild H ealth USA 91.

-
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children’s success. However, changing demographics and social trends have reshaped
American families so that they differ not only from the traditional families, but also from
each other. Along with the decline of traditional families, new types o f families and
living arrangements have become more prominent, including one-parent families,
cohabiting couples with children, and grandparent maintained families.
Changing family structure and children’s current and future economic well-being
are inextricably connected. Greater diversity has meant greater economic inequality
across households. While the overall U.S child poverty rate is 17 percent, the poverty rate
is 46 percent for children in no-parent families and 38 percent for children in one-parent
families.2 Therefore, children in single-parent families and no-parent-present families
have unusually high poverty rates compared to children in other families. Although the
exceptionally high poverty rates observed in such households can not be simply reduced
to a family question especially among the historically disadvantaged groups, the link
between children’s living arrangements and poverty is strong.
The new and changing American family life coupled with economic deprivation,
has greatly affected the experience of childhood and young adulthood for many children
over the past four decades. To understand the interplay o f these changes on child
outcomes, it is thus essential to look at the population o f children with a focus on family
structure and the effectiveness of government programs designed to help children. That is
the main purpose o f this dissertation.

2

Children’s Living Arrangements and Characteristics: March 2002, Current Population Reports, 2003, by
Jason Fields.

-
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The debate over who and what are responsible for the current situation and
controversy over policy response must not obscure the basic national goal outlined in the
Children’s Charter. In the midst o f the complicated research challenges, complex theories
of family economics, and wide policy disagreements, I am attempting to address these
pressing issues.

-3 -
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PART I: A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF FAMILY
STRUCTURE AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILD OUTCOMES

-4 -
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One out o f every six children in the United States is growing up in a household
where the family income is at or below the poverty threshold (2002 U.S. Census Bureau,
March Current Population Survey). This may be in part due to the dramatic increase in
births to unmarried women as well as the high divorce rate in the United States, which
are among the many factors that have changed family structure and affected the economic
security of children in the country. The rates o f divorce and single parenthood are higher
in the United States than in any other part of the world, with one out o f every three births
occurring outside o f marriage (National Center for Health Statistics, 1995); and four out
o f every ten American children are not living with both biological parents. Each year
more than 1.5 million children under 18 (about 2.5 percent) experience the divorce of
their parents, about half o f all children live with only one parent, and two fifths o f all
children live in a cohabiting family at some point.
Much research has demonstrated that children of unmarried mothers, especially
teenagers, are at a higher risk o f having negative birth outcomes, such as low birth weight
and infant mortality, and are more likely to live in poverty than children of married
mothers.3 Growth in female-headed households has been implicated as a major source of
poverty, in part because many fathers fail to pay child support. Since children can be
3 See Hayes (1987) and Prater (1995) for reviews o f the literature.
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thought o f as collective consumption goods from the point o f view o f the father and
mother, within marriage, proximity and altruism help to relieve the free-rider problem
associated with the provision o f public goods. Upon separation or divorce, however, it
may not be feasible for the parents to realize a Pareto-optimal allocation o f their joint
resources as the noncustodial parent loses the control to the allocation decisions of the
custodial parent (Weiss and Willis 1985).
Single-parent families and blended families have received the most attention from
researchers. Some but not all research finds that children who grow up in single-parent or
stepparent families usually fare worse than those who grow up with both biological
parents. Almost all o f these studies either treat single-parent families as one category,
without differentiating between single-father headed and single-mother headed, and
without identifying whether the single parent is in a cohabiting relationship or alone, or
these studies simply compare single-mother families to blended families or to intact
families, leaving out single-father families completely. The gender o f the single parent
may have different intonations for children in the household, and boys and girls are
different in many aspects; even fewer studies have addressed the gender difference and
parent-child gender interaction when studying family structures’ impact on child
outcomes. In addition, few studies have paid attention to outcomes for children living in
no-parent families, in particular grandparent households.
Furthermore, earlier studies, with a few exceptions such as Brown (2004), usually
investigate one aspect of child outcomes. In many cases, these studies either investigate
educational achievement and/or labor force attachment, or outcomes such as early
childbearing and marriage for adolescents or adults (Manski et al. 1992, Ginther and

-
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Poliak 2000, Ginther and Poliak 2004, Biblarz and Gottainer 2000, Havemen and Wolfe,
1995). All these studies only provide one angle to assess how the well-being o f children
is affected, not a complete picture. However, educational achievements such as high
school grades and graduations, college attendance and graduation, although serving as a
good indicator o f a child’s chances of economic success in adulthood, do not cover all
aspects of well-being. First, economic independence and security are not the only
measures of success, as a person also needs to achieve high self-esteem or a sense of
control over his/her life (psychological success) and receive the respect o f his/her peers
(social success), which are other indicators o f success. Second, the vital importance o f
the early school years has been demonstrated by research in psychology and cognition
when human abilities and behaviors are mainly cultivated by families and noninstitutional environments (Chase-Lansdale 1998). Therefore, this essay will analyze the
relationship between household characteristics and children's well-being, with a focus on
three aspects o f child outcomes: children’s school engagement, behavior problems and
health status.
The majority o f studies investigate the issue by using the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) data or data from the National Education Longitudinal Study
(NELS) which are not up-to-date and are also not big enough to allow for stratifying the
sample or investigating less common family structures. By using data from the National
Survey of American Families, it is possible to explore the relationship between family
structure, or more broadly, family environment and the different aspects o f child
outcomes. This essay comprehensively investigates ten types of family structures:
grandparent family, other non-parental family, single-mother family, single-father family,

-7 -
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cohabiting stepfather family, cohabiting stepmother family,4 two biological/adoptive
parent cohabiting family, married stepfather family, married stepmother family, married
two biological/adoptive parents family. These detailed definitions facilitate our
exploration o f how the gender o f single parents and stepparents may interact with the
gender of their children and how race/ethnicity interplay with grandparent caregiving in
the case where neither parent o f the child is present.

4 The use o f the terms stepmother and stepfather in this essay does not necessarily imply marriage.
Cohabiting stepmother fam ilies are defined as those in which the focal child is living with his or her
biological/adoptive father and his unmarried female partner. Cohabiting stepfather fam ilies are defined as
those in which the focal child is living with his or her biological/adoptive mother and her unmarried male
partner.

-
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, we will first survey how past studies define family structure, then
we will discuss the major challenges encountered by researchers when investigating
family structure’s impact on child outcomes. Afterwards, we review why gender and
race/ethnicity may interplay with family structure to have different impacts on child
outcomes. Finally we discuss how this essay can contribute to the literature.

2.1 Family Structure Revisited

Non-marital fertility and single-parent families have been concerns for policy
makers since the 1960s. But economists often ignore the diversification o f family
structures by assuming intact families implicitly or explicitly. For example, the
theoretical and much of the empirical analysis in Becker (1981, 1991) are based on the
assumption that children are born to two parents who are married and remain married to
each other. Behrman, Poliak and Taubman (1995), and Mulligan (1997) also make the
same assumption. Not surprisingly, there are no consistent classification schemes
regarding family structure.
Despite the lack of theoretical models and consistent measures o f family structure
in economics, researchers from other disciplines have investigated correlations between

-9 -
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family structure and children’s outcomes empirically, especially between family structure
and children’s educational and behavioral outcomes. Much o f this research uses a
dichotomous variable to indicate simply whether or not a child lives with a single-parent
(usually the mother) or whether or not a child lives in an intact family, ignoring the
diversity o f living arrangements. For example, Manski et al. (1992) simply classify
family structures as intact vs. non intact families, with a non-intact family defined as a
family that does not have both biological/adoptive parents, such as a family with one
parent, with a parent and stepparent, or with no parents. Similarly, Lang and Zagorsky
(2001) roughly divide families into two groups for a simple comparison: two biological
parents vs. other parental structure.
2.1.1

Cohabitation. One complexity that is just beginning to be explored is

cohabitation. Cohabitation has expanded the definition o f family structure and family
process in recent decades. Although dramatic increases in unmarried cohabitation began
in the late 1970’s, it was still considered as a deviant form from the traditional family
process at that time (only about two percent o f all couples living together were
unmarried) (Glick and Spanierl980). Currently cohabitation among unmarried couples is
so prevalent that cohabitation is increasingly becoming an alternative to marriage
(Bumpass and Lu 2000, Manning and Bulanda 2003, Smock and Manning 2004).
Cohabitation has critical implications for child well-being. The birth o f a child
during cohabitation is much more common as cohabitation is more accepted. Children are
increasingly likely to begin life with cohabiting parents. A recent study reports that
approximately half o f nonmarital births are to mothers in cohabiting relationships
(Osborne 2005). Bumpass and Lu (2000) find that the dramatic increase in nonmarital

-
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childbearing between periods 1980-1984 and 1990-1994 was completely associated with
the increase o f births to cohabiting mothers since the births to single mothers remained
constant during those periods.
A child can also enter into a cohabiting family when the custodial parent
establishes a cohabiting relationship with her/his partner. This living arrangement is
similar to the traditional stepfamily but is formed out of cohabitation instead o f marriage.
As a matter o f fact, if cohabitation is taken into account, then in addition to marriage
approximately one-half o f all stepfamilies in the U.S. are now formed through
cohabitation rather than through marriage (Smock and Manning, 2004). Manning and
Lichter (1996) estimate that 3.5 percent o f children in the U.S. live with a parent and their
unmarried partner (approximately 2.2 million), with a significant proportion (roughly 13
percent o f 2.2 million) living with two cohabiting biological parents instead o f one.
Consequently living in a cohabiting family is a common experience for many
children. Based on data from the 1979-1992 National Longitudinal Survey o f Youth
mother-child files, Graefe and Lichter (1999) estimate that one in four children will live
in a cohabiting family sometime during childhood. Estimates from Bumpass and Lu
(2000) show the trend continues: 40 percent o f all children are likely to experience a
cohabiting household at some point.5 Acs and Nelson (2002) vividly reflect this fast
change regarding cohabiting households as “inferences drawn from data collected even
five years ago may present a dated picture o f the status and outcomes o f children in such
families.”

5 Their estimates are based on data from the 1987-1988 National Survey o f Families and Households and
from the 1995 National Survey o f Family Growth Cycle 5.

-
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Due to the ever rising prevalence o f cohabitation and its inextricable implication
for child well-being, research studying the impact o f cohabitation on child outcomes
burgeons (Raley, Frisco, Wildsmith 2005, Acs and Nelson 2002, Dunifon and
Kowaleski-Jones 2002, Manning and Lamb 2003, Nelson, Clark, and Acs 2001, Manning
and Bulanda 2003, Brown 2004). Studies examining how children fare in cohabiting
families usually make comparison to other living arrangements such as married and
single families. Though various studies use different methodologies and have different
focuses, one theme that does stand out is that parental cohabitation is associated with less
favorable outcomes for children living in such families compared to their counterparts
living with two married biological parent families, and children living in cohabiting
families fare no better than children living with single parents.
2.1.2

Sinele Fathers. A second trend has been the growing complexity of single

parent households. As one o f the most influential works on the correlation between
family structure and children’s outcomes, McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) examine and
compare outcomes o f children who grow up in single-parent or stepparent families to
those growing up with both biological parents. In particular, they find that high school
graduation rates, college enrollment, and college graduation rates for children in single
parent families are lower than those o f children in two-parent families. Many other
studies also either use “single-parent” without specifying whether it is single father or
single-mother, or include only single-mother families in their investigation (Ginther and
Pollark 2000, Corman and Kaestner 1992, McLanahan and Sandefur 1994, Painter and
Levine 2000).
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However, there is a large and increasing population of American men confronted
with single parenthood, and single fathers are one o f the fastest-growing demographic
groups in the U.S. The 2000 Census data shows that there were 2.2 million households
across the country in which single men were raising children, a 62 percent increase since
1990. Despite these statistics, research geared specifically to single fathers has been
limited, although a growing number o f studies are coming to recognize and incorporate
the fact that not all single-parent families are alike and there exist many other different
family structures as society becomes more diverse. For example, Biblarz and Raftery
(1999)’s family structure is relatively complete. It consists of: (1-) two-biological-parent
family; (2) alternative mother-headed families (composed almost fully o f single-mother
families); (3) alternative father-headed families (including both single-father and fatherstepmother families); (4) mother-stepfather families. They conduct a multivariate study
and find that children from single-father families and stepfamilies had lower educational
achievement than children from both two-biological parent and single-mother families.
Nevertheless, children living in no-parent families such as grandparent-maintained
families are considered irrelevant and therefore completely left out o f their study. Painter
and Levine (2000) focus on three family structures: 1) Intact family (with both biological
parents), 2) Mother and stepfather, 3) Single mother. They also look at several other nontraditional family structures such as father and stepmother, father alone, mother and livein companion, and no biological parents. But the sample sizes are either too small, or
because the authors focus on parent involvement, they find it difficult to characterize in
the case o f living without a biological parent. Therefore these family structures are
subsequently dropped from their main results. While focusing on parental cohabitation,
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Brown (2004) explores seven different family structures using NSAF data such as twobiological married family, two-biological cohabiting family, married step family,
cohabiting stepfamily, single-mother family, single-father family and no-parent family,
but her study does not use all measures to investigate various aspects o f child outcomes
as we proposed, nor does her study consider inputs. In addition, her study does not
separate and investigate grandparent-maintained families, or consider differences in
stepparent families.
2.1.3. Grandparent Households. Grandparent households are also too often
forgotten when it comes to defining or measuring family structure. Even fewer studies
focus their attention on child outcomes when investigating grandparent caregiving.
Dubowitz et al. (1994) is the first comprehensive assessment o f the physical and mental
health and educational status o f children in kinship care. It also compares children in
kinship with children in foster care, children in poverty and children from the general
population respectively. The study finds that children in kinship care have substantial
health care needs. Many o f those children’s health problems have not been identified, and
even when they have been, follow-up care was often lacking. In most age categories boys
were reported to have more health problems than girls. Many children also have
substantial school-related problems. However, their sample consists o f 524 children in
kinship care under the supervision o f the Baltimore City Department o f Social Services in
1989, where 47 percent o f caregivers are grandmothers, and therefore their results can not
be generalized to grandparent caregiving. In addition, this study is simply a descriptive
analysis and not a multivariate study.
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An important recent exception that investigates child outcomes in grandparent
households is a study by Casper and Bryson (1998) which focuses on grandparentmaintained families. Using 1997 CPS data, they find that children living with
grandparents do not fare as well economically as their counterparts living in their parents’
homes. In particular, they find that grandchildren in both grandparents, no parent present
families are much more likely to be uninsured. Grandchildren in grandmother-only, no
parent present families are more likely to be poor and get public receipts.
The NSAF data are ideal for investigating single-father families as well as
grandparent families because it is the largest and most recent nationally representative
survey of U.S. children and their families. For example, the 1999 wave alone reveals 771
grandparent families and 931 single-father families. It also has rich information
regarding child outcomes and household inputs. However, its cross-sectional nature does
greatly limit the extent to which we can address two issues that have plagued this
literature - the so-called ‘window problem’ and the endogeneity o f family structure.

2.2 The Window Problem

A challenge encountered by many studies investigating the relationship between
child outcomes and family structure, including the current study is the so-called
“window” problem. Although child outcomes are the “end product” o f many years o f a
cumulative household production process, many surveys, including NSAF, measure
living arrangements at a single point in time. These snapshot measures, i.e. ‘window’
variables, overlook the dynamic nature o f family structure and the many changes in living
situations that occur during a child’s life. For example, the snapshot will obscure the
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effect of divorce on child outcomes and attribute the impact to family structure. In order
to overcome the window problem, panel data have to be employed, or information such
as “how long the child has been living in the household” has to be available.
Wolfe et al. (1996) examine the reliability o f estimated results from studies using
such "window" variables. They first examine an omitted variables model to diagnose the
"window" problem technically. Then they study the potential problems associated with
the use o f window variables empirically. Their conclusion is that window variables
“serve as weak proxies for information describing the entire childhood experience, and
often lead to inferences o f effects that may be misleading....”
Among the studies on child outcome and development studies that follow parents
and their children over time, most focus on a narrow comparison o f different family
structures. Wojtkiewicz (1993) estimates the effect o f having a stepfather on children’s
schooling outcomes by using the National Longitudinal Survey o f Youth. The finding
indicates that duration o f exposure to stepfather families is negatively related to the
probability o f high school graduation. In more recent work, Wojtkiewicz (1998) uses data
from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey to examine the effect on college entry
o f family structure and changes in family structure. He defines stable family structures as
those that do not change between 1988 and 1992 and finds that children from stable
single-parent families are more likely to attend college than those from unstable single
parent families or stepchildren from blended families. Controlling for duration in a
single-parent family and economic resources and using the Panel Study o f Income
Dynamics, Boggess (1998) finds that stepchildren from stepfather families have lower
rates of high school graduation than children growing up in biological-parents families.
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In particular, he finds a negative and significant effect o f living with a stepfather on high
school graduation rates for white males and females, and black females. Painter and
Levine (2000) use the National Educational Longitudinal Survey o f 1988 (NELS) with a
focus on the effect o f divorce on teenager behaviors. But due to the small sample size,
other non-traditional family structures such as single-father families have to be left out of
their analysis.
As discussed earlier, one o f our primary interests is to investigate the less typical
family structures such as single-father families and grandparent families. However, as far
as we know, there are no data available that would allow us to include such households in
our study and at the same time to tackle the window problem. Therefore our study is
subject to the same limitation as many other studies are. Nevertheless using NASF allows
us to present a fuller picture of family structure and its association with a wide array of
child outcomes instead. Given the large sample size of NSAF data and its rich
information on child outcomes and household inputs, we are able to investigate a
complete list of family structures (refer to Figure 1 for family structures investigated by
the current study), a wide array of child outcomes and inputs and the direct impact of
household inputs on child outcomes. NSAF data also allow us to stratify the sample to
investigate whether racial and gender differences are related to the observed differentials
in child outcomes associated with different family structures. Therefore we are able to
investigate several pathways that may contribute to the disparity in child outcomes linked
with different family structures.
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2.3 The Endogeneity of Family Structure

Despite the prevalence of these family structures and the increasing recognition of
the dynamic nature of family structure, practically no consensus exists about how and
why they might be associated with child development outcomes, especially within nontraditional families. Previous research examining why children from single-parent
families fare less well, in general, than children from two-parent families have been
guided by five theoretical explanations: economic theory, evolutionary psychology,
socialization, stress and selection bias (Biblarz and Raftery 1999, McLanahan and
Sandefur 1994). First, the economic perspective proposes that socioeconomic success is
partly a function o f human capital. A household acts as a unit to maximize collective
utility. The substantial economic difference between single-parent and two-parent
families produces differences in child outcomes.
Second, the evolutionary perspective on the family gives more weight to the role
of the mother than that o f the father in determining children’s outcomes, and it
particularly emphasizes biological relationships. The evolutionary view assumes that
mothers invest more o f their resources in children than fathers do and the well-being of a
given child is of greater interest to the mother than to the father. This theory predicts that
children from two-biological-parent families will have an advantage over those from
other kinds o f families. In contrast to the economic model, the evolutionary view would
predict that children from alternative families will fare better raised by a single mother
than by a single father. Children from single-mother families will also have better
outcomes over those from biological mother/stepfather families since the stepfather will
compete with the stepchildren for the mother’s resources. Case, Lin, and McLanahan
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(1999) provide some strong evidence for this argument. They find that the number of
children in a household with a non-biological parent significantly reduces expenditure on
food consumed at home. In general, the effects are stronger when the non-biological
parent is the mother rather than the father. In particular, they find that the presence of
stepchildren is associated with lower food expenditure for home consumption when those
children are stepchildren of the mother. In contrast, spending on home food consumption
does not change depending on the father’s relationship to children (i.e. biological vs.
step- or adoptive children.) However, food expenditure is lower when a man reports he is
not married to the child's mother but raises the child.
Third, the socialization perspective argues that two parents are crucial for
providing important parenting behavior such as monitoring and supervision; it also
argues that children simply benefit from the presence o f a male role model in two parent
families. In contrast with the evolutionary view, the socialization view predicts that the
two-adult structure of a coresidential or cohabiting arrangement might benefit children
given more adults to supervise and monitor. The fourth explanation for observed
differences among children from different family structures is selection bias. For
example, people who divorce are less stable or less competent at family life; parents who
choose different living arrangements might have different characteristics that affect child
outcomes. To put it another way, there are unobservable processes that jointly determined
family structure and children’s outcomes, which is known as the endogeneity o f family
structure.
Finally, stress is another variant of the selection hypothesis which argues that the
main detrimental effect on children is not divorce but family conflict. Divorce is often
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preceded by and sometimes followed by high levels o f domestic conflict. Both parental
death and divorce created sorrow and distress for children in the short run. Changes in
family structure are hypothesized to increase disequilibrium in family relations and
disrupt changes in relationships outside the family as well. The accumulation o f these
changes produces poor developmental outcomes among children.
The selection perspective and stress view both suggest that family structure is
endogenous in the sense it is determined by various factors such as parents’
characteristics and family conflicts, which in turn influence child outcomes. Therefore,
family structure per se might not be the source of differences in child outcomes but a
consequence of the influences o f the underlying determining factors. There have been
several strategies for dealing with this endogeneity problem in the economics literature.
One frequently adopted strategy is to use fixed effects estimates (e.g., Case et al. 1999,
Painter and Levine 2000, Ginther and Poliak 2002, Ermisch and Francesconi 2001). By
utilizing longitudinal data one can include child-level or family-level ‘fixed effects’ in the
regression to capture any unobservable characteristics. Therefore, the endogeneity o f v
family structure is controlled for if the unobservable characteristics are stable over time.
Lang and Zagorsky (2001) choose a different strategy to deal with the
endogeneity o f family structure by using the impact o f parental death as a natural
experiment. After controlling for a variety of background variables their results show
little evidence that a parent's presence during childhood affects economic well-being in
adulthood; using parental death as an exogenous cause o f absence provides similar
results. The two exceptions are that living without a mother adversely affects girls'
cognitive performance while having a father die decreases sons' chances of marriage.
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Similarly, Biblarz and Gottainer (2000) compare the attainments o f children from
widowed single-mother families to those from two-biological-parent families. Their
results show that the children are roughly the same, and the attainments o f children from
widowed single-mother families are substantially higher than those o f children from
divorced single-mother families. The family structure model—that the same structure
should lead to the same outcome regardless o f cause-is rejected by the evidence
presented by Biblarz and Gottainer.
Also adopting the natural experiment approach to deal with endogeneity of family
structures, Ginther and Poliak (2000) examine the effect o f family structure on children’s
educational outcomes by exploiting the sibling structure in the NLSY and NLSY-Child to
control for unobserved heterogeneity across families and individuals. They compare
outcomes for children within the same family— stepchildren with their half-siblings in the
same blended family who are the biological children o f both parents. Controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity across families by using panel data, they find that family
structure effects are statistically insignificant. Finally, comparing half-siblings in the data,
they find no difference in educational outcomes as a function o f family structure. Ginther
and Poliak (2004) adopt a similar approach and find stepchildren and their half-siblings,
who are the biological children o f both parents, have similar educational outcomes to
each other, but are considerably worse off then their counterparts from traditional two
parent families.
Some research involves using instrumental variables to control for the
endogeneity o f family structure. For example, Gruber (2000) uses changes in divorce law
as an exogenous source o f variation in family structure. He finds that family structure has
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a negative and significant effect on socio-economic outcomes. However, the validity and
reliability o f such instrumental variables are questioned by others.
Manski et al. (1992) use a trivariate probit model with structural shift assuming
that family structure and children’s outcomes may be jointly determined by unobservable
processes. They also employ a nonparametric model estimating bounds on the high
school graduation probabilities. They find no evidence to reject that family structure is
exogenous, and they find that living with intact families increases the probability of
graduating from high school.
2.4 How Gender Matters

Gender pervades all levels of society, and it plays a key role in many dimensions
o f family life such as marital relationships, child development, parenting and
intergenerational relationships (Warner and Steel 1999). Economic models, however, are
typically used to analyze the household as one unit, rather than treating the individuals
within a household separately. However, new theoretical work is currently underway.
Willis (2000) outlines some ways in which individuals within a household are treated as
separate economic actors, each with their own interests and resources, particularly in the
context o f fathers' involvement in their children's lives. Research on gender effects within
family life is relatively replete in the sociological and psychological literatures.
Much research focuses on how the effects o f having children on parents vary for
mothers and fathers. For example, there is some evidence that marital satisfaction is more
strongly related to fathers’ reports of parental satisfaction than to mothers’ (Rogers and
White 1998). Fine et al. (1992) detect a gender difference in depression: women report
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higher levels o f depression than men. (But this effect is no longer present when
demographic controls are included, suggesting that the depression in gender difference is
partly accounted for by demographic factors such as women's younger age.) As a
commonsense understanding, having children is more demanding for women’s lives—
what is referred to as “asymmetrically permeable boundaries” (Bielby and Bielby 1989).
On the other hand, in the child development literature much research emphasizes
that parent gender has a great influence on child outcomes, which, more often than not, is
also contingent upon the sex of children. Much o f this research has focused on how
fathers affect child outcomes in the context o f diversified family structures due to ever
increasing divorce rates and childbirth out o f marriage. One branch investigates the
influence of fathers’ involvement on child outcomes (Salem, Zimmerman and
Notaro 1998, Blair, Wenk and Hardesty 1994, Nord, Brimhall and West 1997, King 1994,
Cooksey and Fondell 1996); the other explores the effect o f father absence on child
outcomes (Mott 1990, Mott 1993, Mott, Kowaleski-Jonesand Menaghanl997).

The importance of fathers’ involvement is expressed in a 1997 Current Population
Report:

It is undisputed among researchers and policy pundits alike that fathers’
involvement is extremely important for children’s proper social and emotional
development. Furthermore, fathers interact differently with their children than do
mothers, and it is fathers’ unique interaction that is said to help promote
specifically children’s emotional development. (Casper, 1997, p.l)

In line with this claim, a study by Cooksey et al. (1996) concludes that fathers in
different family settings spend differing amounts o f time with their children: single
fathers are very involved in their children's lives and are more likely to engage in a
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variety of activities (not related to sharing meals) than fathers in more traditional family
settings; their results also show that stepfathers are significantly less likely to participate
in activities with their stepchildren than biological fathers do with theirs, while
stepfathers with both biological children and stepchildren are more likely than stepfathers
with just stepchildren to behave as other biological fathers.
Also studying paternal involvement, Salem et al. (1998) find that fathers appear to
have distinct influences on the development of their sons and daughters. In particular,
they conclude that father involvement may be most relevant for helping sons avoid
problem behaviors, whereas for daughters it may be more influential in preventing
psychological distress.
Within the context o f studying the effect o f paternal absence, Mott et al. (1997)’s
study discovers that the effects of a father's absence are generally found to be more
modest for girls than for boys. In particular, for boys, they have found “clear, systematic
evidence of associations between a father's absence from the home and less satisfactory
behavior paths; for girls, the effects o f a father's absence appear to be far less pronounced
and less robust.” However, they further suggest that the notion that boys are at greater
risk when a father leaves the home than girls are is modest and not always systematic.
Also, they find modest support for the view that short-term behavioral consequences for
boys exceed those evidenced by girls.
Distinct from studies mentioned above, Downey et al. (1998) argue against the
claim that women and men promote different components o f children's well-being and
suggests that “theorists have overemphasized the role o f parent's sex in youths'
development at the expense o f understanding more structural explanations for the
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association between family structure and well-being”. Their investigation yields little
evidence that offspring are better off or develop particular characteristics in one
household versus the other. According to Downey et al. (1998) and Risman and Park
(1988), there are two perspectives on gender-typed parental behaviors: one is
individualist, the other is structuralist. The individualist perspective o f gender views
preference for gendered parental roles as internalized as personality traits or personalities.
That is, due to cultural influence on family patterns, parents develop gendered
personalities for performing gendered roles. Alternatively, the structuralist theory
suggests that the sources o f many sex differences are contextual factors in the everyday
environment, and sex roles are not internalized as personal traits. Men and women
behave differently because they encounter different social conditions. To put it another
way, the structuralist view argues that when necessary men can perform responsibilities
that are usually conducted by women. Risman and Park (1988) compare the relative
strength of two different theoretical explanations by comparing children from single
father families to children from single-mother families. Their findings also support the
structuralist theory: “sex o f the custodial parent per se is not significant in explaining
parental attachment, household organization, or child's development”. Instead, socially
structured role demands of single parenthood, the change in family structure following
divorce, and the socioeconomic status o f parents are better explanations for male or
female parenting behavior.
In addition to the group o f studies investigating the effect of parents’ gender on
child outcomes, there is another body o f research exploring how child gender in turn
could influence their own outcomes, parenting, family life, marital status and parental
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attitudes about policy regarding gender equity. There are strong gender differences in
child outcomes, suggesting that the effects o f living in a non-traditional household may
be very different for preadolescent girls and boys (Bronstein, Clauson, Stoll and Abrams
1993). Girls in single-mother households showed poorer social, psychological and
academic adjustment in comparison with girls in both traditional and father-surrogate
households. In contrast, boys in father-surrogate households demonstrate significantly
poor social, psychological and academic adjustment, and ineffective parenting is
significantly higher than with boys from traditional households. However, boys in single
mother households are essentially not different from boys from either father-surrogate
households or traditional households.6
Elder and Bowerman (1963) find that paternal involvement is most frequent when
all children are boys, and that family size affects paternal involvement most strongly
among middle-class boys and lower-class girls. In particular, sex composition effects are
greatest in the rearing o f girls in large lower-class families. For example, girls in large
families are more likely to perceive their fathers as the prominent figure in making childrearing decisions, less communicative and more controlling, and more likely to report
that parents use physical punishment occasionally and praise infrequently. Looking
through the lens o f economists, although the study does not address family structure
specifically, Conway and Houtenville (2002) provide a household production framework
that clarifies several avenues by which girls may be treated differently and achieve
different outcomes from boys. For example, parents may input more efforts in their

6 Their study is based on data with a small sample size o f 136 observations which are almost entirely
Caucasian children aged 9-12 years old. Among these children 79 are from traditional families and only 57
com e from non-traditional families. In addition, their study does not control basic demographic
characteristics and most o f the results are based on t-tests o f means o f boys and girls across different family
structures, and som e are based on multivariate analysis o f variance.
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daughters’ schooling because (1) the marginal productivity for girls may be higher; (2)
parents want to compensate for the lower inputs their daughters received from school, or
(3) parents derive higher utility from their daughters’ achievements.
There is also evidence about the effects o f child gender on marital dissolution
coming from couples who have experienced divorce. A greater proportion of couples
with only daughters are found among those who had already divorced (Morgan, Lye and
Condra 1988). Katzev, Warner and Acock (1994) attempt to isolate its influences before
divorce occurs. They focus on the pre-divorce process and evaluate the effects of the
child gender on maternal perceptions of the likelihood that the marriage will end in
divorce. Their finding is that mothers with at least one boy reported a significantly lower
propensity to divorce compared to mothers with only girls. They suggest that the
mechanism may lie in the fact that fathers in families with boys were more involved with
their children, which was associated with mothers perceiving less disadvantage in the
marital relationship and a lower likelihood o f separation. In economic terms, this may
suggest fathers may derive higher utility from the well-being o f their sons than from their
daughters, therefore they are more devoted to the involvement with their children when
they have sons vs. daughters. In addition, as Conway and Houtenville (2002) suggest,
fathers could view their involvements as more productive inputs for their sons vs. their
daughters.
Evidence is also found regarding the effect o f child gender on parents’ gender
attitudes. Warner and Steel (1999) discover that both fathers’ and mothers’ support for
public policies designed to address gender equity increases when parents have daughters
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only. The findings are even stronger for men. When men have sons only, they show the
least support for public policies promoting gender equity.
Another group of research explores how parent and child gender interact. Some
child developmental research suggests that fathers are more important in the development
o f sons than daughters (Lamb 1987). However, Amato (1994) finds no evidence to
support this notion among young adult offspring when comparing children from divorced
families to those from intact ones. On the contrary, he finds some evidence that closeness
to mothers was more strongly related to psychological well-being among sons than
daughters, and that father-child relationships appear to be as closely bound up with the
well-being of daughters as that of sons. Downey and Powell (1993) and Powell and
Downey (1997) also do not find evidence o f a benefit from living with a same-sex parent.
Studying children in step-households, Downey (1995) finds that although both boys and
girls appear to fare better in mother/stepfather families than in father/stepmother
households, children do not seem to be more disturbed by the entrance o f an opposite-sex
than of a same-sex stepparent.
To sum up, given the extensive literature that studies how both parental and child
gender may influence the parental styles, practice and child outcomes, and how parental
gender and child gender may interact, it is imperative for economists to take into account
the mechanism underpinning the household production function from the gender angle.
Studies ignoring gender difference may eliminate one possible avenue that could explain
how dissimilar family structures are associated with different child outcomes. As the
majority of the reviewed studies are by and large descriptive analysis, we will apply
econometric analysis to get crisper gender comparisons. Specifically, non-traditional
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families may have different demographic characteristics, fewer economic resources and
lower levels o f inputs. We will first control the basic child, Most Knowledgeable Adult
(MKA) and family characteristics including family structure, then add economic
resources and finally further add inputs to see how much the observed difference in child
outcomes across gender can be explained away by each tier of independent variables. In
doing so we can differentiate the gender disparities in child outcomes caused by other
factors from those purely associated with family structure.
2.5 The Importance of Race/Ethnicity in the Context of Grandparent Caregiving

Grandparent caregivers have increased rapidly since 1990. Census 2000 estimated
that 2.4 million people (or 1.5 percent) aged 30 and over are grandparent caregivers,
defined in Simmons and Dye (2003) as “people who have primary responsibility for their
co-resident grandchildren younger than 18.” The percentage o f grandparents caregivers
considerably varies by race and ethnicity: grandparent caregivers account for
approximately one percent o f non-Hispanic whites, 4.3 percent of people who are African
American, 4.5 percent of people who are American Indian and Alaska Native, 3 percent
o f people who are Hispanic and 1.3 percent o f people who are Asian (U.S. Census
Bureau, Census 2000).
These numbers reveal that while the majority of grandparent caregivers are white,
proportionately, however, African American grandchildren are more likely to live with
their grandparents without either parent present than children o f any other ethnic group in
the United States (Fields 2003, Fuller-Thomson et al. 1997, Pebley and Rudkin 1999,
Chalfie 1994, Joslin and Brouard 1995). For instance, Fuller-Thomson, Minkler, and
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Driver (1997) show that blacks are three times and Latinos almost twice as likely as their
non-Latino white counterparts to be a primary grandparent caregiver.
Not only does the prevalence o f performing the role of grandparent caregiver
differ considerably across race and ethnicity, prior research in sociology, psychology,
social work and education also found that parenting praxis and cultural norms of
parenting behaviors vary notably across race and ethnic groups. Studies have determined
that a person’s ethnicity has implications for their parenting styles (MacPhee et al. 1996,
Tucker et al. 1996, Fagan 2000, Osborne et al.2003, Osborne et al.2004, Hofferth 2003).
Fagan (2000) predicts how parenting actions affect children’s behavioral outcomes.
Osborne et al. (2003) find great differences in mothering behaviors across race and ethnic
groups. Osborne et al. (2004) find mothering behaviors are linked to family structure for
white mothers but not for black and Hispanic mothers. Hofferth (2003) examines how
cultural factors can contribute to explaining racial/ethnic differences in fathering in twoparent families. It reports that black children's fathers show less warmth but supervise
their children more, Hispanic fathers monitor their children less, and both minority
groups take more responsibility for child rearing than white fathers.
Differences in parenting styles suggest that there may also be variance in
grandparenting behaviors. Considerable research has reported that African-Americans
have a long history of caregiving across the generations, and cultural context has
historically caused the frequent assumption of parenting responsibilities by AfricanAmerican grandparents (Scott 1991, Stack and Burton 1993, Burton and DilworthAndersonl991, Burton, Dilworth-Anderson and Merriwether-deVries 1995, Thomas,
Sperry and Yarbrough 2000). As a result, it is not surprising that African-American
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grandparents have been the focus of research studying grandparents raising grandchildren
(Strom et al. 1996, Minkler and Fuller-Thomson 2005, Whitley et al. 2001, Brown et al.
2000, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler 2000, Dilworth-Anderson 1994, Caliandro and
Hughes 1998, Burton 1992).
Although surrogate parenting by African-American grandparents has received the
most attention from researchers, it should not be viewed as the normative grandparental
role only among African-Americans. In the existing ethnographic literature the issue of
grandparents acting as surrogate parents is discussed in the context o f cultural family
norms. For example, among the Navajo and Apache (tribes), the grandmother is the
central figure o f the family and performs the tasks that modern Americans associate with
the mother. In such a society the performance o f parenting and child care are respected.
This pattern has been observed for several decades o f reservation resident NativeAmericans (Burton, Dilworth-Anderson and Merriwether-deVries 1995). While little
research has been done to explore urban resident Native-American family patterns,
Fuller-Thomson and Minkler (2005) document the prevalence and national profile of
American Indian/Alaskan Native grandparents who are raising their grandchildren, based
on data from the American Community Survey/Census 2000 Supplementary Survey,
which may suggest that these patterns are still valued and practiced to a certain extent.
Like African-American grandmothers, Hispanic grandparents also play important
roles in rearing their grandchildren by passing along family history and ethnic heritage
and by providing support of various kinds in times o f crisis. In other research,
acculturation has been identified as an important factor that impacts Hispanic
grandparents’ relationships with younger family members. Within Hispanic groups,
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Mexican-American grandparents are most likely to be involved with grandchildren in
their daily life; Cuban-American grandparents are least likely to have such involvement
(Bengtson 1985). Surrogate parenting by grandparents is also culturally prescribed for
Puerto Rican-American families. Family interdependence and reciprocity are aspects of
the Puerto Rican-American communities, and strong kinship bonds are clearly articulated
as normative values and practices (Burton, Dilworth-Anderson and Merriwether-deVries
1995). Others have identified similar impacts o f acculturation among Asian-American
samples (Kamo 1998, Tam and Detznerl998). Study by Merle et al. (2004) explores
grandparent caregiving role in Filipino-American families. They suggest that FilipinoAmerican grandparents view the grandparent caregiving role as a normative process
rather than a burden in which families take on responsibilities as part of cultural beliefs
and norms such as family unity and closeness, authoritarianism, and mutual reciprocity
and obligation in relationships.
Within studies o f Americans, although there is some work on Native Americans,
Hispanics and Asians, the strand that links much o f the literature is that race and ethnicity
shape the individual and family lives of African-Americans disproportionately. Besides
studies that solely focus on African-Americans, most analyses employ a comparative
framework in which whites are the norm against which blacks and other minorities are
measured (Goodman and Silverstein 2002, Watson and Koblinsky 1997, Pruchno 1999,
Pruchno and McKenney 2002, Strom et al. 1996). Thomas et al. (2000) note that AfricanAmerican grandmothers more often act as surrogating parents for grandchildren than do
non-Hispanic Caucasian grandmothers. As a result, African-American grandparents in
some research report higher levels o f both satisfaction and frustration in relationships
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with grandchildren than do their Caucasian counterparts. Watson and Koblinsky (1997)
find African-American grandparents perceived themselves to be significantly more
involved in teaching their grandchildren than Anglo-American grandparents, but were
also significantly more likely than their Anglo-American counterparts to express
frustration and need for information about the grandparenting role. Other researchers
report that African-American grandmothers raising their grandchildren report more peer
support, and less burden, than do Caucasian grandmothers (Pruchno 1999, Pruchno and
McKenney 2002). For example, Pruchno’s study (1999) contrasts the experiences of 398
white and 319 black grandmothers raising their grandchildren without either parent
present. They found that the two groups shared many similarities such as age, education,
familial relationship to the grandchild, age o f the grandchild being raised, reasons that
grandmothers are raising their grandchildren, behaviors characteristic o f the
grandchildren, and impacts on the grandmother's work life. Black grandmothers are more
likely to have peers who also live with their grandchildren, more likely to come from
families in which multiple generations lived in a household and are more likely to be
receiving support from formal sources than white grandmothers. White grandmothers
experienced more burden from their caregiving role than their black counterparts. Strom
et al. (1997) identify specific issues for consideration in building differentiated education
programs to support the learning needs of African-American, Caucasian and Hispanic
grandparents. Comparison o f grandparents, parents and grandchildren for the different
cultures regarding behaviors o f grandparents shows that Caucasians spent the least time
with grandchildren. African-American grandparents who lived with grandchildren were
viewed as more successful teachers of grandchildren than their counterparts living apart
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from their grandchildren.7 Hispanic grandparents whose grandchildren lived with them
received lower scores for managing difficulties, coping with frustration, and meeting
information needs. Caucasians who lived with their grandchildren were observed as
having greater frustration than grandparents who lived apart (Strom et al. 1997).
Most o f the studies described in this review share some common features: First, of
all the ethnic groups studied, surrogate parenting among non-Hispanic whites has been
the least discussed and studied. Many studies implement a comparative model in which
the white group is used as the norm against which the minority is compared. Second,
there is a theme running through the existing literature that grandparents often step in to
help in crisis times. Third, grandparents contribute in meaningful ways to their
grandchildren's upbringing that are affected by differences in cultural norms. The cultural
lens through which grandparenthood is viewed has a marked effect on grandparents’
congenital impact o f its contributions. Fourth, the grandparents have been the focus so
the outcomes o f grandchildren raised by grandparents have received little attention. This
paper seeks to identify whether the consequences and costs of living in a grandparent
family differ by race and ethnicity. We examine grandparenthood not only in highly
dependent, at risk households, but also in families whose conditions offer alternative
options for grandparental behaviors. In doing so, we try to uncover some pathways to the
disparities in child outcomes associated with family structure, especially between
grandparent and other non-parental families.

7 Their study is based on a sample o f 626 non-consanguineous subjects including 204 grandparents, 128
parents, and 294 grandchildren. Each generation group completed a separate version o f the Grandparent
Strengths and N eeds Inventory survey to identify the favorable qualities o f grandparents and aspects o f
their relationships in which further improvement was necessary. Each group reports aspects o f
grandparents’ success and identifies specific aspects o f learning that grandparents should acquire in order
to become more effective.
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2.6 Contributions of This Essay

The review presented above helps clarify a number o f research gaps and issues
existing in the literature. This essay attempts to fill in such gaps and address those issues
identified as much as possible. First, the number o f single-father households and
households headed by grandparents have both grown enormously, especially since 1990.
The Census 2000 data shows that more than 2.4 million grandparents are primary
caregivers to a grandchild; there are 2.2 million households across the country in which
single men are raising children. While there is extensive research on the effects of family
structure on child outcomes, relatively little attention has been paid to these relatively
uncommon households. In many cases the paucity o f research is due to the limitations of
data available to investigate such households. This essay investigates ten different family
structures, as aforementioned, and tries to answer the question: how do children in these
types o f households fare in comparison to children in other ‘nontraditional’ but
extensively investigated households, e.g., single-mother households, as well as to
‘traditional’ households? This essay contributes to the economic literature theoretically
by extending the current theoretical framework on households to encompass single-father
households and also by dealing with gender differences and gender interactions in single
parent and stepparent households.
Second, even less investigated by economists is how the effects o f these family
structures differ by gender. Research by sociologists and psychologists undoubtedly
expands our knowledge about the role of gender and gender interaction within
households, but most o f the research is limited to simple categorical analysis or bivariate
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analysis, or using data sets that are not up to date or data with very small sample sizes.
For example, Downey et al. (1998) compare outcomes o f 15-16-year-old children (such
as deviance and behavior in school, self-concept and relationships with others) in single
mother households vs. single-father households using data from the 1990 National
Education Longitudinal Study. Unlike many other sociological studies, it controls for a
variety of variables such as family incomes, parents’ education, etc. Their final sample
consists of 3039 15-16-year-old children, including 456 who lived in single-father
households and 2583 who lived in single-mother households. But the data set is relatively
outdated given the surge of single-father households since 1990, and the outcomes
considered are only behavioral. In addition, stratifying the analyses by gender, this essay
addresses such questions as: does living with a single father differentially affect sons as
opposed to daughters regarding their behavioral, developmental and health outcomes?
Moreover, stratifying the sample by race, we investigate how parenting may differ across
race/ethnicity paying particular attention to grandparent-caregiver households.
Third, as mentioned above, this essay analyzes the relationship between family
structure and children's well-being by considering a wide array o f child outcomes. In
particular, it focuses on three aspects o f child outcomes by including health-related
outcomes as well as the typical behavioral and school outcomes with a view to depict a
more complete picture o f children’s well-being. The closest research to ours is Brown
(2004) which also uses NSAF data. Two child outcome measures employed by Brown
(2004) are the same as ours, and as discussed earlier, single-father parent households are
also examined in her study. However, it does not include health outcomes nor does it
include grandparent caregiving, and its focus is on parental cohabitation.
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Last but not least, past research tells us little about why living in non-traditional
families affects children negatively, or what might be done to reverse these patterns. This
essay investigates the association between family structure and several ‘inputs’ which
help ‘produce’ child outcomes, such as well-child care visits or parental mental health. In
so doing, it attempts to answer the question: is the observed lesser well-being o f children
in ‘nontraditional’ families at least in part due to fewer ‘inputs’? This is a critical
question as many public programs designed to improve child outcomes such as food
stamps, SCHIP and TANF, are, in practice, designed to improve access to critical inputs.
Clarifying the differences between ‘inputs’ and ‘outcomes’ in the production o f child
well-being helps investigate how much the difference in child outcomes is due to
differences in inputs, and how much is due to the underlying production process.
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CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section we first review the general theoretical framework employed in
family economics and health economics. Then within that general framework a
theoretical model that represents a single-parent household is set up to help understand
and tackle the issues the essay attempts to address. It is the simplest case, but it eases the
investigation of parental and child gender interaction. Then we talk about the
complications pertaining to other family structures such as two-parent families.
3.1 A Review of the Household Production Function Model (Becker-GrossmanRosenzweig and Schultz)

The household production function model pioneered by Gary Becker (1965,
1981), treats a family as a quasi-firm engaging in the production o f household
commodities. The household combines its time and market purchased commodities to
produce household commodities that ultimately enter its utility function. In Becker’s
model, consumers often gain utility not only directly from the goods that they purchase,
but also they transform the market purchased into commodities goods via a household
production function that cannot be directly purchased from the market. Such commodities
include “children, prestige and esteem, health, altruism, envy and pleasure of the
sense.”(p24, Becker 1981).
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The household production model has been used to analyze a variety o f household
issues, and it lends itself well to the field o f health economics. Grossman (1972) first
developes a health production model investigating how individuals allocate their
resources to produce health. According to Grossman, demand for health care is derived
from a demand for health, and demand for health is also a derived demand from the
demand for utility. Individuals are not passive consumers of health but active producers
who combine time and money to produce health. Health demand consists of two
elements: consumption effects (health yields direct utility, i.e. you are more energetic
when you are healthier) and investment effects (health increases the number o f days
available to participate in market and non-market activities - the novel part o f the model).
Therefore, in Grossman’s model health is also a capital good. A person is bom with an
initial endowment o f H, which they add to by investment. The rate o f H production will
depend on the efficiency of investment in H. There will be depreciation in the value of
the stock o f H through age, accident, carelessness, sudden disease, etc.
The health production function in Grossman’s original notation is written as
I , = I i{Mi, T H - E i)
The consumption good is produced according to
Z ,= Z ,.(X „ ^ ;£ ,.)
where /, = investment in health
A/, = market health care inputs
THi = time spent on improving health
Z( = composite consumption goods
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X , = market produced goods
Tt = time spent on composite consumption good
Et = stock of human capital
Just like a firm using inputs to produce goods, the individual makes decisions
according to production functions. He allocates time subject to total time available among
labor time, leisure time and ill time. Within leisure time, he allocates health producing
time vs. non-health producing time. He also allocates resources between health care
inputs and other consumption, subject to a budget constraint.
The model goes beyond traditional demand analysis and has been extremely
influential in health economics. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) can be viewed as an
application and extension of Grossman’s model. In their model the household has the
following utility function:
U = U ( X , , 7 . , H ) , i= l,...n ; j= n+ l, . . . , m
where H = child health;
X t = market-purchased goods (not health related);
Y = market-purchased goods that affect child health.
Child health can not be purchased directly from the market but is produced by the
household by the production function:
H = f ( 7 . , / i ,p);
where I k = health inputs that do not affect utility other than indirectly through
their effects on H, such as medical care, k = m + l,.. ..r;
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|i = family specific health endowments such as genetic traits or
environmental factors.
The household’s reduced-form demand function for the market-purchased goods
is derived from maximizing its utility function subject to the child health production
function and budget constraint. Rosenzweig and Schultz’s household model is
characterized by joint production since a subset o f goods Y both influences child health
and affects utility directly. In their model child health is produced and valued by the
household in a process in which the household as one identity makes the choice. The
household only faces resource allocation. Time allocation is not considered explicitly.
The household production function models reviewed above especially the model
provided by Rosenzweig and Schultz, furnish the cornerstone for the theoretical
framework developed in this analysis, because one measure adopted by this study for
child quality is child health status, and also because time is not available in the data set
used. I set up the next theoretical model to facilitate investigating the issues o f interest
described earlier and will discuss other complications afterwards.
3.2 Single-parent Households Model

Since a single-parent household consists o f one parent and one child, it represents
the simplest scenario among all parent-child families. This framework is particularly
appropriate for better understanding the possible role that gender plays in a family, and,
as discussed later, this setup is also consistent with information available from the data
for empirical investigation because the NSAF only has information on the MKAs (Most
Knowledgeable Adult). However, in most cases the MKAs are the focal children’s
parents.
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In this economic model of the household, the objective o f the household is
assumed to be maximizing the utility that it derives from consuming the various
commodities that it produces using inputs of market-purchased goods. Child Quality is
one particular good from which the parent derives utility. Greater investment in children
is expected to be associated with higher achievement, which is represented by the child
quality. Our interest, therefore, is on understanding the factors that affect the family’s
production of child quality, denoted as CQ, and why CQ may differ by gender.
Therefore, the family’s utility function is defined as
U(C,CQy)

(1)

where CQy is child quality and C is composite market-purchased goods.
Households derive utility directly from Child Quality, which cannot be purchased
in the marketplace but is produced using market purchased commodities and various
environmental inputs.
Child Quality is produced according to the production function
CQ, = f 0 (x, G, E, N F )

/= b, g; j =m, f

(2)

where x = market purchased inputs;
G= child’s genetic endowment;
E h o u se h o ld ’s efficiency o f combining x, other family environmental
variables, proxied by parental education, etc;
NF= nonfamilial influences such as social climate on CQ.
The subindex m stands for the mother and / stands for the father, subindex b
stands for boy (son), g stands for girl (daughter).
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Self-produced commodities like Child Quality do not have market prices, but each
does have a shadow price equal to the cost o f production:
PCQ= P xx /C Q

(3)

Given market prices for x and C, parent utility is maximized subject to the income
constraint:
Pxx+Pc C = I

(4)

where Px is the price for good x, Pc is the market price for consumption
good C, I is the household income. Normalizing the price o f the market purchased
consumption goods C to 1, the budget constraint can be expressed as
Pxx + C=l

(5)

The parent’s problem becomes
max U (ftj (x; G, E, NF), C)
subject to the income constraint (Eq. (5)).

The parent chooses the level of consumption C for herselfThimself, and the level
of consumption x to produce the desired level of child quality subject to the income
budget.
L = U ( f0 (x; G, E, NF), C) - A(Pxx + C - 1)

FOCs:
dx

d f y dx
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The equilibrium condition from maximizing the utility function therefore yields
the following equation (suppressing the subscripts for simplicity)

MUC

(6)

In equilibrium, the marginal rate o f substitution between x and C equals Px. The
first order condition reveals that C affects the parental utility directly, while x only
contributes to utility indirectly through Child Quality.
The parent optimal demand for his/her own consumption is
C* = C (P ,,I ,G ,E ,N F )

(7)

And the optimal level of x to produce the optimal level o f Child Quality is
x*

= x (Pi , I , G ! E ,N F )

(8)

A parental demand function for Child Quality, the optimal level of Child
Quality, denoted as CQ*, can be written analogously as:
CQ* = f v {x* (Px ,l , G, E, NF), G, E, NF}

(9)

What factors contribute to the observed difference in Child Quality in single
parent household, such as boys in single-father households vs. boys in single-mother
households? A general analysis o f Child Quality demand equation (9) offers a few
possible explanations. First, input x may be different due to different budget constraints,
which can produce different child outcomes. For example, single-father households may
have more income than single-mother households. This possibility can be easily checked
by comparing resources o f these two households and by controlling for family incomes
when regressions are estimated. Moreover, inputs (x) are not exogenous to the model,
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but are an ensuing result o f parental choices of their own consumption and child quality
subject to the family budget constraint. Higher investment in the child leads to higher
child quality, therefore families valuing child quality more dearly may invest more.
Second, even with the same preferences and inputs, different families could produce
divergent CQ due to the underlying production process ( f 0) because o f gender
differences. For example, a single father may have a comparative advantage in raising a
son than a single mother, as a father may serve as a role model more easily. The third
avenue could be traced to the difference in factors which are exogenous to the model,
such as E, G and NF. For example, E indicates parental efficiency o f combining all other
factors. This effect is subtly different from the aforementioned production efficiency. Its
overall effect on CQ can be expressed as:

dCQL _VL _dx_+ VL
dEij

dx ' dEj

9E0

What Equation (10) demonstrates is that E can affect the whole production
process directly ( — L ) as wen as indirectly through the selected inputs
dEtj

). In
dx dEy

practice, E refers to parental education level, age and experience in childbearing. Child
genetic traits (G) and non-familial factors (NF) can similarly affect CQ. For example, the
gender difference could be traced to social environment (NF). There are many
sociological studies documenting that society still values males more than it values
females. Therefore, for example, it is possible that a single father-son pair has some
advantage over a single mother-daughter combination, or mother-son single-parent
households may be less disadvantaged than mother-daughter single-parent families. We
use regional indicators to roughly proxy for those societal inputs.
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Last but not least, following the point mentioned above, the parent may have a
different preference ( U) for CQ contingent on the gender o f the child as well as the
gender of the parent. For example, a father could value the quality o f a son more than that
o f a daughter, or a mother may value the quality o f a daughter more than that o f a son. In
other words, following the first point, all else being equal, different inputs may be due to
parental preference for CQ. In addition, the parent may determine the level o f inputs
according to the inputs’ productivity in producing CQ. In other words, he/she may choose
to provide fewer o f certain inputs when they are not very productive in producing CQ and
allocate resources to where they could be more productive. In practices, we need to hold
the coefficients constant, which is hard to do. Therefore it is difficult to isolate this effect
directly. Hence, differences in CQ could be attributed indirectly to variation in parental
preference for CQ. This possibility can be tested by looking at whether there is a
difference in inputs across different family structures when family income is held
constant.
All in all, the issue this essay attempts to address is more empirical than
theoretical. Therefore, empirical evidence is provided that helps tease out which factor(s)
is(are) accountable for the observed difference in child quality. Three groups o f child
quality measures will be used here: health outcomes, school engagement index, and
behavior problem index. The first argument in the CQ demand function in equation (9) is
family inputs into the production of CQ. The difference in CQ that can be attributed to
family inputs is evaluated in a structural form equation.
Unlike reduced form equations, which only contain exogenous variables,
structural form equations include variables that are endogenous such as inputs, which are
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determined by various other factors. Although we encounter the endogeneity issue when
estimating structural form equations, the advantage o f using them is that we can know
immediately whether family structures are associated with the same child outcomes once
inputs are controlled for. For example, if it is found that boys fare better with single
fathers than boys with single mothers, then the difference could be attributed either to
family resources, preference or production process, or any combination o f these factors.
Since data on family incomes are available, it can be more evident whether there is a
difference in the earning power between fathers and mothers by comparing incomes
between single-father households vs. single-mother households. The budget constraint
can be easily controlled for in estimation. On the other hand, if it is found that boys and
girls fare equally well within the same type o f family structure once inputs are controlled
for, then the difference in observable child outcomes can be due to preference and
production process.
The single-parent household model could be easily adapted to analyzing other
households. For example, for grandparent households and other non-parental households,
the utility function still is U(C, CQlt), but the Child Quality production becomes
CQ, = f , (x, G, E, NF)

/= Gd, Np ; j =w, b, h, o

where the subindex Gd stands for the grandparent household and Np stands for all other
non-parental households, subindex w stands for non-Hispanic white, b stands for nonHispanic black, h for Hispanic and o for all other race/ethnicity. In this case, different
cultures associated with different ethnicities could be another source o f differences
observed in child outcomes.
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3.3 Other Extending Issues

3.3.1

The Role o f Family Structure When Two Parents are Present. It is much

more complicated to construct a universal framework for a two-parent household since
there are many different types of two-parent households such as two-biological parent
families, two-adoptive parent families, step-father families and step-mother families and
cohabiting partnership families. Moreover, a division o f labor within the family makes it
more important to bring in time allocation. We review some theories to show why twoparent households may perform better for producing child outcomes as well as present
some complexities in modeling two-parent families. As there is much literature devoted
to each o f the cases, we only summarize the findings here.

1) Division o f Labor within the Family
Consider a household consisting o f two persons, say the husband and the wife.
The objective o f the partnership is to increase utility by producing children and by
increasing total resources by division o f labor and coordination o f investments in human
capital (Becker 1981). Division of labor and allocation o f time is critical in modeling a
two-parent household. Therefore, time is added and plays an essential role in such
framework.
Suppose the wife has a comparative advantage in household production, while the
husband has a comparative advantage in market work. If they do not cooperate, the
husband and the wife individually choose consumption and time allocated between
market work and household work. But the household will be better off if the wife
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specializes in household production while the husband specializes in market work. By
division of labor, productivity and total resources available to the household are increased
through specialization as well as through economies of scale.

2) Children as a Public Good within the Family
The household can also be modeled8 as such that one parent, for example the
husband, dominates the household production and utility maximizing process in which
the fact that child quality is essentially a public good in a two-parent household is
emphasized. This framework is especially useful for analyzing the effect of divorce on
children and marriage. Within marriage, both child quality and the wife’s utility, which
also includes child quality as a parameter, enter into the husband utility function.
Therefore the husband is altruistic to both the child and the wife, and vice versa. Under
such circumstances, children are a collective consumption good from the point o f view of
the father and mother. Proximity and altruism help to relieve the free-rider problem
associated with the provision o f public goods. Upon divorce, however, it is not feasible
for the former couple to realize a Pareto-optimal allocation o f their joint resources as the
noncustodial parent loses the control over the allocation decision o f the custodial parent
(Weiss and Willis 1985). The child is still a public good to the mother and the father.
However, like all other public goods, the free rider problem arises, and the noncustodial
parent may invest much less. For the custodial parent, as fewer resources are available to
the household, the investment by the custodial parent into child quality production will
also decrease.

8 This analysis is conducted in line with the framework developed by W eiss and W illis (1985).
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In addition, fertility decisions (Becker 1960, Ben-Porath 1973, Schultz 1973,
Willis 1973 or see Robsinson 1997 for a recent review), the trade-off between quantity
and quality of children (Becker 1965, Becker and Lewis 1973, Becker and Tomes 1976,
Willis 1973) and bargaining in marriage (Manser and Brown 1980, Chiappori 1991,
Lundberg and Poliak 1996, Lundberg and Poliak 1994, Marchant 1997) are other
important issues in the economics o f families. Given the focus o f this study and the
existing extensive literature for each issue, I will not discuss them here.
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CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES

In this chapter we first discuss the data and variables used in the study. In
particular we explain why we choose the data sets and discuss why we select the
measures o f child outcomes to proxy for child quality and well-being. Then we explain
the empirical strategies for testing the hypothesis with a view to provide possible causes
of disparities in observable child outcomes across family structures.
4.1 Data and Variables

This essay investigates a number o f child outcomes across a complete spectrum of
family structures using the 1999 and 2002 waves of the National Survey of American
Families (NSAF). Despite its cross-sectional nature, the NSAF provides the best
opportunity to undertake this analysis with its large sample size (over 30,000 sampled
children in each wave), its over-sampling o f low income households, its rich set of child
outcomes and ‘inputs’, and its detailed information of child living arrangements. For
example, the data from the 1999 NSAF provides information on all 35,938 sampled
children under 18 years old, as well as information relating to their family settings and
the adults who care for them. Although the survey provides estimates for targeted states
as well as for the nation as a whole, it focuses on the experiences o f low-income families
(about $33,000 in 1998 currency for a family of two parents and two children). The
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survey was carried out from February 1999 through October 1999 and from February
2002 through November 2002 for the Urban Institute and Child Trends by Westat. Some
questions covered the families’ circumstances at the time o f the survey; others refer to the
previous 12 months prior to the interview (Abi-Habib et al. 2004).
This analysis uses only a subset o f data including children between 6 and 17 years
old because developmental child outcomes such as school engagement and behavioral
problems are inapplicable to children aged 0-5 years. In doing so, this also eliminates the
possible correlation when two children come from the same households because NSAF
samples only up to two children from the same household to reduce respondent burden:
one randomly from the age 0-5 group, the other from the age 6-17 group if there is more
then one child in each age group in the household.9 Once focal children are selected, the
NASF questionnaire asks for the name o f the parent or guardian who knows the most
about the selected child’s health and education, and this person is referred to as the Most
Knowledgeable Adult or MKA. The MKA is the selected respondent who answers
questions about his or her focal child(ren), his or her spouse/partner (if there is one), and
the family and household. In almost all cases, the MKA is a parent o f the selected child.10
The data used are created by combining (1) the Focal Child data set with (2) the Person
data set, which includes all adults covered in the survey, (3) Family Respondent and (4)
Household data sets to obtain additional information on the MKA and the household so
that the analyses on the individual child can be conducted in the context o f intra
household resource allocation.

9 When a household contained exactly one child, that child was always selected.
10 See Wang et al. 1999 for the actual questionnaire: question SC7, and Cunningham et al. for a in-depth
discussion o f in-person survey methods.
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The analysis uses information about the MKA to proxy parents’ characteristics for
the following reasons: First, if we use parents’ characteristics, which are not directly
available in the Focal Child data set, then a greater proportion of observations will be
dropped due to missing values, especially for nonparent households. Second, in most
cases, the MKA is the child’s parent. Third, the MKA’s information may shed more light
for the purpose o f the current study in the case that the MKA is not a parent. This is
because the current study is exploring how child outcomes are associated with different
types of family structures. For example, if a child has never lived with his/her parents
after he/she was born, then information about his/her biological parents should have a
different effect. Instead, using information on the MKA can capture household dynamics
and should be more appropriate for predicting the child’s outcomes for the purpose of this
study. In addition, using the information on the MKA allows us to measure the
characteristics o f the adult with the greatest influence on the child. Last but not least,
because o f the diversity o f family structures examined in the study, not all children have
two co-resident parents. That makes it it is impossible to include the characteristics of
each parent separately in a regression model directly comparing single parent, cohabiting
and married two-parent families, cohabiting and married two-parent families, and nonparental families in particular. Although this measure may not fully reflect the potential
benefit associated with having two parents instead of one, by using the characteristics of
the MKA, it does allow for a comparison across the complete spectrum o f family
structures.
In the current study, family structure is determined according to a detailed
variable “ULIVARR” provided by NSAF. It describes the type o f parents/caretakers that
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each focal child is living with. All o f the possible combinations of caretakers are coded,
and 45 different living arrangements are available in the data sets. The variable identifies
whether the focal child is living with married, unmarried but cohabiting, or unmarried
and not cohabiting caretakers and whether the caretakers are single parents, stepparents,
non-parents or adoptive/biological parents. In addition, the relationship o f each focal
child to the MKA with whom he/she was living is used when determining a grandparent
household.
Married two-parent families11 are married couple families in which the focal child
is the biological or adoptive child of both parents. Married stepmother families are
married couple families in which the father is the biological father and the mother is the
stepmother. Married stepfather families are defined in a parallel manner. Cohabiting
two-parent families are non-married couple families in which both parents are biological
or adoptive parents. Cohabiting stepmother families are those non-married couple
families in which the focal child is living with biological/adoptive father and his female
partner. Again, cohabiting stepfather families are defined in a parallel manner. Single
father families and single-mother families are those single parents living without partners.
Grandparent families are defined as children living with grandparent(s) who are the
MKAs and without either parent present. To complete the universe, any other living
arrangements are classified as other, which includes households in which uncles, aunts or
siblings are the MKAs. Ginther and Poliak (2004) argue against using a child-based
classification scheme in which the same family could be classified as a stepfamily for the

11 Because w e can not separate married two-biological parent families from married two-adoptive parent
families in the data, the traditional families therefore include married tw o-biological parent fam ilies as w ell
as married two-adoptive parent families. For the rest o f the paper w e use married two-parent fam ilies and
traditional families interchangeably, referring to both married tw o-biological parent fam ilies and married
two-adoptive parent families.
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stepchild but as a two-biological-parent family for the joint child. Instead, Ginther and
Poliak propose using a family based scheme so that children raised in traditional nuclear
families will be distinguished from joint children in blended families. However, the
NSAF data is not well-suited to address this issue. In order to identify the children living
in blended families according to the classification scheme proposed by Ginther and
Poliak (2004), we first choose households with two sampled children. (10,962
observations are retained for both years). Second, one child's relationship to one of the
MKAs has to be a biological child and the other child has to be a step child. We have
only 35 observations that fall into this subgroup. Third, the child has to be 6-17 years old,
and only 28 observations qualify for the child-based definition o f blended family. But it
is likely to underestimate the children living in such households for the following
reasons:
1) It is possible that both sampled focal children are joint biological children of
the parents and the step child is not sampled.
2) It is also likely that in some stepparent households the stepparent is not the
MKA but the biological parent is the MKA.
Hence the number o f observations is so small that it is not suitable for
comparison with biological children defined as family-based.
As discussed above, in order to incorporate the dynamic nature o f family structure
as well as to employ the fixed-effect strategy to deal with the endogenous nature of
family structure, longitudinal data is essential. At the present time, however, there is no
longitudinal data set available that is large enough to provide the opportunity to closely
examine children from all family structures over time. As discussed earlier, this essay
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uses data from the 1999 and 2002 waves o f the National Survey o f American Families
(NSAF). The 1997 wave ofN SA F data is also available, and it contains partial overlaps
of sampling units used on the 1999 NSAF (there is no overlap with the 2002 wave of
data). However, a flag to identify matched persons in NSAF 1997 and 1999 is not
provided on the public use files for confidentiality reasons (Safir et al. 2000). Thus we
could not identify the overlaps and could not use it as panel data. Most importantly, the
key information on the focal child’s detailed living arrangement, which is used to classify
different family structures, is not available in the 1997 data. Therefore, only the 1999 and
2002 waves ofN SA F data are used in the current study.
4.1.1

Dependent Outcomes Variables. There is one caveat about the outcomes

measures. As all outcome measures are reported by the MKA, it may be subject to selfreporting errors, and such errors may be associated with income and family structure. For
example, some studies find evidence of self-reported health outcomes measurement
errors (Butler et al. 1987, Bound 1991) and such measurement errors are correlated with
family income (Marra et al. 2004). With respect to academic performance, Bird and
Berman (1985) found that mothers’ perceptions o f their children’s performance on a new
task are more accurate than fathers’ are. Nevertheless, it is much more difficult to obtain
objective measures, and most surveys use self-reported measures.
The primary health outcome is the focal child’s current health status reported by
the MKA. It is similar to the measures o f overall health used in many studies that
correlate to mortality, morbidity, physical fitness, and health care utilization (Ren and
Amick 1996, Denton and Walters 1999, Idler and Benyamini 1997, Matthews et al.
1999). Compared health status and physical and mental functionality o f the focal child
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are also included to supplement the analysis. The importance o f health is welldocumented in the vast literature examining the linkage between health and economic
status, labor market outcomes and educational attainment.12 A life course perspective
was employed by the medical, sociological and economic literatures to address
occurrence o f events across entire life spans as well as to explain intergenerational
influences. The importance of health status in one’s early life was highlighted. For
example, studying health with the life course approach sheds light on the existence of
wide disparities in adult morbidity and mortality rates across socio-economic classes
(Bartley and Blane 1997, Blane et al. 1999, Davey Smith et al. 1997, Kuh and BenShlomo 1997, Mare 1990, Martyn 1991, Van de Mheen 1998, Wadsworth 1997, Wunsch
et al. 1996). Case et al. (2002) suggest that the well-known positive association between
health and income in adulthood is anteceded by a similar association in childhood. They
found that children from lower-income households with chronic conditions are less
healthy than those from higher-income households. Moreover, the adverse effects o f
lower income on health accumulate over children's lives. They further suggest that the
impact o f parents' income on children's health may be a pathway through which the
intergenerational transmission o f socioeconomic status takes place. Case et al. (2005)
also find that childhood health and economic circumstances have a long-lasting effect on
health status, educational attainment and social status into adulthood. Specifically, they
suggest that health may be a potential mechanism through which intergenerational
transmission o f economic status occurs. Given the enduring impact of childhood health, it
is important for studies to include health outcomes in addition to educational and
behavioral outcomes when investigating child well-being.
12 See Currie and Madrian (1999) and Currie and Hyson (1999) for an extensive review.
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Current Health Status
This variable concerns the MKA’s perception about the current health status of
the children. The MKA is asked:
In general, would you say the child’s health is:
5= Excellent
4 =Very good
3 =Good
2=Fair
1 =Poor
This question applies to all children. There were no special interviewer
instructions for this question. Basically, the M KA’s answer to this question is used. For
example, if the answer is excellent, than the variable is assigned a value of 5, etc.
Current Health Status Compared to 12 months ago - Health Getting Worse
Similarly, this variable also concerns the MKA’s perception about the current
health status o f the children compared to 12 months ago. The MKA is asked:
Flow is your child’s health in general compared to 12 months ago? Is it:
5 = Much better
4 = Somewhat better
3 = About the same
2 = Somewhat worse
1 = Much worse
This question applied to children two years old or older. One difficulty with this
variable is that no information is available regarding the child’s past health status, and
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there is an upper limit towards which a child’s health could improve. Therefore this
variable is dichotomized to a new variable indicating whether the child has experienced
deterioration in his/her health status in the past 12 months, with 1 corresponding to the
values of 1 and 2, and 0 equals to the values o f 3, 4, 5.
Having a Health Condition that Limits Activity
This variable was created by asking the MKA whether the child has a physical,
learning, or mental health condition that limits (his/her) participation in the usual kinds of
activities done by most children (his/her) age and/or limits (his/her) ability to do regular
school work. If needed, the interviewer is to elaborate on the question by defining what is
meant by a physical learning or mental health condition. For children six years old and
older, an ongoing or chronic impairment or condition is one that limits the child’s ability
to participate in routine physical education and learning activities at public, private,
vocational, or parochial schools. The interviewer is to record ‘YES’ if the child is
enrolled in a special school for children with physical or mental disabilities (such as a
school for the hearing-impaired or blind, or children with learning disabilities). It also
records ‘YES’ if the child is enrolled in a regular school but spends most of the day in
special education classes. 5318 children or 12.16 percent o f the whole sample used in this
study fall into this category.
School Engagement Scale
A child’s future economic status and work productivity as an adult are determined
in part by his performance in school and ultimate educational degree obtained (Kuh and
Wadsworth 1991, Bruno 1995, Bauman and Ryan 2001). Daily participation in school
such as attending class, making an effort to learn, and completing homework are the
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fabric of the learning process. Due to the tendency o f researchers to focus on the
educational achievement and attainment o f children, such non-achievement aspects o f the
educational experience warrant better understanding. School engagement is an
appropriate measure to use also because for some children in the sample, it is too early to
measure achievement yet.
Research has documented that school engagement is associated with positive
academic outcomes including achievement and persistence in school.13 A key outcome of
engagement is higher achievement. Children who are highly engaged in school perform
better in terms o f grades, test scores, and grade advancement, although the
operationalizations14 o f engagement may differ from one study to another.15 Another
body of research finds that academically engaged students are less likely to drop out of
high school and less likely to engage in delinquency (Bryk and Thum 1989, Crosnoe
2002, Farkas et al. 1990, Jenkins 1995).
The NSAF includes a scale measure of school engagement created by Jim Connell
and Lisa Bridges at the Institute for Research and Reform in Education in California.
This scale is used to assess the degree to which children aged 6 to 17 are interested in
doing and willing to do school work.
MKAs are asked:
How often
•

Does the child care about doing well in school?

13 See Fredricks et al. (2004) for a r e v ie w o f the growing research literature that addresses school
engagement.
14 Operationalization refers to the process o f converting concepts into specific observable behaviors that a
researcher can measure.
15 See Connell et al. (1994), Finn and Rock (1997), Finn and Voelkl (1993), Lamborn et al. (1992), Lee and
Smith (1995), Roscigno and Ainsworth-Damell (1999), Skinner et al. (1990), Steinberg et al. (1992); in
contrast, Newmann et al. (1992) and Smerdo (1999) fail to find such a connection.
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•

Does the child only work on schoolwork when forced to?

•

Does the child just do enough schoolwork to get by?

•

Does the child always do homework?

The response set contains: all o f the time (assigned a value o f 4), most of the time
(assigned a value o f 3), some of the time (assigned a value o f 2), and none of the time
(assigned a value o f 1). Responses to questions about how often the child only works on
schoolwork when forced to and does just enough schoolwork to get by are reverse coded.
Responses to the above four questions are coded and then totaled to create a scale score
ranging from 4 to 16 with a higher score indicating greater school engagement.
Behavioral Problems Index Score
Psychological development and social development are also essential aspects of
child well-being. Even though family environments and experiences influence these
developments at all stages, those early in life are thought to have a particularly powerful
impact, largely because life is a process of cumulative effect, beginning with social and
family circumstances in early life. Behaviors and attributes that are acquired early in life
may have a compounding effect into late adolescence and adulthood (Wadsworth 1999,
Caspi et al. 1995, Pulkkinen and Hamalainen 1995, Friedman et al. 1993, Friedman et al.
1995).
Two separate scores are used to assess behavior and emotional problems for
children aged 6 tol 1 and children aged 12-17 due to the distinct characteristics of
children in each age group. The M KA’s responses to the following questions are used to
create the scale for age group 6-11:
In the past month,
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•

Does she/he feel worthless or inferior

•

Has she/he been nervous or tense

•

Does she/he act too young for her/his age

•

Does she/he have trouble sleeping

•

Does she/he lie or cheat

•

Does she/he do poorly at school work

The responses to those questions reflect the M KA’s perceptions about the child’s
behavior in the past month. The response categories include often true (assigned a value
o f 3), sometimes true (assigned a value of 2), and never true (assigned a value o f 1).
Scores for respondents who answered at least five out o f the six questions are totaled and
then standardized to the 18-point scale ranging from 6 to 18. A higher score indicates
more behavior problems.
Similar to the behavior problem index score for children aged 6-11, the index for
children aged 12-17 is created by asking the MKA the following six questions:
In the past month,
•

Does she/he not get along with other kids?

•

Can she/he not concentrate for long?

•

Has she/he been sad or depressed?

•

Does she/he have trouble sleeping?

•

Does she/he lie or cheat?

•

Does she/he do poorly at school work?

-
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4.1.2

Control and Production Function Input Variables. The set of control and

production function input variables used in the estimations include (1) basic demographic
characteristics o f the child and the household: child’s age, race and gender, MKA’s age,
family structure as discussed earlier, number of children under age 6, number o f children
between 12 and 17, region; (2) household socioeconomic status such as MKA’s highest
education level, M KA’s labor force status and family social income level; (3) inputs
which include health specific inputs, educational and developmental inputs and
psychological inputs which indicate parental resources:
•

Health specific inputs include: whether the child has health insurance at
the time o f the survey, child’s number of dental visits in the past 12
months, whether the household has a usual source for health care other
than the emergency room, whether the child received well child care visits
in the past 12 months;

•

Educational and developmental inputs consist o f whether the child has
changed schools in the past 12 months (school stability); whether the
MKA worries that food would run out (food insecurity), whether the
household has no phone service, whether the child took lessons (computer,
music, dance, etc.) after school last year, whether the child was on a sports
team last year.

•

Parental resources: the MKA’s aggravation scale score and MKA’s mental
health scale score, which are discussed below.
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M K A ’s Aggravation Scale Score
This variable is derived by summing the M KA’s responses to four questions—
how often in the past month the MKA felt the child was much harder to care for than
most, felt the child did things that really bothered the MKA a lot, felt he or she was
giving up more o f his or her life to meet the child’s needs than he or she ever expected,
and felt angry with the child. The response categories include all o f the time (coded 4),
most of the time (coded 3), some o f the time (coded 2), and none o f the time (coded 1).
Responses are totaled creating a parent aggravation index-a scale score ranging from 4
to 16. A higher score indicates more aggravation.
M K A ’s Mental Health Scale Score
The mental health scale is created by summing the MKA’s responses to five
questions that ask how often in the past month the respondent had been a very nervous
person, felt calm or peaceful, felt downhearted and blue, had been a happy person, and
felt so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer him or her up. The response
categories include all o f the time (coded 1), most o f the time (coded 2), some o f the time
(coded 3), and none of the time (coded 4). Responses to the questions about feeling calm
or peaceful and being a happy person are reverse coded. Responses are totaled, creating a
scale score ranging from 5 to 20, then all scores are rescaled to 100 by multiplying by 5.
A higher score indicates better mental health.
There is a caveat with the measures of parental resources in particular and with
the measures of all inputs in general. Inputs, similar to family structure, are potentially
endogenous and could be affected by a variety of factors. For parental resources, reverse
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causality is especially relevant. For instance, a parent caring for a problematic child may
experience more stress and aggravation than one who is raising a well-behaved child,
which could in turn adversely affect the child’s outcomes. Nevertheless, controlling for
the inputs could shed light on such questions as whether differences in inputs lead to the
disparity in child outcomes across family structures and how much the difference in child
outcomes persists after inputs are controlled for.
4.2 Estimation Strategies

The theoretical model o f a single-parent household and its extension to a
grandparent household suggests several possible explanations for differences in child
quality varying by gender and by race. We follow the standard household production
theory approach in the economics literature to motivate the empirical study. Clarifying
the differences between ‘inputs’ and ‘outcomes’ in the production o f child well-being
helps investigate how much the difference in child outcomes is due to differences in
inputs, and how much is due to the underlying production process. We also employ and
extend the theoretical framework of Conway and Houtenville (2002) to clarify the
possible role o f gender and gender interaction within households.
To investigate empirically, the equations to be estimated will be the inputs
equation corresponding to equation (8) and a child quality production function
corresponding to equation (9) as follows:
X,

=

a 7, + (3j Gi + y E

+ tj

NFi + o,

CQ, = $'X , + 3,1, + yy,Gj + S'E + r N F i + e,
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where /represents economic resources such as family income and the MKA’s education,
etc., G contains child characteristics such as age, gender and race, E includes parental and
family characteristics such as parents’ age, number o f children in the households and a
vector of ten family structure dummy variables: (0) married two-parent biological or
adoptive family (the omitted category), (1) married mother-stepfather family, (2) married
father-stepmother family, 3) single mother, 4) single father, 5) cohabiting two-parent
biological or adoptive family, 6) cohabiting mother-stepfather family, 7) cohabiting
father-stepmother family, 8) grandparent caregiver family and 9) other non-parental
caregiver family; N F denotes factors such as living in the south, etc.
The developmental inputs (x) include 1) the parental aggravation and mental
health status o f the ‘most knowledgeable adult’ (assumed to be the primary caregiver), 2)
how many times the child has changed schools in the past 12 months, 3) taking afterschool lessons, and 4) being on a sports team. The developmental outcomes (CQ) include
1) the child’s reported engagement in school, and 2) the Behavioral Problems Index
score. The health inputs (X) include 1) whether the child has health insurance, 2) number
o f dental visits during the last 12 months, 3) number of well child care visits during the
last 12 months, 4) whether the child has a usual source for care. The health outcomes
(CQ) include 1) child’s current health status, 2) child’s current health compared to 12
months ago (whether the child has experienced deterioration in health status), and 3)
whether the child has a mental, physical or learning condition limiting activity
participated in by most children in his/her age group. In addition, we include two general
inputs that might contribute to both developmental and health outcomes such as food

-
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insecurity and interrupted phone services in the households. These two measures can
capture general aspects o f the home environment.
First, we perform a descriptive analysis on these various measures to make simple
comparisons o f the various child inputs and outcomes across the different types o f family
structures by gender and by race, as well as to investigate the relative prevalence of these
family structures.
Second, in order to better identify the associations between family structure and
child outcomes, the basic demographic characteristics must be controlled for. We
therefore estimate the following child input and outcome equations:
la) Inputk = <I>(G, E, N F ) ;
2a) Outcomeq = g(G, E, N F ) ;
These equations contain those variables most likely to be considered exogenous (the child
and MKA’s characteristics), with the exception of family structure itself.
Next, the household’s socioeconomic status is controlled. This helps identify to
what extent economic resources matter and also test the economic theory regarding
family structure and child outcomes:
lb) Inputk = 0 (G , E, NF, I ) ;
2b) Outcomeq = g(G, E, NF, I)
Finally, the outcome equations will also be estimated including the full vector of
input variables as explanatory variables:
2c) Outcome = g{G, E, NF, I, Input)
This exercise helps clarify whether the lesser outcomes o f children in
‘nontraditional’ families is due at least in part to receipt o f fewer observable ‘inputs’, and,
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if so, whether the lesser inputs vary within the different nontraditional family structures
and whether they vary by the child’s gender. Despite the likely endogeneity of these
inputs, including them in the regressions enables us to investigate how much of the
outcome differential is due to an observed difference in inputs across family structures.
For instance, if children in single-mother families receive less medical care than children
living in other families, then once medical care is controlled for the impact of living in a
single-mother family on the child’s health may be reduced or even eliminated. We are not
trying to instrument these inputs because 1) there is the usual difficulty in finding valid
instruments, and 2) the possible endogeneity o f family structure already renders the
exercise a ‘descriptive regression”.
These equations are first estimated on the entire sample. By providing estimates
of the overall differences in child well-being across the different family structures, the
results provide information on how the well-being o f children living in single-father and
grandparent caregiver families differs from children living in other ‘nontraditional’
families or in ‘traditional’ families.
Each equation is then estimated on each gender sub-sample and each race sub
sample separately. These results help to illustrate the difference between the well-being
of children living in single-father families in comparison to other family structures,
especially single-mother families and grandparent families, contingent upon the child’s
gender and race. Specifically, the equality o f the estimated coefficients on family
structure is tested across structures for each sub-sample (e.g., the effects on a girl of
living with a single father versus a single mother, or the effects on a non-Hispanic white

-
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child of living with in a grandparent household versus living in an other non-parental
household).
Results would be biased without adjustments for oversampling, undercoverage
and nonresponse. Child Weights from the NSAF survey and Stata survey commands are
used to produce approximately unbiased and representative estimates for the nation (see
Brick et al. 1999 for a more complete discussion o f weights in the NSAF).
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CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

We first perform a descriptive analysis, investigating the relative prevalence of
various family structures and making simple comparisons o f the various child inputs and
outcomes across these different family structures. However, to get a crisper measure of
the associations between family structure and child outcomes, we must control for the
household’s socioeconomic status and relevant child characteristics. Furthermore, we
further control for specific inputs in order to answer the question o f how much the
differences in child outcomes between ‘non-traditional’ families and ‘traditional’ families
could be explained by differences in the receipt o f critical inputs.
Due to the completeness o f types o f family structures we examine, various and
numerous comparisons can be made when reporting the empirical results. For both
descriptive and empirical results, we emphasize four major comparisons to keep the
discussion tractable. First, we make comparisons between traditional and all other
families to investigate how children from different non-traditional families fare compared
to traditional families. Second, we make comparisons within single-parent families,
within married stepparent families and within cohabiting stepfamilies to study how child
outcomes differ by the gender of the biological parent in these non-traditional families.
Third, we make comparisons between single mother, married stepfather and cohabiting
stepfather families as well as between single father, married stepmother and cohabiting
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stepmother families to investigate how the presence o f a married or cohabiting stepparent
may affect child outcomes. Finally, comparisons are made between grandparent families
and other non-parental families to investigate whether living with grandparent(s) is
associated with more desirable outcomes for children than other non-parental alternatives
when living with their parent(s) is not possible (comparison results are listed in Table
18).
5.1 Descriptive Results

5.1.1

Full Sample. Table 1 delineates the diversity and relative prevalence of

different family structures investigated by this study (Percentage for each family structure
is calculated by using the survey weights). Although the traditional family is still the
majority among family types (56.4 percent), its dominance becomes less prominent when
compared to the combination o f all other family structures. While single-father families
(3.2 percent) are much less common than single-mother families, which is the second
dominant family structure (19.8 percent), it is still noteworthy since researchers tend to
ignore this family type when investigating single-parent households. Grandparent headed
households with neither parent present (2.0 percent) is another family type that is under
investigated in studies examining family structure. Finally, cohabiting families are
another form that emerged as an alternative to families formed by traditional marriage,
and they together represent 4.8 percent o f the whole sample. Among cohabiting couples,
a mother cohabiting with her partner is the most common arrangement (3.0 percent). This
group may be otherwise categorized as single-mother households due to the survey
design or strategies utilized by researchers.
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Table 2 presents the weighted means and adjusted standard deviations for all
variables used in the current study for the full sample, and Table 3 stratifies the sample
across ten family structures. The summary statistics show wide variation in child
outcomes among different family structures. As discussed earlier, comparisons are made
to test the different hypotheses regarding the relationship between family structure and
child outcomes. Simple comparisons based on mean values can be misleading sometimes.
Nevertheless, they can highlight the crude differences of child outcomes and variations in
inputs associated with various child outcomes.
Several salient results emerge from the descriptive analysis. First, children in
married two-parent families have more desirable outcomes than children from alternative
types of families. Married two-parent families also have more inputs in general than any
other types o f families (Table 9 summarizes the comparison between traditional families
and all other families). However, for current health status, children raised in single-father
families have the highest mean value (4.397), while children in married two-parent
families have an average score o f 4.391, and the difference is statistically significant ( t =
7.62).
Second, comparisons are made within single-parent families, within married
stepfamilies and within cohabiting stepfamilies to investigate how child outcomes differ
contingent on parent gender (comparison results are presented in Table 10). Within
single-parent families, children in single-mother families fare worse in terms o f all five
outcomes investigated in the current study than children in single-father families. The
differences in child outcomes may not be surprising as substantial differences in
economic resources and inputs within single-parent families exist. In general, Table 3
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suggests that single-mother families have fewer economic resources and fewer inputs
than single-father families do, with only two exceptions: children from single-mother
families are more likely to have a usual source for health care and are more likely to
receive well-child care than children from single-father families. The difference in child
health outcomes and health related inputs, such as having a usual source o f care and
receiving well-child care, could also be due to selection. In other words, sick children
might be more likely to be living with their biological single mothers than living with
their biological single fathers.
When comparisons are made within married stepfamilies, children in married
stepfather families fare better in terms of current health status, school engagement, and
behavioral outcomes. Regarding economic resources, married stepfather families have
fewer economic resources than married stepmother families do. But married stepfather
families have more developmental inputs than married stepmother families do, such as
school stability, taking after-school lessons, being on a sports team and having a lower
parent aggravation scale.
When it comes to comparisons within cohabiting stepfamilies, children in
cohabiting stepfather families perform worse than their peers from cohabiting stepmother
families for all outcomes examined except for the behavioral problem index for 12-17
year olds. Cohabiting stepfather families also tend to have fewer economic resources.
With respect to inputs, cohabiting stepfather families have much fewer inputs than
cohabiting stepmother families as well, with a few exceptions: their children have more
dental visits, have usual source of care and are more likely to receive well-child care.
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Therefore, the simple statistical comparisons reveal that children living in single
mother and cohabiting stepfather families tend to fare worse and their families tend to
have fewer economic resources and have fewer inputs than their peers from single father
and cohabiting stepmother families respectively. However, children from married
stepfather families tend to have better outcomes than their peers from married stepmother
families although their families tend to have fewer economic resources and have no
obvious advantage over married stepmother families.
The third set o f comparisons is to compare single-mother families, cohabiting
stepfather families and married stepfather families to gauge the impact of having a male
present in the household, who is not biologically related to the child, on child outcomes
as well as on the levels of the inputs invested to produce such outcomes. (Table 11
summarizes the differences between these three family structures.) It is an informative
exercise because such comparisons can be used to evaluate whether the relationship
constructed on the basis o f marriage is equivalent to the relationship formed upon
cohabitation in terms of producing desirable child outcomes. Table 3 shows that children
living in married stepfather families have the best outcomes, while children in cohabiting
stepfather families fare worse than children in single-mother families with respect to all
outcomes except for current health status. Regarding economic resources and inputs,
married stepfather families have more economic resources and inputs than the other two
alternative family types. Single-mother families have a higher level o f investment than
cohabiting stepfather families do for many health inputs and for all developmental inputs
investigated in the current study.
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These comparisons seem to suggest that living in married stepfather families or
in single-father families might be linked to more desirable child outcomes than living in
cohabiting stepfather families. But can such differences in child outcomes be attributed to
the differences in economic resources and inputs? It is interesting to see that simple
descriptive statistics suggest that a cohabiting stepfather is associated with worse child
outcomes than being absent. Differences in economic resources and inputs between these
types o f families also highlight the need to control for economic resources and inputs in
order to get incisive comparisons among these family structures.
Parallel, simple comparisons are also made among single father, cohabiting
stepmother families and married stepmother families. (Table 12 summarizes the results of
these comparisons.) It turns out that children from single-father households in general
have the highest school engagement level, best current health status, and lowest
frequency o f morbidity and lowest level o f behavior problems (both 6-11 and 12-17 age
groups). No clear pattern emerges when comparing economic resources and inputs.
Single fathers seem to invest more in developmental resources such as taking after-school
lessons, MKAs have lower parental aggravation, and the households have higher school
stability than the other two family types. It is surprising that children from single-father
families, which do not seem to have the most economic resources and inputs among the
three family types, tend to fare best in general. The presence o f a stepmother, no matter in
the form o f marriage or cohabitation, is not associated with better child outcomes than
being absent. Again, we need to control for both economic resources and inputs in order
to gauge to what extent such differences in child outcomes are due to differences in
economic resources and inputs, and to what extent these differences in child outcomes are
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associated purely with particular family structures. In addition, these comparisons are
hindered by the smaller number of observations for these household types.
Finally, grandparent families are compared with other non-parental families.
Table 13 outlines the differences between these two family types. Children in
grandparent families are less likely to have health conditions that limit children’s
activities, are more likely to have a higher school engagement scale and to have fewer
behavioral problems for children aged 12-17. Grandparent households tend to have fewer
economic resources but have more health and developmental inputs than other nonparental families do. However, grandparent caregivers tend to have higher aggravation
and lower mental health than other non-parental caregivers. This corroborates what is
found in the grandparent literature that grandparents in the skipped generation households
tend to live isolated and stressful lives.

5.1.2 Stratifying the Sample by Race and Gender. Now we examine how the
distribution o f family structures and child outcomes may differ across race and child
gender. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics by stratifying the sample across
race/ethnicity. The relative prevalence o f different family structures varies considerably
across race/ethnicity. It shows that the single-mother family is the most typical family
structure among non-Hispanic blacks, and the grandparent family is also common among
non-Hispanic blacks when compared to other racial and ethnic groups. Single-father
families are highly concentrated in the non-Hispanic white group. Except for nonHispanic blacks, married two-parent families are still the dominant family structure.
Hispanics have the highest percentage o f cohabiting two-parent families among all racial
groups (2.8 percent).
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Child outcomes also differ by race and ethnicity (refer to Table 4). Non-Hispanic
black children have the highest percentage of morbidity, highest level o f behavior
problems (for both age groups of 6-11 and 12-17 years old) and have the lowest level of
school engagement (although the school engagement scores between non-Hispanic black
and Hispanic children are not statistically different). In contrast, non-Hispanic white
children have the highest level o f school engagement, lowest level o f behavior problems
for age group 6-11, and highest level o f current health status. Hispanic children are
reported to have the lowest level of current health status and most likely to report health
status has deteriorated in the past 12 months. Children in the “Other” racial/ethic groups,
which includes all races/ethnicities except Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks and nonHispanic whites, have the lowest occurrence o f morbidity, lowest probability o f having
deteriorated health status and lowest level of behavior problems for age group 12-17. A
similar pattern o f differences is also found for inputs. Generally speaking, non-Hispanic
whites and other racial/ethnic group have more economic resources and inputs than nonHispanic blacks and Hispanics. In particular, Hispanics tends to have the least health
inputs such as health insurance, dental visits, a usual source for health care and well-child
care visits, and least developmental inputs such as taking after-school lessons and being
on a sports team. In contrast, non-Hispanic whites have the highest level of inputs such
as health insurance, dental visits, usual source for health care, the highest frequency of
school stability and being on a sports team, the lowest level o f food insecurity and the
lowest percentage o f no phone service.
When it comes to gender, girls are more likely to live with single mothers than
live with single fathers. Conditional upon living with a single parent, a greater fraction of
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boys live with a single father compared to girls. This can be verified from Table 5.
Differences in child outcomes are quite pronounced by gender. Girls have better
outcomes across all measures used in this study. However, differences in inputs are not
as conspicuous and consistent as differences in outcomes by gender. For example, girls
are found to have higher levels o f inputs such as number of dental visits, staying in the
same school last year, taking lessons after school and lower probability o f food
insecurity, the MKA having lower level o f aggravation and a higher level of mental
health scale. In contrast, boys tend to have more inputs in terms o f having health
insurance, having a usual source for health care and being on a sports team last year than
girls do. All the aforementioned differences in means are statistically significant.
Therefore, there are differences in child outcomes by race as well as by gender.
Next we will also control for economic resources and inputs to examine whether the
association between family structure and child outcomes differs by race and by gender.
We will also investigate how inputs are linked to different family structures contingent on
race and gender. In doing so, we can explore whether (1) racial and gender differences
observed in child outcomes across family structures can be explained by controlling for
differences in resources, and (2) different types o f families may allocate resources
differently depending on race and child gender. If so, then channeling more resources
and/or changing the way resources are utilized for the less advantaged children could be
an effective solution to eliminate or reduce racial and gender disparities in child
outcomes.
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5.2 Regression Results
Results presented for outcome equations are estimated by ordered probit models
and probit models (for dichotomous variables). Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is also
applied to each o f the outcome equations and the results are similar. Because four out of
six outcomes are measured with indexes, for which 5 to 6 is not necessarily the same as 6
to 7, ordered probit models are more appropriate for these variables than OLS models.
We present only Tables 6-9 as examples of a typical regression model due to space
limitation. Given the large number o f results, we instead report summaries o f the four
major comparisons outlined above in Tables 14-18 for the entire sample, Tables 19-23
and Tables 24-28 are for the sample stratified by race and gender, respectively.

5.2.1.

Full sample. When reporting the regression results, we repeat the same

comparisons as we present the descriptive results. The results obtained from regressions
are more informative as we now control for child, the MKA and family characteristics as
well as control for economic resources and inputs. To keep the discussion focused we
again emphasize four main comparisons. We first make comparisons between traditional
and all other types of families to investigate how children from traditional families fare
compared to other types of families (comparison results are summarized in Table 14). We
then make comparisons within single-parent families, within married stepparent families
and within cohabiting stepfamilies to study how parent gender may influence child
outcomes (comparison results are tabulated in Table 15). Next, in order to see how the
presence of a stepparent may affect child outcomes, we make comparisons between
single mother, married stepfather and cohabiting stepfather families as well as between
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single father, married stepmother and cohabiting stepmother families (results from such
comparisons are reported in Table 16 and Table 17 respectively). Finally, comparisons
are made between grandparent families and other non-parental families to investigate
whether living with grandparent(s) is associated with more desirable outcomes for
children than other non-parental alternatives when living with their parent(s) is not
possible (comparison results are listed in Table 18).
1) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Families
Generally speaking, results generated from regressions are similar to results
obtained from simple descriptive statistics. Children from married two-parent families
have better outcomes than children from all other family types, by and large. This is
especially true for outcomes such as current health status, school engagement and
behavioral outcomes. Adding economic resources only mitigates the adverse effect of
poverty associated with cohabiting two-parent families with respect to children’s current
health status. Once inputs are controlled for, the negative effect o f living with cohabiting
two-parent families is eliminated for children in those families regarding school and
behavioral outcomes.
It is notable that children living with single fathers have better health status and
are less likely to report that their health status is getting worse in the past 12 months after
inputs are controlled for, which are similar to the descriptive statistics comparisons.
Children’s morbidity is associated with certain types o f family structure. Again, moving
from model A to model B reduces the magnitude o f the coefficients but in general does
not change the sign or significance o f the coefficients, which suggests that the effect of
adding economic resources is mitigating but not eliminating the differences. When inputs
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are added in addition to controlling for economic resources, coefficients on married
stepfather, single mother and cohabiting stepfather families retain their statistical
significance, which suggests that the causation could also go the other way: children with
morbidity are more likely to live with a biological mother after some family transition.
Therefore, we observe that children in these three family types are more likely to have
morbidity. In addition, estimates on inputs such as having health insurance and received
well-child care are positive, which also suggests self-selection and possible adverse
selection. On one hand, if children in these families are healthy and do not have those
health conditions that limit their normal activities, then obtaining health insurance and
receiving well-child care should help to produce better health outcomes. On the other
hand, if sick children tend to live with their biological mother such as living in single
mother, cohabiting stepfather and married stepfather families (self-selection), they may
have more health care needs, and we observe they are more likely to have health
insurance and more likely to seek well-child care (adverse selection).
As for school engagement, children living outside married two-parent families are
less engaged in school than their peers from married two-parent families, as shown in
Table 9. Again, economic resources and inputs mediate but do not eliminate the adverse
effect associated with other family structures except for cohabiting two-parent families.
Once both economic resources and inputs are controlled for, children living in such
families are not statistically different from their counterparts in married two-parent
families. In terms of magnitude, children from other non-parental families, cohabiting
stepmother families and married stepmother families tend to have less desirable outcomes
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than others; single-mother families tend to be associated with better child outcomes than
most other non-traditional families.
An overview o f regression results for input equations yields the following
synthesis:
•

The raw statistics results show that some families may have more inputs than
married two-parent families. But almost none is associated with better child
outcomes than married two-parent families once the basic child, MKA and
family characteristics are controlled for (the only exception is well-child care
for grandparent families). By and large, further controlling for economic
resources reduces the negative effect associated with non-traditional families
in determining input levels except for MKA aggravation. Moving from Model
A to Model B does not mitigate the aggravation level at all: the coefficients are
almost the same. Therefore parenting is more difficult for non-traditional
families, and the difficulty can not be reduced or eliminated by increasing
economic resources.

•

Many observed disadvantages in inputs associated with grandparent families
and single-mother families compared to married two-parent families,
especially health inputs, can be explained by the difference in economic
resources.

•

In contrast, controlling for economic resources has little or no impact on
stepfamilies, both married and cohabiting.
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2) Gender o f the Biological Parent in Single Parent and Stepparent Families
Similar to the descriptive statistics comparisons, children living in single-mother
families tend to have worse health outcomes across all three health measures than
children living in single-father families. However, the adverse effects on school
engagement and behavioral outcomes associated with living with single mothers
disappear. Once inputs are controlled for, living with a single mother is associated with
less behavioral problems for 12-17 year-old children than living with a single father.
Single-mother families also tend to have more health-related inputs but have less parental
resources than single fathers do. Therefore the results suggest that adverse selection may
contribute to the adverse health outcomes associated with living in single-mother
households. In addition, fewer economic resources and a lower level o f inputs might
explain the disparity in child school and behavioral outcomes between single mother and
single-father households. The receipt o f lesser inputs by children from single-mother
families could be due to fewer economic resources available to single-mother families.
Once basic demographic characteristics and economic resources are controlled for,
single-mother families tend to have more or no less inputs than single-father families do
with a few exceptions such as parental resources: single mothers still tend to have more
aggravation and lower mental health score.
Within married stepfamilies, in contrast to descriptive results, children from both
types of families appear to have similar outcomes except for compared health status:
children from married stepmother families are still less likely to have deterioration in
their health status in the past 12 months. In addition, married stepmother families tend to
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have more inputs regarding food security, having phone service in the household, being
on a sports team and their MKA having better mental health. There are no statistical
differences between the two types o f stepparent families regarding other inputs.
Within cohabiting stepparent families, similarly, children in cohabiting
stepmother families are also less likely to report deterioration in their health status in the
past 12 months. Otherwise, children from both types o f families appear to have similar
outcomes. Regarding inputs, cohabiting stepmother families seem to have more inputs
than cohabiting stepfather families except for dental visits and having a usual source of
care. These two additional comparisons provide further evidence that children with
significant health conditions are less likely to reside with their biological fathers.
3) The Presence o f a Stepparent
First, comparing single-mother families with cohabiting stepfather families reveals
that children from the two family types have similar outcomes, especially after
controlling for inputs: there are no statistical differences between the two family
structures. Regarding inputs, these two family types are also similar with a few
exceptions: single-mother families tend to have more health inputs than cohabiting
stepfather families do, which is similar to the descriptive comparisons.
Next, when comparing single-mother families to married stepfather families, the
results are mixed. But once inputs are controlled for, children from both types o f families
exhibit similar outcomes. Not surprisingly, married stepfather families tend to have more
inputs than single-mother families in general.
Finally, between married and cohabiting stepfather families, children living in
married stepfather families are associated with better outcomes than children living in
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cohabiting stepfather families for all measures examined except for compared health
status. But once inputs are controlled for such distinctions are no longer statistically
significant. Married stepfather families also tend to have more inputs than cohabiting
stepfather families such as health insurance, food security, after-school lessons, sports,
and parental resources, even after economic resources are controlled for. Hence, the
differences in child outcomes associated with living in married and cohabiting stepfather
families seem to be explained by differences in inputs. The findings regarding differences
in inputs between these two types of families reinforce such a conclusion.
Examining the presence o f a stepmother in a parallel way reveals several findings.
First, there are no statistically significant differences between living in single-father
families and living in cohabiting stepmother families regarding child outcomes examined,
and there are very few differences regarding the receipt o f inputs.
When comparing single-father families with married stepmother families, in
contrast to the descriptive comparisons, children from both types o f families have similar
outcomes except for current health status: children from single-father families have better
current health status than their peers from married stepmother families, which could
again be due to selection. Examining the level o f inputs indicates that children from
married stepmother families tend to receive more health related inputs than children from
single-father families. This evidence also supports the selection hypothesis.
Comparing married stepmother families to cohabiting stepmother families
demonstrates no statistical difference in all outcomes investigated between children living
in these two types of families although there is some evidence that married stepmother
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families tend to have more health inputs such as having dental visits and having a usual
source for care.
4) Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families
Many differences between grandparents and other non-parental households
disappear in a regression framework, and for those that remain, the results are the same as
simple descriptive comparisons. For instance, grandparents and other non-parental
families have similar results for most child outcomes examined except for morbidity and
current health status. On one hand, children living in grandparent households are
associated with a lower possibility o f morbidity than children living in other non-parental
families, after controlling for economic resources and inputs. On the other hand, children
living in other non-parental families tend to have better current health status, but this
distinction vanishes after economic resources and inputs are controlled for. With respect
to inputs, grandparent households tend to have more health inputs after economic
resources are controlled for, such as having insurance and having a usual source of health
care. This could be due to the availability o f Medicaid or SCHIP programs. Children in
grandparent households are also more likely to be on a sports team, but grandparents
have lower mental health scores than other non-parental MKAs. In contrast to descriptive
comparisons, children from grandparent families are more likely to experience food
insecurity and are less likely to take after-school lessons, which could be due to a lack of
economic resources: after economic resources are controlling for, these two types of
families have similar results with respect to both inputs.
To sum up, some regression results reinforce those obtained from simple
descriptive statistics comparisons and others do not. Results from regression analyses
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help us not only better understand the existence o f differences in child outcomes and
inputs associated with different family structures, but also help us better understand
where these differences come from. Again, traditional families are associated with better
child outcomes and more inputs than most non-traditional families. Within nontraditional families, living with the biological father is associated with better health
outcomes than living with the biological mother. The results also suggest that living in
married stepfather families is usually associated with better child outcomes than living
with single mothers. In contrast, children living in cohabiting stepfather families fare no
better than those living in single-mother families. Economic resources and inputs
contribute to the differences observed in child outcomes associated with family
structures: once they are controlled for, non-traditional families are usually less different
from each other and less different from traditional families as well.

5.2.2.

Stratifying the whole sample by race/ethnicitv. Space limitations dictate that

for outcomes equations, we only estimate model 2b) and 2c) when stratifying the sample
by race/ethnicity as well as by gender. There is one caveat before going on to discuss the
results: because non-Hispanic whites are the dominant majority, attempts were made to
draw a random sample from this group so that its sample size is comparable to the
Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks. However, estimates from sample to sample vary
substantially, with including more non-traditional families yielding more similar
estimates to the results obtained from the entire non-Hispanic whites sample. This may be
due to the fact that although non-Hispanic whites dominate in absolute number of
observations, non-traditional families are relatively rare among this group. Given the
volatile nature o f estimates from random sample to random sample, the full sample of
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non-Hispanic whites is retained for stratifying estimation by race/ethnicity. As in the
previous section that discusses the results for the full sample, here we will also focus on
the four major comparisons among different family structures.
1) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Families
Generally speaking, the differences in child outcomes associated with living in
non-traditional families and living in traditional families are biggest for non-Hispanic
whites, and smallest for Hispanics (refer to Table 19). The same pattern follows
regarding inputs.
It is notable that living with single fathers is associated with better current health
status than living in traditional families only for Hispanic children, not for children from
other racial groups. For compared health status, living with a single father is associated
with a less likely deterioration in health status only for Hispanic and non-Hispanic white
children, but not for non-Hispanic black children.
2) Gender o f the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent Families
There are racial differences associated with single-parent families with respect to
child developmental outcomes but not so much with respect to health outcomes, as shown
in Table 20. For instance, in contrast to the results for the full sample, 12-17 year old
Hispanic children living with single fathers tend to have fewer behavioral problems than
their peers living with single mothers; but for 12-17 year old non-Hispanic black
children, living with single mothers is not statistically different from living with single
fathers regarding behavioral problems. There are also racial differences regarding certain
inputs between single-parent households. Non-Hispanic black children living with single
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mothers tend to receive more health inputs than living with single fathers, which is
similar to the results obtained from the full sample.
Between the two types of married stepparent families, fewer differences exist
between these two types o f families within each racial group and relatively less
dissimilarity is found across different racial groups. Although it is hard to detect any
patterns, generally speaking, stepmother families and stepfather families vary least for
non-Hispanic black children but vary most for non-Hispanic white children regarding
both outcomes and inputs.
Comparing cohabiting stepfather with cohabiting stepmother families, the
distinction between these two family structures is negligible for Hispanics and nonHispanic blacks but is significant for non-Hispanic whites, particularly regarding inputs.
Once all three pairs o f comparisons are taken into account, it is noticeable that
there are no differences in children’s morbidity between the two types o f single-parent
families as well as between the two types o f cohabiting stepparent families for nonHispanic whites, but such distinctions exist for both non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics.
If the selection hypothesis we proposed earlier is true, then this finding suggests that such
selection primarily exists for certain non-Hispanic black and Hispanic households.
Another observation is about 6-11 year old non-Hispanic white children. It seems that if
there is a stepparent present, no matter in the form o f marriage or cohabitation, then the
company of a biological mother is associated with better behavioral outcomes than that o f
a biological father. This pertains to neither non-Hispanic blacks nor Hispanics.
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3) The Presence o f a Stepparent
Between single-mother families and cohabiting stepfather families, once inputs
are controlled for, there is no distinction for non-Hispanic blacks with respect to all child
outcomes (see Table 21), which is the same as for the full sample. For Hispanics,
however, living in cohabiting stepfather families are associated with better health
outcomes than living in single-mother families.
Comparing single-mother families with married stepfather families shows that
non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics have similar results to those obtained for the full
sample, but the results are different for non-Hispanic blacks. For instance, after inputs are
controlled for, living with single mothers is associated with higher school engagement
than living in married stepfather families for non-Hispanic black children. With respect to
inputs, once economic resources are controlled for, living in married stepfather families
tends to have more inputs than living in single-mother families for Hispanics and nonHispanic whites, which is similar to the whole sample results. But the inputs level
between single mother and married stepmother families are less different for nonHispanic blacks than for the other two racial groups.
When comparing cohabiting stepfather with married stepfather families, the
distinction between these two family structures are greatest for non-Hispanic whites,
which is similar to the full sample results. In contrast, for Hispanics, these two family
structures are similar except that living in cohabiting stepfather families is associated
with lower likelihood of experiencing deterioration in health status.
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Therefore, the results suggest that single-mother families are associated with child
outcomes that are better than or similar to those o f married or cohabiting stepfather
families for non-Hispanic blacks. This finding is of interest given the prevalence of
single-mother families within this racial group. Married and cohabiting stepfather
families are very similar to each other for both Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks.
Comparing single-father and cohabiting stepmother families, the two living
arrangements are not statistically different with respect to child outcomes for nonHispanic black children, which is similar to the comparison results obtained from full
sample comparisons (refer to Table 22). However, for Hispanic children, living with
cohabiting stepmother families is associated with lower likelihood o f morbidity than
living with single-father families. When it comes to inputs, these two family structures do
not make any difference for Hispanics regarding all inputs considered, but they differ
regarding some inputs for both non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites.
Comparing single-father families with married stepmother families reveals some
racial differences in child outcomes associated with living in these two family structures.
In contrast to the results for the full sample, living in married stepmother families seems
to be associated with better current health status than living with single fathers for nonHispanic white children. However, no differences in current health status associated with
these two living arrangements are found for children from the other two racial groups.
No differences exist between living in cohabiting stepmother and living with
married stepmother families regarding all child outcomes examined, which is similar to
the full sample comparisons with one exception for non-Hispanic black children. It is
found that non-Hispanic black children living in cohabiting stepmother families tend to
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have lower probability o f morbidity than those living in married stepmother families. The
causality could go the other way: a biological father with a child having serious health
problems may be less likely to find a partner and get married again. Few differences
between living with married stepmother and cohabiting stepmother families are found for
all racial groups regarding inputs.
There is one caveat about this comparison as well as any comparison involving
cohabiting stepmother families: the small number o f cohabiting stepmother families in
the sample suggests that the estimates are not as accurate as for other household types,
especially after stratifying the sample by race. Therefore we are hesitant to give any
further interpretation or conclusion based on such results.
4) Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families
Stratified results show that living in grandparent families is occasionally
associated with better child outcomes for different racial groups than living in other nonparental families (see Table 23), but that the improvements involve different kinds of
outcomes. For example, children living in grandparent households tend to have lower
likelihood of morbidity than children living in other non-parental households for nonHispanic blacks, which is the same as that for the full sample, but this finding is no
longer relevant to either non-Hispanic whites or Hispanics. In contrast, living in
grandparent households is associated with fewer behavioral problems than living in other
non-parental households for 6-11 year old Hispanic children as well as for 12-17 year old
non-Hispanic white children.
In terms o f inputs, both non-Hispanic black and Hispanic grandparents are more
likely to have a usual source o f care than other non-parental caregivers do, which is the
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same as the result for the full sample. However, no such difference exists between
grandparent and other non-parental households for non-Hispanic whites. For all other
inputs, the two living arrangements are similar to each other for both non-Hispanic blacks
and Hispanics. The results regarding other input differentials obtained from full sample
comparisons apply only to non-Hispanic whites.
Prior research in sociology, psychology, social work and education has found that
parenting practices and cultural norms o f parenting behaviors vary considerably across
race and ethnic groups. We stratify the sample to see whether there is disparity in child
outcomes associated with living in different family structures. The results show that the
differences in child outcomes associated with living in non-traditional families and living
in traditional families are greatest for non-Hispanic whites, and smallest for Hispanics.
Within non-traditional families, if the selection theory we proposed is true, then the
findings suggest that healthy children are more likely to reside in a biological father
headed household for Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks, but not necessarily for nonHispanic whites. Moreover, given the prevalence of single-mother families within nonHispanic blacks, it is interesting to see that single-mother families are associated with
child outcomes that are better than or similar to those of married or cohabiting stepfather
families for non-Hispanic black children. Finally, despite the large literature from other
disciplines that describes the differences in grandparent households across racial groups,
our stratified results show less dissimilarities across race.
5.2.3.

Stratifying the whole sample by sender. Here we again focus on the four

types of comparisons to investigate how the results may differ contingent on the child
gender, reported in Tables 24-28.
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1) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Families
Although no obvious pattern arises for the outcome equations, boys’ outcomes are
generally more adversely associated with living outside married two-parent families
compared to living in married two-parent families than girls are, with a few exceptions
(refer to Table 24). It is noteworthy that with respect to current health status and
compared health status, boys living with single fathers tend to have better current health
status and lower likelihood o f health status getting worse in the past 12 months than their
peers living in traditional families, which is similar to the full sample comparison results.
However, such a distinction does not exist for girls. If selection into single-father families
exists, then these findings suggest that selection pertains particularly to boys but not for
girls: healthy boys are more likely than healthy girls to be living with single fathers.
2) Gender o f the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent Families
First, comparisons are made between single-parent households (see Table 25).
For girls, there are no differences between living with single fathers and living with
single mothers regarding all outcomes examined. In contrast, for boys, generally
speaking, living with single fathers is associated with better outcomes than living with
single mothers except for 12-17 year old behavioral outcomes. Differences in inputs also
exist between these two living arrangements when comparing boys with girls. For
example, boys living with single mothers tend to receive more health inputs such as
dental visits and well-child care visits than boys living with single fathers. In contrast, we
do not find such a distinction for girls. These findings together could suggest selection
depending on the child’s health: healthy boys are more likely to live with single fathers
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than to live with single mothers; single mothers tend to take care o f less healthy boys and
therefore are more likely to invest more health-related inputs for those boys.
When comparing married stepmother to married stepfather families, girls living
with married stepfather families are more school engaged than those living with married
stepmother families. For boys, once inputs are controlled for, living in married stepfather
families is associated with fewer behavioral problems (12-17 year old only) than living in
stepmother families.
There are no gender differences in boys’ and girls’ outcomes between living in
cohabiting stepmother and living in cohabiting stepfather families. However, gender
differences exist with respect to inputs: by and large, girls living in cohabiting stepmother
families tend to receive more inputs than living in cohabiting stepfather families, which
does not pertain to boys.
Overall, adolescent boys living in single-mother families tend to have fewer
behavioral problems than their counterparts living in single-father families, and
adolescent boys living in married stepfather families are associated with fewer behavioral
problems than their counterparts living in married stepmother families. These results
seem suggesting that the presence of the biological mother is associated with better
behavioral outcomes than the presence o f the biological father for adolescent boys.
Again, this could be due to reverse causality; adolescent boys with behavioral problems
may be more likely to live with their fathers.
3) The Presence o f a Stepparent
Again, we first make comparisons between single-mother families and cohabiting
stepfather families. The results obtained from the full sample do not apply equally to
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boys and girls. Living in single-mother families vs. living in cohabiting stepfather
families are not statistically different from each other for girls with respect to all
outcomes, but girls living in single-mother families tend to receive more inputs than girls
living in cohabiting stepfather families. In contrast, boys living in single-mother families
tend to have better outcomes such as higher school engagement and lower probability o f
morbidity than living in cohabiting stepfather families. Therefore, adding a cohabiting
stepfather is not associated with better outcomes for girls, and it is associated with worse
outcomes for boys.
Second, single-mother families are compared with married stepfather families,
and subtle differences by gender again appear. The comparison shows that living in
married stepfather families is associated with better child outcomes such as current health
status and behavioral outcomes for 12-17 year-old girls than living in single-mother
families. But such differences could be explained by differences in inputs, as girls from
married stepfather families receive more inputs than girls from single-mother families.
Once inputs are controlled for, the two family structures are no longer statistically
different from each other for girls. In contrast, for boys, once inputs are controlled for,
boys from single-mother families tend to be more school engaged and have fewer
behavioral problems (12-17 years old) than boys from married stepfather families do.
Again, adding a married stepfather is not associated with better child outcomes for boys,
at least once inputs are controlled for.
Third, comparing cohabiting stepfather families with married stepfather families
shows that married stepfather families are associated with fewer behavioral problems for
12-17 year old girls than living with cohabiting stepfather families, which could be

-96-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

explained by differences in inputs between those two types o f families (see Table 26). In
contrast, these two family structures are not statistically different from each other with
respect to all outcomes considered for boys. To sum up, for girls, having a married
stepfather in the household is associated with better child outcomes than without a
stepfather, probably by improving the inputs available to the household. For boys,
single-mother families are associated with better school and behavioral outcomes than
married and cohabiting stepfather families, although adding a male role into the
household also improves the level of inputs for boys such as lower probability o f food
insecurity and higher likelihood of sports participation. However, the results show that
boys from both married stepfather families and single-mother families tend to receive
more well-child care than boys from cohabiting stepfather families. Between married
stepfather and cohabiting stepfather families, girls living in married stepfather families
fare better than those living in cohabiting stepfather families. In contrast, comparisons
between these two family types show no difference in boys’ outcomes.
Turning now to the presence o f a stepmother, we compare single-father and
cohabiting stepmother families. Boys living in single-father families tend to have better
outcomes, such as being more school engaged (which could be due to differences in
inputs) and better health status, than boys living in cohabiting stepmother families
(comparison results are summarized in Table 27). In contrast, these two family structures
are associated with statistically similar outcomes for girls, which is the same as the
results from the full sample comparisons. Next, in contrast to the results o f full sample
comparisons between single-father families and married stepmother families, boys living
in single-father families tend to have better health and behavioral outcomes than those
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living in married stepmother families. Again, no such distinction regarding any child
outcome investigated exists for girls between these two types o f families.
Finally, comparing married stepmother families to cohabiting stepmother families
shows no differences between these two family structures for either boys or girls
regarding outcomes, which is the same as the result from full sample comparisons.
However, boys from married stepmother families tend to receive more o f certain inputs
than those from cohabiting stepmother families do.
Therefore, the presence o f a stepmother, no matter through formal marriage or
informal cohabitation, is associated with no statistically significant differences for girls
with respect to child outcomes investigated by the current study. For boys, the presence
of a stepmother, including both cohabiting and married (which are essentially similar to
each other) is associated with worse child outcomes than simply living with their single
fathers. This combined with the results for the presence o f a stepfather suggests that
boys’ outcomes are more strongly associated (negatively) with the presence o f a
stepparent o f either gender.
4) Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families
Again, unlike the results from the full sample comparisons, living in grandparent
families is not statistically different from living in other non-parental families for girls
(summarized in Table 28). However, for boys, in addition to the results shown by the full
sample comparisons, boys living with grandparents have better other outcomes, such as
higher school engagement and fewer behavioral problems (12-17 years old), than boys
living in other non-parental families. Regarding inputs, girls from grandparent
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households receive more inputs than their peers from other non-parental households. In
contrast, for boys the results are mixed.
Hence, these findings add further evidence to literature reviewed earlier that
documents gender differences in child outcomes. Generally speaking, boys have more
adverse outcomes when living outside married two-parent families than girls do. Within
non-traditional families, boys living with single fathers are associated with better school
and health outcomes than living with single mothers. If selection o f healthy children into
single-father families exists, then our findings suggest that such selection pertains
particularly to boys and not to girls. However, we find that adolescent boys from single
mother families tend to have fewer behavioral problems than their counterparts from
single-father families, and adolescent boys from married stepfather families are
associated with fewer behavioral problems than their counterparts from married
stepmother families. These findings seem to suggest that the presence o f the biological
mother is associated with better behavioral outcomes than the presence of the biological
father for adolescent boys.
As for adding a male role into a single-mother family, having a married stepfather
in the household is associated with better child outcomes than without a stepfather for
girls, probably by improving the inputs available to the household. Nevertheless, for
boys, single-mother families are associated with better school and behavioral outcomes
than both married and cohabiting stepfather families, although adding a male role into the
household also improves the level o f certain inputs. By the same token, adding a female
role into a single-father family, no matter through formal marriage or informal
cohabitation, makes no difference for girls’ outcomes. In contrast, for boys, the presence
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o f a stepmother, including both cohabiting and married, is associated with worse child
outcomes than simply living with their single fathers.
Overall, these results suggest that the outcomes for boys are much more strongly
associated with the specific composition o f a nontraditional household - e.g., whether
there is a stepparent present, whether they live with their biological mother or father, or
whether they live with their grandparents as opposed to living in some other nonparent
household. Whether these differences are due to differing causal effects or
selection/endogeneity mechanisms remains to be seen.
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CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

A rise in the U.S. child poverty rate took place over the same period as an
increase in divorce rates, an increased rate o f single-mother families and other dramatic
changes to family structure. In this paper, we have examined family structure’s effect on
child outcomes by controlling for income and education level as well as controlling for
some inputs’ levels. This analysis is conducted in a theoretical framework that assumes
parents or caregivers are concerned about the welfare o f their children and try to produce
children’s well-being so as to maximize their own utility. Children’s well-being is
therefore determined by the interaction o f this utility-maximizing behavior with
investment and consumption opportunities in different family environments subject to
budget and time constraints. This paper is the first that consolidates data on children and
their families into a single study and presents a broad picture o f different family
structures in relation to several measures of child well-being.
Given the limited information available in the data sets and the problems
encountered such as the window problem and the endogeneity o f family structure, it is
hard for us to draw causal conclusions. Our goal is therefore to introduce some potential
mechanisms that may help explain why children bom into some types o f families fare
worse than others. Given the difficulty of drawing causal inferences, we proceed in two
ways. Using data from the NSAF, we first present reduced form models that reveal the
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associations between child outcomes and family environments including family
structures. We then present more speculative estimates o f the pathways through which
family structure and other family resources affect child health and developmental
outcomes by adding inputs to the models as well as by stratifying the sample by gender
and by race. This can help to attribute causal effects to different pathways.
The questions raised in the introduction about the effects o f family background on
child development outcomes are difficult to answer for several reasons. First, there is the
question o f the long-term effect of family life and economic environments to which
children are exposed. Second, child development is a complex process, where family
environment is only one element, though likely quite important, o f influencing how
children learn, grow and develop. Genetic factors, given at birth, vary from child to
child. The nature o f family life and environment to which children are exposed vary
substantially even within the same family structure. Third, family structures are often the
results of selective decisions. It is likely that unobserved personality traits affect both
parenting skills and marital status. Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that
child development can affect marital status and adverse child development outcome can
cause family disruption (Corman and Kaestner 1992). Empirically, it is difficult to
control for the unobservable selection factors and for unobserved aspects of the home
environment and parental traits. Despite the aforementioned challenges, some illustrative
findings are in order.
First, traditional families are associated with better child outcomes than any nontraditional families. Children from married two-parent families are doing better than
those from cohabiting two-parent families regarding all outcomes examined in the current
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study, although differences in observed inputs could explain many o f the observed
differences in child outcomes. This suggests that marriage may be a stronger institution
for raising children than cohabitation to the extent that it helps increase input levels
available to children living in the households, when everything else is equal. It also lends
support to the economic view discussed earlier.
Second, some marriages are not necessarily associated with better child outcomes
than cohabitation, as the findings suggest that in general cohabiting two-parent families
are the closest family type to married two-parent families in producing desirable child
outcomes and are associated with better child outcomes than all other non-traditional
families including married stepfamilies. Cohabiting two-parent families are also
associated with better child outcomes than cohabiting stepfamilies. These findings
support the evolutionary view discussed earlier. Moreover, cohabiting two-biologicalparent families are also associated with more advantageous child outcomes than single
parent families. The results support the socialization arguments that two-parent families
provide more supervision for the children. Nevertheless, cohabiting stepfamilies in many
cases do not outperform single-parent families. This again supports the evolutionary
theory.
Third, both parental gender and child gender make a difference. Boys generally
have more adverse outcomes by living outside married two-parent families than girls do.
Moreover, their outcomes are more strongly associated with the specific form that the
nontraditional household takes. Their outcomes differ more depending on whether there
is a stepparent (married or cohabiting, of either gender), whether they live with their
biological mother or father, and whether they live with their grandparents as opposed to
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another nonparent caregiver. For example, boys from single-father families enjoy a better
health status than children from single-mother families. In contrast, boys from single
father families have worse developmental outcomes than boys from single-mother
families. For girls, there is no difference between living with a single father or a single
mother. As discussed earlier in the paper, the evolutionary perspective argues that
mothers invest more o f their resources in children than fathers do and the well-being o f a
given child is o f greater interest to the mother than to the father. According to this theory,
children from two-biological-parent families will have an advantage over those from
other kinds o f families, and children from single-mother families will fare better than
children from single-father families. The evolutionary theory also predicts that children
from single-mother families will do better over those from biological mother/stepfather
families since the stepfather will compete with the stepchildren for the mother’s
resources. Data from the current study show that boys living with single fathers have
better current health status than boys living with single mothers, which could not be
explained by difference in health-related inputs. This could be suggesting that single
fathers might be more likely to obtain the custody of healthy boys. Similarly, it is
possible that they are more likely to obtain custody o f adolescent boys with behavioral
problems.
Just as the evolutionary theory predicts, health and school engagement outcomes
o f boys from cohabiting stepmother families are statistically worse than the outcomes of
boys from single-father families (which could be due to differences in inputs), and
cohabiting stepfather families are statistically associated with worse school engagement
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outcomes than single-mother families are. All o f these results provide evidence
supporting the evolutionary perspective.
Fourth, race/ethnicity could matter, too. Hispanic children are least affected and
non-Hispanic white children are most affected by living outside traditional families.
Hispanic children living in grandparent families do not fare differently from their peers
living in other non-parental families. In contrast, for non-Hispanic black children, living
in grandparent families is associated with higher odds o f morbidity than living in other
non-parental families. Non-Hispanic white children living in grandparent families have
fewer behavioral problems (for children aged 12-17) than those living with non-parental
families do.
Fifth, as expected, adding inputs helps reduce the unfavorable effect of living in
non-traditional families, but it does not eliminate them. Therefore, from a policy-maker’s
point o f view, subsidizing these families, especially single-mother families and
grandparent families, can assist such less advantaged families, but subsidizing alone may
not solve the problems fundamentally.
This paper therefore paints a fuller picture o f the relationship between family
structure and child outcomes. The results presented here add to our understanding of the
least common nontraditional households. In particular, they reveal differences in child
outcomes associated with more subtle differences across nontraditional families such as
the gender of the biological parent, stepparent and child, the strength o f the presence of
stepparent (absent, cohabiting or married) and the ability to live with one’s grandparents
as opposed to some other nonparent caregiver. A worthwhile direction for future
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research is to determine if these differences are causal or due to selection mechanisms
and other unobservable factors.
Last but not least, our study represents the first effort that investigates a complete
array o f family structures and its association with different aspects of child outcomes.
The empirical results suggest that some family structures are more similar to each other,
but others are so distinct from the rest of the non-traditional families that they warrant
individual investigation. For example, as shown in Figure 2, single-father and single
mother families are so dissimilar in terms o f their association with child outcomes that
research ignores single-father families completely, or classifying these two family
structures as one category when studying single-parent households may be misleading.
Therefore, the current study may inform future research by helping to simplify the
classification or aggregation o f diverse family structures in an efficient and meaningful
way.
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Figure 1. The Diversity o f Fam ily Structures
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Figure 2. A Simplification o f the Diverse Fam ily Structures
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Table 1. Prevalence of Different Fam ily Structures

Family Structure ( 10 )
Two parents— married
Single mother
Stepfather—married
Single father
Stepfather— cohabiting
Grandparents
Stepmother—married
Others
Two parents— cohabiting
Stepmother— cohabiting
Total

N
24120
9101
3840
1554
1304
1049
986
952
623
215
43744

Percentage
56.4%
19.8%
8.7%
3.2%
3.0%
2.0%
2.5%
2.5%
1.3%
0.5%
100%

N o te: P ercen tages are calcu lated b y u sin g w eig h ts.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample)
Outcome

Estimate
4.285
0.023
0.119
12.893
7.962
8.091

(Std. Err.)
0.008
0.001
0.002
0.027
0.027
0.033

11.454
0.489
0.638
0.158
0.156
0.047
39.455
0.335
2.126
0.182
0.234
0.238
0.346
0.161
0.251
0.318
0.271
0.726
0.146
0.213
0.641

0.032
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.002
0.058
0.006
0.013
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.005

0.888
2.022
0.926
0.592
0.256
0.029
0.822
0.332
0.536
6.221
79.517
43744
93699279

0.003
0.019
0.002
0.005
0.003
0.002
0.004
0.004
0.005
0.020
0.114

Current health status
Health status getting worse
Has health condition that limits activity
School engagement
Behavioral problems (6-11 years old)
Behavioral problems (12-17 years old)

Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
A ge
Girl
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Any other ethnicity
MKA's age
Number o f children under five years old
Number o f children 6-17 years old
Northeast
West
Midwest
South
MKA has no High School diploma
M KA has High School diploma
M KA has som ecollege education
M KA has a bachelor's or higher degree
M KA is working
Family income below 100% FPL
100% =<Family incom e< 200%
Family income above 200% FPL

Input
Child has health insurance
Number o f dental visits last year
Has usual source for health care
Child received well care last year
Worried whether food would run out
Household doesn't have phone
C hild in the Same School last year
Child took lessons after school last year
Child on sports team last year
M KA aggravation scale score
M KA 100 mental health scale
Number o f observations
Population size
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Fam ily Structure

Two
rarentsmarried

Step
Step father mothermarried married

Single
mother

Single
father

Two parent- Step father- Step mother- Grand
cohabiting parent
cohabiting cohabiting

Other-non
parental

Outcome
Current health status

4.391

4.279

4.257

4,063

4.397

4.124

4.109

4.360

3.870

4.149

Health status getting worse

0.018

0,028

0.012

0.032

0.010

0.023

0.048

0.006

0.029

0.024

Has health condition that lim its activity

0.091

0.148

0.122

0.161

0.102

0.079

0.196

0,139

0.175

0.213

School Engagement

13.283

12,532

12.166

12,410

12.590

12.720

12.108

12.150

12.328

11.904

Behavioral Problems (6-11 years old)

7.684

8.199

8,264

8.321

8.092

8.029

8.765

8.398

8.909

8.653

Behavioral Problems (12-17 years old)

7.664

8.433

8.655

8.652

8.395

8.509

8.809

8.844

8.482

8.937
12.516

Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
Age

11.344

11.953

12.487

11.446

11.508

9.532

11.286

11.223

11.348

Girl

0.489

0.471

0.469

0.511

0.413

0.487

0.486

0.478

0.508

0.469

Non-Hispanic White

0.732

0.671

0.709

0.408

0.719

0.427

0.572

0.724

0.365

0.463

Non-Hispanic Black

0.069

0.135

0.140

0.369

0.142

0.194

0.176

0.177

0.465

0.330

Hispanic

0,142

0.160

0.117

0.188

0.101

0.336

0.220

0.084

0.164

0.151

Any odier ethnicity

0.057

0.034

0.034

0.035

0.038

0.044

0.033

0.016

0.006

0.056

M KA's age

40.227

36.060

37.734

37.797

42.164

35.894

34.845

37.504

56.814

39.002

Num ber o f children under five years old

0.318

0.470

0.468

0.314

0.113

0.454

0.401

0.382

0.255

0.480

Num ber o f children 6-17 years old

2.122

2.151

2.428

2.093

1.839

1.970

2.258

2.394

1.951

2.464

Northeast

0.196

0.128

0.125

0.180

0.170

0.212

0.187

0.090

0.150

0.169

West

0.238

0.222

0.216

0.217

0.274

0.320

0.264

0.270

0.188

0.221

M idwest

0.255

0.233

0.286

0.199

0.206

0.179

0.258

0.227

0.162

0.245

South

0.311

0.417

0.373

0.404

0.351

0.289

0.291

0.413

0.501

0.365

M KA has no High School diploma

0.116

0.164

0.140

0.230

0.155

0.370

0.311

0.152

0.380

0.183

M KA has High School diploma

0.237

0.267

0.294

0.262

0,267

0.278

0.285

0.257

0.216

0.322

M KA has somecollege education

0.299

0.400

0.296

0.351

0.305

0.263

0.303

0.450

0.252

0.308

M KA has a bachelor's or higher degree

0.348

0.170

0,271

0.157

0,273

0.089

0.101

0.140

0.152

0.188

M KA is working

0.727

0.713

0.801

0.745

0.842

0.648

0.670

0.905

0.401

0.699

F amily income below 100% FPL

0.071

0.080

0.075

0.376

0.107

0.216

0.169

0.062

0.323

0.188

100%=<Family income< 200%

0.174

0.213

0.153

0.298

0.211

0.338

0.256

0.258

0.259

0.320

Family income above 200% FPL

0.756

0.707

0.772

0.326

0.682

0.446

0.575

0.680

0.418

0.492

Child has health insurance

0.907

0.885

0.911

0.863

0.873

0.788

0.824

0.917

0.861

0.819

Num ber o f dental visits last year

2.109

2.118

2.150

1.829

1.964

1.583

1.988

1.389

1.755

1.848

Has usual source for health care

0.944

0.919

0.918

0.900

0.886

0.896

0.908

0.849

0.912

0.858

Child received well care last year

0.586

0.581

0,533

0.623

0.537

0,608

0.573

0,550

0.637

0.635

W orried whether food would run out

0.159

0.267

0.192

0.494

0.201

0.414

0.442

0,202

0.310

0.334

Household doesn't have phone

0.020

0.035

0.007

0.046

0.037

0.038

0.061

0.011

0.041

0.047

Child in the Same School last year

0.860

0.785

0.780

0.771

0.825

0.811

0.744

0.799

0.756

0.713

Child took lessons after school last year

0.371

0.307

0.295

0.279

0.299

0.251

0.232

0.253

0.286

0.250

Child on sports team last year

0.593

0.526

0.471

0.443

0.524

0.368

0.402

0.564

0.474

0.400

Input

M KA aggravation scale score

5.990

6.189

6.215

6.706

5.922

6.347

6.738

6.286

7.005

6.754

M KA 100 mental health scale
Number o f observations

81.540

79.129

81.119

74.828

80.439

77.675

73.665

79.727

77.232

79.359

24120

3840

986

9101

1554

623

1304

215

1049

952
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics by Race/Ethnicity

NonHispanic
White

NonHispanic
Black

4.435
0.023
0.115
13.094
7.888
7.990

4.058
0.022
0.145
12.496
8.226
8.435

3.924
0.024
0.116
12.499
7.979
8.277

4.210
0.018
0.089
12.799
7.946
7.809

0.647
0.091
0.028
0.126
0.036
0.009
0.027
0.006
0.012
0.018

0.246
0.074
0.022
0.461
0.029
0.016
0.033
0.006
0.059
0.052

0.514
0.089
0.019
0.239
0.021
0.028
0.042
0.003
0.021
0.024

0.680
0.063
0.018
0.147
0.026
0.012
0.021
0.002
0.003
0.030

11.333
0.496
38.870
0.382
2.243
0.152
0.087
0.208
0.553
0.194
0.284
0.359
0.162
0.710
0.301
0.276
0.423

11.222
0.486
37.732
0.493
2.273
0.137
0.466
0.082
0.314
0.396
0.217
0.267
0.119
0.652
0.267
0.324
0.409

11.449
0.484
40.902
0.308
1.971
0.144
0.482
0.158
0.216
0.086
0.138
0.295
0.482
0.763
0.114
0.161
0.725

Hispanic

Other

Outcome

Current health status
Health status getting worse
Has health condition that limits activity
School Engagement
Behavioral Problems (6-11 years old)
Behavioral Problems (12-17 years old)
Family Structure

Two parents-married
Stepfather-married
Stepmother—married
Single mother
Single father
Two parents—cohabiting
Stepfather—cohabiting
Stepmother—cohabiting
Grandparents
Others

Child, MKA and Household Characteristics

Age
Girl
MKA's age
Number of children under five years old
Number of children 6-17 years old
Northeast
West
Midwest
South
MKA has no High School diploma
MKA has High School diploma
MKA has some college education
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree
MKA is working
Family income below 100% FPL
100%=<Family income< 200%
Family income above 200% FPL

11.542
0.488
39.914
0.287
2.073
0.203
0.195
0.289
0.313
0.100
0.259
0.322
0.319
0.745
0.081
0.174
0.746
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Table 4.(continued)

Input
Child has health insurance
Number o f dental visits last year
Has usual source for health care
Child received well care last year
Worried whether food would run out
Household doesn't have phone
Child in the Same School last year
Child took lessons after school last year
Child on sports team last year
MKA aggravation scale score
MKA 100 mental health scale
Observations

NonNonHispanic Hispanic
White
Black
Hispanic
0.922
0.873
0.760
2.185
1.694
1.646
0.958
0.894
0.839
0.575
0.700
0.553
0.404
0.178
0.433
0.034
0.023
0.049
0.846
0.752
0.799
0.339
0.331
0.263
0.590
0.441
0.438
6.054
6.272
6.766
80.061
78.253
78.388
30214
6321
5703
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Other
0.906
2.173
0.890
0.586
0.229
0.032
0.814
0.468
0.453
6.485
80.138
1506

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics by Gender
Girls

Boys
Std. Err.
0.013
0.002

Outcome
Current health status
Health status getting worse

Mean
4.296
0.021

Std. Err.
0.009
0.001

Mean
4.273
0.024

Has health condition that limits activity
School engagement

0.087
13.535

0.004
0.030

0.149
12.279

0.004
0.041

Behavioral problems (6-11 years old)

7.738

0.034

8.175

0.039

Behavioral problems (12-17 years old)
Family Structure
Two parents—married
Stepfather—married
Stepmother-married
Single mother
Single father
Two parents—cohabiting
Stepfahter—cohabiting
Stepmother—cohabiting
Grandparents
Others
Child, MKA and Household Characteristics
Age
Non-Hispanic White
Non-Hispanic Black
Hispanic
Any other ethnicity
MKA's age
Number o f children under five years old

7.891

0.037

8.283

0.045

0.565
0.084
0.024
0.207
0.027
0.013
0.030
0.005
0.021
0.024

0.007
0.003
0.002
0.005
0.002
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.002
0.002

0.563
0.090
0.026
0.189
0.037
0.013
0.030
0.005
0.019
0.026

0.006
0.004
0.002
0.004
0.002
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.002

11.467
0.637
0.160
0.155
0.047
39.499
0.340

0.042
0.005
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.093
0.009

11.442
0.639
0.156
0.157
0.048
39.413
0.331

0.044
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.003
0.083
0.007

Number o f children 6-17 years old
Northeast
West
Midwest
South
MICA has no High School diploma
MKA has High School diploma
MKA has some college education
MKA has a bachelor's or higher degree
MKA is working
Family income below 100% FPL
100%=<Family income< 200%
Family income above 200% FPL

2.139
0.180
0.236
0.238
0.346
0.163
0.248
0.318
0.271
0.724
0.150
0.209
0.641

0.019
0.004
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.007

2.114
0.184
0.232
0.238
0.347
0.158
0.254
0.317
0.270
0.727
0.142
0.217
0.642

0.016
0.003
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.007
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.006
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Table 5. (continued)
Girls

Boys

Input

Mean

Std Err

Mean

Std Err

Child has health insurance

0.884

0.004

0.892

0.004

Number of dental visits last year

2.060

0.024

1.987

0.025

Has usual source for health care

0.925

0.003

0.927

0.003

Child received well care last year

0.591

0.006

0.593

0.006

Worried whether food would run out

0.253

0.005

0.260

0.005

Household doesn't have phone

0.031

0.003

0.028

0.003

Child in the Same School last year

0.829

0.004

0.816

0.005

Child took lessons after school last year

0.408

0.006

0.259

0.006
0.006

Child on sports team last year

0.462

0.006

0.607

MKA aggravation scale score

6.183

0.026

6.257

0.023

MKA 100 mental health scale

79.585

0.167

79.453

0.168

Observations

21392
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22352

Table 6. Ordered Probit M odels Predicting Child's Current Health Status (Age 617)

Married stepfather
Married stepmother
Single mother
Single father
Cohabiting two parents
Cohabiting stepfather
Cohabiting stepmother
Grandparent
Other non-parental
Child's age
Child's gender, equals 1 for girls
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
MKA's age
Number o f children aged 0-5
Number o f children aged 6-17
West
Midwest
South

-

A

B

c

-0.12
(0.03)***
-0.16
(0.08)**
-0.29
(0.03)***
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.23
(0.10)**
-0.27
(0.08)**
-0.06
(0.14)
-0.49
(0.07)***
-0.2
(0.07)***
-0.02
(0.00)***
0.03
(0.02)*
-0.34
(0.03)***
-0.55
(0.03)***
-0.30
(0.05)***
0.00
(0.00)
-0.04
(0.02)**
-0.03
(0.01)*
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.03)

-0.12
(0.03)***
-0.18
(0.08)**
-0.18
(0.03)***
0.04
(0.04)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.19
(0.08)**
-0.04
(0.14)
-0.27
(0.07)***
-0.16
(0.07)**
-0.01
(0.00)***
0.03
(0.02)
-0.31
(0.03)***
-0.41
(0.03)***
-0.33
(0.05)***
0.00
(0.00)***
0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01
-0.03
(0.03)
0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)

-0.07
(0.03)*
-0.15
(0.09)*
-0.06
(0.03)**
0.07
(0.04)*
-0.02
(0.10)
-0.03
(0.08)
0.01
(0.14)
-0.2
(0.07)***
-0.08
(0.07)
-0.01
(0.00)***
0.04
(0.02)**
-0.29
(0.03)***
-0.4
(0.03)***
-0.27
(0.05)***
-0.01
(0.00)***
0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.01
-0.03
(0.03)
0.00
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
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Table 6. (continued)
A
M KA has a high school diploma
MKA has som e college
M KA has a bachelor's or higher degree
MKA is working
Family incom e below 100% o f FPL
Family incom e below 200% o f FPL

B
0.26
(0.03)***
0.34
(0.03)***
0.46
(0.04)***
0.02
(0.03)
-0.21
(0.04)***
-0.12
(0.03)***

Have health insurance
Number o f dental visits
Have a usual place for care
Number ot w ell-child care visits during last 12
Worry food would run out
N o phone service at home
Stay in the same school during last 12 months
Take after-school lessons
On a sports team
M KA aggravation score

C
0.21
(0.03)***
0.26
(0.03)***
0.33
(0.04)***
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.08
(0.04)**
-0.05
(0.03)*
0.09
(0.03)***
0.01
(0.00)**
0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.17
(0.02)***
0.03
(0.08)
0.04
(0.02)*
0.06
(0.02)***
0.2
(0.02)***
-0.04
(0.01)***
0.01
(0.00)***

M KA 100 point mental health score
43744

Number o f observations

Note: 1. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.
2.*** indicates significant at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05 level and * at 0.1 level
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Table 7. Ordered Probit M odels Predicting School Engagem ent (Age 6-17)

Married stepfather
Married stepmother
Single mother
Single father
Cohabiting tw o parents
Cohabiting stepfather
Cohabiting stepmother
Grandparent
Other non-parental
Child's age
Child's gender, equals 1 for girls
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
MKA's age
Number o f children aged 0-5
Number o f children aged 6-17
West
M idwest
South

A
-0.21
(0.03)***
-0.34
(0.09)***
-0.29
(0.03)***
-0.24
(0.06)***
-0.22
(0.07)***
-0.38
(0.07)***
-0.40
(0.13)***
-0.42
(0.06)***
-0.41
(0.06)***
-0.03
(0.00)***
0.50
(0.02)***
-0.10
(0.03)***
-0.18
(0.03)***
-0.14
(0.05)***
0.01
(0.00)***
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.05
(0.03)*
-0.05
(0.03)
-0.06
(0.03)**

-
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B
-0.21
(0.03)***
-0.34
(0.09)***
-0.23
(0.03)***
-0.21
(0.06)***
-0.15
(0.08)*
-0.34
(0.07)***
-0.38
(0.13)***
-0.31
(0.06)***
-0.38
(0.07)***
-0.03
(0.00)***
0.51
(0.02)***
-0.07
(0.03)**
-0.12
(0.03)***
-0.16
(0.05)***
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.03)*
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.03)*

c
-0.16
(0.03)***
-0.30
(0.09)***
-0.11
(0.03)***
-0.18
(0.06)***
-0.06
(0.08)
-0.19
(0.07)***
-0.32
(0.13)**
-0.21
(0.07)***
-0.27
(0.07)***
-0.03
(0.00)***
0.52
(0.02)***
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.10
(0.03)***
-0.08
(0.05)**
0.00
(0.00)**
0.01
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.02)**
-0.04
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.03)*

-
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Table 7. (continued)
A
M KA has a high school diploma
M KA has som e college
M KA has a bachelor's or higher degree
M KA is working
Fam ily incom e below 100% o f FPL
Fam ily incom e below 200% o f FPL

B
0.08
(0.02)***
0.15
(0.03)***
0.26
(0.03)***
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.04)*
-0.06
(0.03)**

Have health insurance
Number o f dental visits
Have a usual place for care
Number o tw ell-ch ild care visits during last
Worry food would run out
N o phone service at home
Stay in the sam e school during last 12
Take after-school lessons

C
0.02
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)**
0.14
(0.03)***
-0.05
(0.02)**
0.03
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.04)
0.01
(0.01)**
0.08
(0.04)*
0.05
(0.02)**
-0.11
(0.03)***
0.01
(0.08)
0.05
(0.02)**
0.13
(0.02)***

On a sports team

0.19
(0.02)***

M KA aggravation score

-0.11
(0.01)***
0.01
(0.00)***

M KA 100 point mental health score
Number o f observations

43329

Note: 1. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.
2.*** indicates significant at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05 level and * at 0.1 level
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Table 8. Ordered Probit M odels Predicting Behavioral Problem s (age 6-11 and 1217)
|
Married stepfather
Married stepmother
Single mother
Single lather
Cohabiting two parents
Cohabiting stepfather
Cohabiting stepmother
Grandparent
Other non-parental
Child's age
Child's gender,= 1 lor girls
Non-Hispanic black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
MKA's age
Number ot children aged 0-5
Number o l children aged 6-17
West
Midwest
South

0.23
(0.05)***
0.29
(0.13)**
0.32
(0.04)***
0.20
(0.07)***
0.19
(0.08)**
0.50
(0.10)***
0.41
(0.20)**
0.66
(0.07)***
0.48
(0.09)***
0.05
(0.01)***
-0.23
(0.02)***
0.00
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.01
(0.08)
0.01
(0.01)*
0.03
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.04)
0.01
(0.03)

A ge 6-11
0.23
(0.05)***
0.30
(0.14)**
0.26
(0.04)***
0.17
(0.07)***
0.14
(0.08)*
0.46
(0.10)***
0.40
(0.21)*
0.56
(0.08)***
0.46
(0.09)***
0.05
(0.01)***
-0.24
(0.02)***
-0.02
(0.06)
-0.08
(0.03)**
0.01
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.02)**
0.00
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.04)
0.00
(0.03)

-
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0.17
(0.06)***
0.38
(0.14)***
0.09
(0.04)**
0.17
(0.08)**
0.03
(0.08)
0.16
(0.08)**
0.46
(0.21)**
0.40
(0.09)***
0.39
(0.09)***
0.06
(0.01)***
-0.26
(0.03)***
-0.12
(0.05)**
-0.08
(0.04)**
-0.11
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.02)
-0.08
(0.01)***
0.05
(0.03)
0.03
(0.04)
0.06
(0.04)*

0.33
(0.04)***
0.44
(0.09)***
0.47
(0.03)***
0.39
(0.06)***
0.44
(0.12)***
0.53
(0.08)***
0.50
(0.17)***
0.51
(0.11)***
0.56
(0.07)***
0.00
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.03)
0.04
(0.04)
0.04
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.07)
-0.01
(0.01)***
0.03
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
0.05
(0.04)
0.03
(0.04)
0.04
(0.03)

A ge 12-17
0.32
(0.04)***
0.46
(0.09)***
0.43
(0.04)***
0.37
(0.06)***
0.38
(0.13)***
0.49
(0.09)***
0.52
(0.17)***
0.39
(0.10)***
0.54
(0.07)***
0.00
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.03)
0.02
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)**
0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.05
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)

0.25
(0.05)***
0.37
(0.10)***
0.18
(0.04)***
0.39
(0.07)***
0.18
(0.17)
0.28
(0.08)***
0.38
(0.18)**
0.24
(0.10)**
0.37
(0.10)***
-0.01
(0.01)*
-0.21
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.04)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.22
(0.07)***
0.00
(0.00)*
0.02
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.01)***
0.12
(0.04)***
0.09
(0.04)**
0.06
(0.04)

-
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Table 8. (continued)
A
M K A has a high school diploma
M K A has som e college
M KA has a bachelor's or higher
IVLKA is w orking
f am ily incom e below 100% ot
fa m ily incom e below 200% o f

B

C

B

C

-0.13

0.00

-0.13

-0.12

(0.05)***

(0.04)

(0.04)***

(0.05)**

-0.15

0.00

-0.13

-0.07

(0.04)***

(0.04)

(0.04)***

(0.04)*

-0.21

-0.12

-0.18

-0.01

(0.04)***

(0.04)

-0.01

0.05

-0.07

0.00

(0 .0 3 )

(0.03)

(0.04)*

(0.04)

0.12

-0.03

0.07

-0.10

(0.05)**

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.05)*

(0.04)*** (0.04)***

0.03

0.01

0.04

-0.03

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.04)

Have health insurance
Number ot dental visits
Have a usual place tor care
Number ot w ell-ch ild care visits
Worry tbod w ould run out
N o phone service at hom e
Stay in the sam e school during
Take alter-school lessons

0.01

0.07

(0.05)

(0.05)

0.01

0.00

(0.01)

(0.00)

0.01

0.02

(0.07)

(0.04)

0.07

0.03

(0.03)**

(0.03)

0.12

0.15

(0.04)**

(0.04)***

0.09

-0.25

(0.09)

(0.15)

-0.09

-0.18

(0.04)**

(0.03)***

-0.01

-0.12

(0.03)

(0.02)***

-0.15

-0.27

(0.03)***

(0.02)***

Un a sports team
M K A aggravation score
M K A 100 point mental health
Number ot observations

A

21613

0.20

0.21

(0.01)***

(0.01)***

-0.02

-0.02

(0.00)***

(0.00)***
21950

Notes: 1. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported.
2 *** indicates significant at 0.01 level, ** at 0.05 level and * at 0.1 level
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Table 9. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional Fam ilies (Descriptive Statistics for Full
Sample)
Outcomes
Current health

Only single father families are better

Health getting worse

Only married stepmother, single father, and cohabiting stepmother
families are better

Morbidity

Only cohabiting two parent families are better

School

None is better than traditional

Behavior 6-11

None is better than traditional

Behavior 12-17

None is better than traditional

Economic Resources
MKA college & above

None is better than traditional

MKA working

cohabiting stepmother, single father, married stepmother, single
mother families are better

Family income below 100% of FPL

Only cohabiting stepmother families are better

Family income above 200% of FPL

Only married stepmother families are better

Inputs
1.Health insurance

cohabiting stepmother, married stepmother are better

2.Dental visit

married stepmother, married stepfather are better

3.Usual source of care
4.Well-child care

None is better than traditional
grandparent, other non-parental, single mother, cohabiting twoparent are better

5.Food insecurity

None is better than traditional

6.No phone

cohabiting stepmother, married stepmother families are better

7.School stability

None is better than traditional

8.After-school lessons

None is better than traditional

9. On sports team

None is better than traditional

10.MKA aggravation

Only single father families are better

1l .MKA mental health

None is better than traditional

Note: "better" means that the non-traditional family structure(s) reported is(are) associated with more desirable
outcomes or higher level of inputs than the traditional families regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are
positive or negative. All the relationships reported are statistically significant.
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Table 10. The G ender of the Parent (Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample)

stepmommar
singledad vs. singlemom stepdadmar
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Economic resources
MKA college & above
MKA working
Family income below
100% ofFPL
Family income above
200% o f FPL
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4 .Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

vs. stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh

vs.

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmom coh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh

singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom

stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmommar

singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom

stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh

singledad>singlemom

stepmomm ar>stepdadm ar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh

singledad>singlemom

stepmommar>stepdadmar stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh

singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singlemom>singledad '
singlemom>singledad
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom

stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepmommar>stepdadmar

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh

Note: ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are
positive or negative.
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Table 11. The Presence o f a Stepfather (Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample)
O utcom es
Current health

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh>singlem om

Health getting w orse

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

Morbidity

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

School

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

Behavior 6-11

stepdadmar>singlemom >stepdadcoh

Behavior 12-17

stepdadmar>singlemom >stepdadcoh

E conom ic R esou rces
M K A college & above

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

M K A working

singlem om >stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh

Fam ily incom e below 100% o f FPL

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh>singlem om

Fam ily incom e above 200% o f FPL

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh>singlem om

Inputs
1 .Health insurance

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh>singlem om

2.Dental visit

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

3.Usual source o f care

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

4 .W ell-child care

singlem om >stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh

5.Food insecurity

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh>singlem om

6.N o phone

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

7. School stability

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

8.After-school lessons

stepdadmar>singlemom >stepdadcoh

9 .On sports team

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

10.M KA aggravation

stepdadmar>singlemom >stepdadcoh

11 .M KA mental health

stepdadm ar>singlem om >stepdadcoh

Note: ">" indicates the fam ily structure before the sign is associated w ith more desirable
outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the fam ily structure after the sign, regardless o f
whether the outcom es/inputs are positive or negative.
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Table 12. The Presence o f a Stepm other (Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample)

sin gled ad vs. stepm om coh vs. stepm om m ar
O utcom es
Current health

singledad>stepmomcoh>stepmommar

Health getting worse

stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar

Morbidity

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

School

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

Behavior 6-11

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

Behavior 12-17
E conom ic R esources

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

M KA college & above

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

M KA working

stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar

Family incom e below 100% o f FPL

stepmomcoh>stepmommar>singledad

Family incom e above 200% o f FPL
Inputs

stepmommar>singlefather=stepmomcoh

l.H ealth insurance

stepmomcoh>stepmommar>singIedad

2.Dental visit

stepmommar>singlefather>stepmomcoh

3 .Usual source o f care

stepmommar>singlefather>stepmomcoh

4. W ell-child care

stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar

5.Food insecurity

stepmommar>singlefather=stepmomcoh

6.N o phone

stepmommar>stepmomcoh>singldad

7. School stability

singledad>stepmomcoh>stepmommar

8.After-school lessons

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

9.On sports team

stepmomcoh>singledad>stepmommar

10.MKA aggravation

singledad>stepmommar>stepmomcoh

11 .MKA mental health

stepmommar>singlefather>stepmomcoh

Note: ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable
outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f
whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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Table 13. G randparent vs. Other Non-parental Fam ilies (Descriptive Statistics for
Full Sample)
O utcom es
Current health

other>grandparent

Health getting worse

other>grandparent

Morbidity

grandparent>other

School

grandparent>other

Behavior 6-11

other>grandparent

Behavior 12-17

grandparent>other

Econom ic R esources
M KA college & above

other>grandparent

M KA working

other>grandparent

Family income below 100% o f FPL

other>grandparent

Family income above 200% o f FPL

other>grandparent

Inputs
1 .Health insurance

grandparent>other

2.Dental visit

oth er>gran dpar ent

3.Usual source o f care

grandparent>other

4.W ell-child care

grandparent>other

5.Food insecurity

grandparent>other

6.N o phone

grandparent>other

7.School stability

grandparent>other

8.After-school lessons

grandparent>other

9 .On sports team

grandparent>other

10.MKA aggravation

other>grandparent

11 .MKA mental health

other>grandparent

Note: ">" indicates the fam ily structure before the sign is associated with more desirable
outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f
whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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Table 14. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional Fam ilies (Regression for Full Sample)
Outcomes
twomar>stepdadmar‘1,u’'';
twomar>stepmommara,bc;
twomar>smglemom3'b,c;
singledad>twomarc;

twomar>twocoha

twomar>stepdadcoh3'b;
Current health

twomar>granda,b'c; twomar>others3,b
twomar>stepdadmarL’;
twomar>singlemoma,b;
singledad>twomarc;;
twomar>stepdadcoh3,b;
stepmomeoh>twomar3'bc;

Health getting worse

twomar>granda,b;
twomar>stepdadmard’“1';
twomar>singlemom3’b,‘:;
twocoh>twomarc;
twomar>stepdadcoh3’b’l:;

Morbidity

twomar>granda'b; twomar>others3,b'c
twomar>stepdadmar"'“'';
twomar>stepmommara'b'c;
twomar>singlemoma’b,c;
twomar>singledad3'b'c;
twomarHwocoh3,11;
twomar>stepdadcoh3'bc;
twomar>stepmomcoha’b,c;

School

twomar>grand3'b'c; twomar>othersabc
twomar>stepdadmar
twomar>stepmommar3’b'c;
twomar>singlemoma’bc;
twomar>singledada’b'c;
twomar>twocoh3’b;
twomar>stepdadeoha,b'c;
twomar>stepmomcoha’b’l:;

Behavior 6-11

twomar>granda'bc; twomar>otherslb c
twomar>stepdadmar
twomar>stepmommar3,b,c;
twomar>singlemoma'bc;
twomar>singledada,b'c;
twomar>twocoh3’b;
twoma^stepdadcoh3,11'3;
twomar>stepmomcoha’b'c;

Behavior 12-17

twomar>grand3'b'c; twomar>others3,b,c
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Table 14. (continued)
Inputs
twom ar>singlem om a;
twomar>singledada’b;
twomar>twocoha’b;
twomar>stepdadcoha,b;
1 .Health insurance

twomar>granda; twomar>othersa,b
twom ar>singlem om a;
twomar>singledada;
twomar>twocoha;
twomar>stepmomcoha,b;

2 .Dental visit

twomar>granda
twomar>stepdadmara’b;
twom ar>singlem om a;
twomar>singledada,b;
twomar>twocoha;
twomar>stepdadmoma'b;

3.Usual source o f care

twomar>granda’ t\vomar>othersab
singlemom >twomarb;
twomar>singledada; grand>twomara

4 .W ell-child care

others>twomarb
twomar>stepdadmara;
twom ar>singlem omab;
twomar>singledada,b;
twomar>twocoha’b;
twomar>stepdadcoha,b;

5.Food insecurity

twomar>granda,b’ twomar>othersa,b
twomar>stepmommara,b;
twom ar>singlem om a;
twoniar>singledadab;
twomar>twocoha,b;

6.N o phone

tw om a^stepdadcoh3,1’

twomar>stepdadmara,b;
twomar>stepmommara,b;
twomar>singlem oma’b;
twomar>singledada,b;
twomar>stepdadcoha,b;
7 .School stability

twomar>grandab; twomar>othersa'b
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Table 14. (continued)
Inputs
twomar>stepdadmara;
twom ar>singlem om a’b;
twomar>singledada,b;
twomar>twocoha’b;
twomar>stepdadcoha,b;
twomar>stepmomcoha;
8.After-school lessons

twomar>granda’b' twomar>othersa,b
twomar>stepdadmara,b;
twomar>stepmommara,b;
twom ar>singlem om a'b;
twomar>singledadab;
twomar>twocoha,b;
twomar>stepdadcohab;

9 .On sports team

twomar>granda’ twomar>othersa,b
twomar>stepdadmara,b;
twom ar>singlem om a’b;
twomar>twocoha;
twomar>stepdadcoha,b;

10.MKA aggravation

tw om a^ grand3,15' twomar>othersa’b

twomar>stepdadmara,b;
twom ar>singlem om a’b;
twomar>singledada,b;
twomar>twocoha,b;
twomar>stepdadcoha,b;
11 .MKA mental health

twomar>granda’b; twomar>othersa,b

N ote:(l) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated
with more desirable outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family
structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are
positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA
and family characteristics, "b" indicates that economic resources are added,
and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 15. The Gender of the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent
Families (Regression Results for Full Sample)
singledad vs. singlemom stepmommar vs. stepdadmar stepdadcoh vs. stepmomcoh
Outcomes
Current health

singledad>singlemoma'b'c

Health getting worse

singledad>singlemoma,b'c stepmommar>stepdadmara,b

Morbidity

singledad>singlemoma’b

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha'b'c

School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17

singlemom>singledadc

Inputs
1.Health insurance

singlemom>singledada,b

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha

2.Dental visit

singlemom>singledadb

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b

3.Usual source of care

singlemom>singledada'b

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b

4.Well-child care

singlemom>singledada'b

5.Food insecurity

singledad>singlemoma’b

stepmommar>stepdadmarI,b

6.No phone

singlemom>singledadb

stepmommar>stepdadmara’b

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh

»

b

7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation

singledad>singlemom“’b

1l.MKA mental health

singledad>singlemoma'b

stepmommar>stepdadmarab

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha'b

jj

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha
„b
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh

-

stepmommar>stepdadmar

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or
negative.

(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, “b” indicates
that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 16. The Presence o f a Stepfather (Regression Results for Full Sample)
stepdadcoh vs. singlemom
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit

stepdadmar vs. singlemom stepdadcoh vs stepdadmar
singlemom>stepdadmara'b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha
stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha'b
stepdadmar>singlemoma

singlemom>stepdadcohb

singlemom>stepdadcoha,b

stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma

stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b

3.Usual source of care
4. Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
stepdadcoh>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
6.No phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>stepdadcohab
9.On sports team
singlemom>stepdadcoha,b stepdadmar>singlemoma stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
10.MKA aggravation
stepdadmar>singlcmoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,lj
stepdadmar>singlemoma,b stepdadmar>stepdadcoha,b
1 l.M KA mental health
Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or
negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, “b”
indicates that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that both economic resources and inputs are
added.
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Table 17. The Presence o f a Stepm other (Regression Results for Full Sample)

stepmomcoh vs. singledad stepmommar vs. singledad stepmomcoh vs. stepmommar
Outcomes
Current health

singledad>stepmommarb,c

Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance

stepmomcoh>singledada,b

stepmommar>singledada,b

2.Dental visit

singledad>stepmomcoha,b

stepmommar>singledada

stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b

stepmommar>singledada

stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b

3.Usual source of care
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity

stepmommar>singledada

6.No phone

stepmommar>singledada'b

7.School stability
8. After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation

singledad>stepmommarb
singledad>stepmomcohb

stepmomcoh>stepmommarb

singledad>stepmommarb

11 .MKA mental health
Note: (1J

level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or
negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, “b” indicates
that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 18. G randparent vs. Other Non-parental Fam ilies (Regression Results for Full
Sample)
O utcom es
Current health

others>granda

Health getting worse
Morbidity

grand>othersb,c

School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance

grand>othersb

2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care

grand>othersb

4.W ell-child care
5.Food insecurity

others>granda

6.N o phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons

others>granda

9 .On sports team

grand>othersb

10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

others>granda

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more
desirable outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign,
regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript “a” indicates dependant variables include basic child, M KA and fam ily
characteristics, “b” indicates that economic resources are added, and “c” indicates that
both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 19. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional Fam ilies (Regression Results Stratified by
Race)
Outcomes

Hispanic

Black

W hite

Current

stepmommar>twomarbc

twomar>stepdadmarb’c

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

health

singledad>twomarb,c

twomar>singlemomb,c

twomar>stepmommarb,c

twomar>stepdadcohb

twomar>singlemomb
twomar>stepdadcohb
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb'c
twomar>singlemomb

Health

twomar>singlemomb

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

getting

singledad>twomarbc

stepmommar>twomarbc

singledad>twomarc

worse

stepdadcoh>twomarc

twomar>singlemomb

twomar>stepdadcohbc

Morbidity

School

twomar>stepdadcohb

stepmomcoh>twomarc

others>twomarb,c

twomar>grandb,c

twomar>singlemomb

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

twomar>singlemomb

singledad>twomarb,c

twomar>singlemomb,c

twocoh>twomar€

twocoh>twomarbc

twomar>stepdadcohb,c

stepmomcoh>twomarb,c

twomar>stepdadcohb

twomar>grandb

twomar>grandb,c

stepmomcoh>twomarb,c

twomar>othersb,c

twomar>othersb

twomar>othersbc

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

stepmommar>twomarc

twomar>stepdadmarbc

twomar>singlemomb,c

stepmommar>twomarb,c

stepmommar>twomarb,c

twomar>grandb

twomar>singlemombc

twomar>singlemombc

twomar>othersbc

twomar>singledadb’c

twomar>singledadbc

twomar>stepdadcohb

twomar>twocohb

twomar>grandb,c

twomar>stepdadcohb'c

twomar>othersbc

twomar>stepmomcohb,c
twomar>grandb'c
twomar>othersbc

Behavioral

twomar>stepdadmarb

twomar>singlemomb

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

problems

twomar>stepmommarb,c

twomar>singledadb

twomar>stepmommarb,c

(6-11)

twomar>singlemomb

twomar>twocohb,c

twomar>singlemomb,c

twomar>stepdadcohb

twomar>stepdadcohb,c

twomar>stepdadcohb

twomar>grandb

twomar>grandb,c

twomar>stepmomcohbc

twomar>othersbc

twomar>othersbc

twomar>grandbc

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

twomar>stepdadmarb,c

twomar>stepmommarb,c

twomar>stepmommarb'c

twomar>singlemomb'c

twomar>singlemomb,c

twomar>singlemomb,c

twomar>grandbc

twomar>stepdadcohb,c

twomar>singledadbc

twomar>othersb,c

twomar>grandc

twomar>twocohb

twomar>othersbc

twomar>stepdadcohb,c

twomar>othersb,c
Behavioral
problems
(12-17)

twomar>stepmomcohb,c
twomar>grandb
twomar>othersb,c
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Table 19. (continued)
Inputs

Hispanic

Black

W hite

1.Health
insurance

stepdadmar>twomara

twomar>stepdadmara'b

twomar>singlemoma

stepmommar>twomara,b

twomar>singlemoma,b

twomar>singledadJ,b

singlemom>twomara,b

twomar>twocohdb
twomar>stepdadcoha,b
twomar>granda

2. Dental visit

stepdadmar>twomara

twomar>singlemoma

stepmommar>twomarJ'b

twomar>singledadJ,b

twomar>singledadu

singlemom>twomarb

twomar>stepmomcoha'b

twomar>twocoha,b

twomar>granda,b

twomar>stepmomcoha,b

stepdadcoh>twomara,b

twomar>singIemoma

twomar>othersdb
3. Usual source
of care
twomar>twocoha
grand>twomarb

twomar>singledadu'b

twomar>stepdadmara,b

twomar>othersa

twomar>stepmommara,b
twomar>singlemoma,b
twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha
twomar>stepmomcoha’b
twomar>granda,b
twomar>othersa,b

4. Well-child care singlemom>twomardb

others>twomarb

twomar>singlemomu

singledad>twomarJ’b

twomar>singledadab

twomar>stepdadcoha'b

twomar>twocoha
twomar>grandb
twomar>singlemoma,b

twomar>stepdadmara,b

twomar>twocoha

twomar>stepdadcoha,b

twomar>singlemomab

twomar>stepdadcohab

twomar>granda

twomar>singledadab

5.Food insecurity twomar>singlemoma,b

twomar>othersa,b

twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stepdadcoha,b
twomar>granda,b
twomar>othersab

6. No phone

stepdadmar>twomara,b

twomar>stepdadmarab

twomar>twocoha'b
others>twomara,b

stepmommar>twomara,b

twomar>singlemoma

twomar>singlemoma,b

twomar>singledada,b

twomar>twocohab

twomar>twocoha,b

twomar>stepdadcohJ,b

twomar>stepdadcohdb

7.School stability twomar>stepdadmara,b

twomar>stepmommara'b

twomar>stepdadmara,b

twomar>stepmommara,b

twomar>singledada,b

twomar>singlemoma,b

twomar>singlemomdb

twocoh>twomara'b

twomar>twocoha’b

twomar>grandb

twomar>stepdadcoha

twomar>stepdadcoha,b

twomar>othersb

twomar>grandb
twomar>othersb
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Table 19. (Continued)
Inputs

Hispanic

Black

White

8. After

twomar>singlemomab

twomar>stepmommara’b

twomar>singlemoma,b

school

twomar>twocohab

twomar>singlemoma'b

twomar>singledada,b

lessons

twomar>stepdadcoha,b

twomar>stepdadcoha

twomar>twocoha

twomar>stepmomcoha'b

twomar>stepdadcoha,b
twomar>granda,b
twomar>othersa'b

9. On sports

stepdadmar>twomara

twomar>singlemoma

twomar>stepdadmara'b

team

twomar>twocoha

twomar>singledadab

twomar>stepmommara'b

twomar>stepdadcohab

twomar>othersa

twomar>singlemoma'b

stepmomcoh>twomarb

twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stepdadcoha’b
twomar>granda
twomar>othersa,b

10. MKA

twomar>singlemom,b

twomar>singlemomab

twomar>stepdadmara,b

aggravation

twomar>stepmomcoha'b

twomar>twocoha,b

twomar>singlemoma,b

twomar>granda'b

twomar>stepdadcoha,b

twomar>stepdadcoha,b

twomar>granda

twomar>granda,b
twomar>othersa,b

11. MKA

twomar>stepdadmara’b

mental health twomar>singlemoma'b
twomar>stepdadcoha,b

stepmommar>twomara,b

twomar>stepdadmara’b

twomar>singlemoma

twomar>singlemomB'b

twomar>stepdadcoha,b

twomar>singledad

twomar>stepmomcoha

twomar^wocoh8,11
twomar>stepdadcoha,b

3 b

twomar>stepmomcoha
twomar>grandb
Note:
(1)">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are
positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b"
indicates that economic resources are added and, "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are
added.
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Table 20. The Gender of the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent
Families (Regression Results Stratified by Race)
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4. Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation

Single-m other vs. single-father fam ilies
Hispanic
B lack
singledad>singlemomb,c
singledad>singlemomb,c
singledad>singlemom

singledad>singlemomb,c

W hite
singledad>singlemom
singledad>singlemom ,c

smgledad>singlemomb,c
singledad>singlemom
singlemom>singledadc

singledad>singlemomb

singlemom>singledada,b
singlemom>singledadb
smglemom>singledada’b
singlemom>sxngledad
singledad>singlemoma'b

singledad>singlemoma’b
singledad>singlemoma,b

singlemom>singledada’b
singledad>singlemoma’b
singlemom>singledad
singledad>singlemoma,b

singledad>singlemoma
singledad>singlemoma’b
singledad>singlemoma’b
M arried stepfather vs.
Hispanic
stepmommar>stepdadmarb

singlemom>singledada,b
singledad>singlemoma,b
singledad>singlemoma’b
singledad>singlemoma’l:>
singledad>singlemoma’b
married stepm other families
B lack
W hite
stepmommar>stepdadmar ’
stepdadmar>stepmommarb,c
stepdadmar>stepmommarc

stepmommar>stepdadmar

stepmommar>stepdadmar
stepmommar>stepdadmara
stepdadmar>stepmommar
stepdadmar>stepmotnmarb
stepmommar>stepdadmara,

11 .MKA mental health

stepdadmar>stepmommarb
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Table 20.(continued)
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
1 l.MKA mental health

Cohabiting stepfather vs. cohabiting stepmother families
Black
Hispanic
W hite
stepmomcoh>stepdadcohb,c
stepmomcoh>stepdadcohbc

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b

stepmomcoh>stepdadcohbl:
stepmomcoh>stepdadcohb

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh°

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b
stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b
stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b
stepdadcoh>stepmomcohab
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha,b
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoh“’b
stepmomcoh>stepdadcohab
stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,D

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher
level of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or
negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" indicates
that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 21. The Presence of a Stepfather (Regression Results Stratified by Race)
C ohabiting stepfath er vs. single-m other fa m ilie s

Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2. Dental visit
3. Usual source of care
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9,On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

Hispanic

Black

stepdadcoh>singlemomb'c
stepdadcoh>singlemomb,c

White

stepdadcoh>singlemomb,
singlemom>stepdadcohb
singlemom>stepdadcohb,c
singlemom>stepdadcoha,D

stepdadcoh>singlemoma
singlemom>stepdadcohb
singlemom>stepdadcoha,b
stepdadcoh>singlemoma

stepdadcoh>singlemoma
singlemom>stepdadcohb

stepdadcoh>singlemoma

stepdadcoh>singlemom"singlemom>stepdadcohb
singlemom>stepdadcohb

singlemom>stepdadcohb

M arried stepfath er vs. single-m other fa m ilie s

Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse

Hispanic

Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs

stepdadmar>singlemomb

1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3. Usual source of care
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6,No phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

Black

White

singlemom>stepdadmarc
stepdadmar>smglemomb

stepdadmar>singlemomb
stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma

singlemom>stepdadmarb
stepdadmar>singlemoma’
stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma’b
stepdadmar>singlemom“b

stepdadmar>singlemoma’b

stepdadmar>singlemoma,b

stepdadmar>singlemoma,b

stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma
stepdadmar>singlemoma,b
stepdadmar>singlemom1'b
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Table 22. The Presence o f a Stepmother (Regression Results Stratified by Race)
Cohabiting stepmother ws. single-father families

Outcomes

Hispanic

Black

White

Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity

stepmomcoh>singledadbl'

School
Behavior 6-11

singledad>stepmomcohc

Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1 Health insurance

stepmomcoh>singledada,b

2.Dental visit

singledad>stepmomcohab

singledad>stepmomcohab

3.Usual source of care
4. Well-child care
5.Food insecurity

stepmomcoh>singledada

6.No phone

stepmomcoh>singledada

7.School stability
8.After-school lessons

singledad>stepmomcoha,b

9. On sports team

stepmomcoh>singledadJb

10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

singledad>stepmomcoha
Married stepmother vs. single-father families

Outcomes

Hispanic

Black

Current health
Health getting worse

White
stepmommar>singledadc

stepmommar>singledadb,c

Morbidity

singledad>stepmommarb,
stepmommar>singledadc

School

singledad>stepmommarc

Behavior 6-11

stepmommar>singledadc

Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1 Health insurance

stepmommar>singledada,b

2.Dental visit

stepmommar>singledadJ,b

3.Usual source of care
4.Well-child care

stepmommar>singiedada
stepmommar>singledadb

5.Food insecurity

stepmommar>singledada

6.No phone

singledad>stepmommara

7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.0n sports team

singledad>stepmommarb

10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

stepmommar>singledada
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Table 22. (continued)
Cohabiting stepmother vs. married stepmother families

Outcomes

Hispanic

Black

White

Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity

stepmomcoh>stepmommarb't

School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1 Health insurance

stepmommar>stepmomcoh“,
stepmomcoh>stepmommarb

2.Dental visit

stepmommar>stepmomcoha

3.Usual source of care

stepmommar>stepmomcoha

stepmommar>stepmomcohiLb

stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b

4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7.School stability
8. After-school lessons

stepmommar>stepmomcohab

9 On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or higher level
of inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless of whether the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b" indicates
that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 23. Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families (Regression Results
Stratified by Race)
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs

B lack

Hispanic

W hite

grand>othersb,c
grand>others°
Hispanic

B lack

grand>othersa,b

grand>othersb

grand>othersb'c
W hite

1.Health insurance
2,Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4.Well-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7. School stability

others>granda

other s>granda
grand>othersb

8. After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

others>grand“

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs are
positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b"
indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs are
added.
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Table 24. Non-Traditional vs. Traditional (Regression R esults Stratified by Child
Gender)
O utcom es
Current health

G irls

B oys
twomar>stepdadmar ,c
twomar>stepmommarbc
twom ar>singlem om b
singledad>twomarb,c

twom ar>singlem om bc
twomar>stedadcohb
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb,c
Health getting worse

twomar>grandb,c

twomar>stepdadmarb
twom ar>singlem om b
twomar>stedadcohb
stepmomcoh>twomarbc

Morbidity

twomar>stepdadmarb,c
twom ar>singlem om b,c

School

Behavior 6-11

Behavior 12-17

twomar>stedadcohb
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb’°
twomar>stepdadmarb,c
twomar>stepmommarb,c
twom ar>singlem om b,c
twomar>singledadb,c
twomar>stedadcohb
twomar>stepmomcohb
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb
twomar>stepdadmarb
twomar>stepmommarc
twomar>singlem omb
twomar>stedadcoh°
twomar>stepmomcohc
twomar>grandb'c
twomar>othersb,c
twomar>stepdadmarb,c
twomar>stepmommarb
twomar>singlem ombc
twomar>singledadb,c
twomar>twocohb
twomar>stedadcohb,c
twomar>stepmomcohc
twomar>others°

twom ar>singlem om b
singledad>twomarbc
twomar>stedadcohb
stepmomcoh>twomar°
twomar>grandb
twomar>stepdadmarb,c
twomar>stepmommarb
twom ar>singlem om b
twocoh>twomarb,c
twomar>stedadcohb’°
twomar>grandb
twomar>othersb’°
twomar>stepdadmarb,c
twomar>stepmommarb,c
twom ar>singlem om b,c
twomar>singledadb
twomar>twocohb
twomar>stedadcohb,c
twomar>stepmomcohb'c
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb,c
twomar>stepdadmarb,c
twomar>stepmommarb,c
twom ar>singlem om b,c
twomar>stedadcohb,c
twomar>stepmomcohbc
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb'c
twomar>stepdadmarbc
twom ar>stepmomm arb,c
twom ar>singlem om b,c
twomar>singledadb,c
twomar>twocohb
twomar>stedadcohb,c
twomar>stepmomcohb’c
twomar>grandb,c
twomar>othersb'c
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Table24. (continued)
Input
1, Health insurance

2. Dental visit

3. usual source o f care

G irls
twom ar>singlem om a
twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha,b
twomar>granda
twomar>othersa’b
twom ar>singlem om a

B oys
twom ar>singlem om a
twomar>singledada

twomar>granda
twomar>othersa’b
twom ar>singlem om a
twomar>singledada’b
twomar>stepmomcoha,b

twomar>stepmomcoha’b
twomar>granda
twom ar>singlem om a
twomar>singledada’b

twom ar>singlem om a
twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stepmomcoha,b

twomar>stepmomcohab
twomar>granda
twomar>othersa,b

twomar>othersa,b
stepdadmar>twomara,D
singlemom >twomarb
twomar>singledada
twomar>stedadcoha
grand>twomarb

4. W ell-child care

5. Food insecurity

others>twomara,b
twomar>stepdadmara’b
twom ar>singlem om a’b
twomar>singledada,b
twom ar>twocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha'b

twomar>stepdadmara,b
twom ar>singlem om a’b
twomar>singledada
tw om a^ tw ocoh 3,13
twomar>stedadcoha,b

twomar>granda
twomar>othersa’b

twomar>granda
twomar>othersa
twomar>stepmommara’b

6. N o phone

7 .School stability

twomar>singlem oma
twomar>singledada,b
twom ar>t wocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha’b
twomar>grandb
twomar>stepdadmara,D
twomar>stepmommara’b
twomar>singlem oma,b
twomar>singledadab
twomar>stedadcoha,b

twomar>singledada
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>granda
twomar>stepdadmara,b
twomar>stepmommarb
twomar>singlem omab
tw om a^ sin gled ad 3,13
twomar^stedadcoh3,111
twomar>stepmomcoha,b
twomar>granda’b
twomar>othersa’b

twomar>granda,b
twomar>othersa,b
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Table 24. (continued)
8.After-school lessons

twomar>stepdadmara
twomar>stepmommara’b
twom ar>singlem om a
twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha
twomar>stedadcohab
twomar>granda'b
twomar>othersa,b

9. On sports team
twomar>stepmommara’b
twom ar>singlem om a’b
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha,b
twomar>granda
10. MKA aggravation
twom ar>singlem om a’b
singledad>twomara,b

twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha,b
tw'omar>stepmomcohab

tw om a^stedadcoh3,13

11. MKA mental health

twom ar>singlem om a,b
twomar>singledada
twomar>twocoha
twomar>stedadcoha,b
twomar>stepmom coha’b
twomar>granda
twomar>othersa
twomar>stepdadmara,b
twomar>stepmommara,b
twom ar>singlem om ab
twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha,b
twomar>granda
twomar>stepdadmaraD
tv,'omar>singlemoma’b

twomar>granda’b
twomar>othersa,b
twomar>stepdadmara,b
twom ar>singlem om a,b
twomar>singledada,b
twomar>twocoha,b
twomar>stedadcoha’b
twomar>stepmomcoha’b
t\\'omar>granda,b

twomar>othersa,b
twomar>stepdadmara’
twomar>singlem oma,b
twomar>twocoha
twomar>stedadcoha,b
twomar>grandab
twomar>othersa

Note: ">" indicates the fam ily structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or
higher level o f inputs than the fam ily structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the
outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
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Table 25. The Gender of the Biological Parent in Single-Parent and Stepparent
Families (Regression Results Stratified by Child Gender)
Single-father vs. single-mother fam ilies
O utcom es

Girls

Boys

Current health

singledad>singlem ombc

Health getting worse

singledad>singlem ombc

Morbidity

singledad>singlem omb

School
Behavior 6-11

singledad>singlem omb

Behavior 12-17

singlemom >singledadc

Inputs
1 .Health insurance

singlemom>singledadb

singlemom >singledadb

singlemom>singledadb

singlemom >singledada'b

2.Dental visit

singlemom >singledada,b

3.Usual source o f care
4.W ell-child care

singlemom >singledada,b

5.Food insecurity

singledad>singlemoma’b

6.N o phone

singlemom>singledadb

singledad>singlem oma’b

7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
9 .On sports team
10.MKA aggravation

singledad>singlemoma,b

singledad>singlem oma,b

11.MKA mental health

singl edad>singl emoma,b

singledad>singlem oma,b

M arried stepfather vs. married stepmother fam ilies
Outcomes

stepmommar vs. stepdadmar

stepmommar vs. stepdadmar

Girls

Boys

Current health

stepdadmar>stepmommarc

Health getting worse

stepmommar>stepdadmarb

Morbidity

stepdadmar>stepmommarb,c

School

stepdadmar>stepmommarc

Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17

stepdadmar>stepmommarb’c

Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit

stepdadmar>stepmommarb

3.Usual source o f care
4 .W ell-child care
5.Food insecurity

stepmommar>stepdadmara,b
stepmommar>stepdadmara’b

6.N o phone
7 .School stability
8.After-school lessons
9 .On sports team

stepdadmar>stepmommara’b

10.MKA aggravation
1 l.M K A mental health

stepmommar>stepdadmara’b
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Table 25. (continued)
C o h a b itin g ste p fa th e r vs. co h a b itin g ste p m o th e r fa m ilie s

O utcom es

stepdadcoh vs. stepmomcoh

stepdadcoh vs. stepmomcoh

G irls

B oys

stepmomcoh>stepdadcohb,c

stepmomcoh>stepdadcohb,c

Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1 .Health insurance

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b

2 .Dental visit

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha’b

3.Usual source o f care

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoh

a.b

stepdadcoh>stepmomcoha’b

4.W ell-child care
5.Food insecurity

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha’b

6.N o phone
7 .School stability

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b

8.After-school lessons
9 .On sports team

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b

10.MKA aggravation

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha,b

11 .MKA mental health

stepmomcoh>stepdadcoha’b

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable
outcomes or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether
the outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, M KA and family
characteristics, "b" indicates that econom ic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both
economic resources and inputs are added.
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Table 26. The Presence of a Stepfather (Regression Results Stratified by Child
Gender)
Cohabiting stepfather vs. single-mother fam ilies
O utcom es
Current health
Health getting worse

G irls

B oys

Morbidity

singlemom >stepdadcohc

School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs

singlemom>stepdadcohb'c

1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care

sin glemom>stepdadcoh3,13

4. W ell-child care

singlemom >stepdadcoha’b

5.Food insecurity
6.N o phone
7. School stability

stepdadcoh>singlemoma

8.After-school lessons

singlemom>stepdadcohb

9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

stepdadcoh>singlemomb
singlemom >stepdadcoha,b

M arried stepfather vs. single-mother fam ilies
O utcom es

G irls

Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity

stepdadmar>singlemom

Boys

singlemom>stepdadmarc

School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs

stepdadmar>singlemomb

1.Health insurance

stepdadmar>singlemoma

2.Dental visit

singlemom>stepdadmar°

stepdadmar>singlemoma

3.Usual source o f care
4.W ell-child care

stepdadmar>singlemoma

singlemom>stepdadmarb

5.Food insecurity
6.N o phone
7 .School stability

stepdadmar>singlemoma’b

stepdadm ar>singlem om 3,13

8.After-school lessons

stepdadm ar>sin gl em oma

stepdadmar>singlemoma,b

9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation

stepdadm ar>singlem oma

stepdadm ar>singlem om a

11 .MKA mental health

stepdadmar>singletnoma'b

stepdadmar>singlemoma’b
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Table 26. (continued)
Outcomes
Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11

M a rried step fa th er vs. C ohabiting step fa th er fa m ilie s
G irls
Boys

Behavior 12-17
Inputs

stepdadm ar>stepdadcohb

1 .Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3 .Usual source o f care

stepdadmar>stepdadcoh3’b

4.W ell-child care

stepdadmar>stepdadcoh3,b

5.Food insecurity
6.No phone
7 .School stability

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3,11

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3,b

8.After-school lessons

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3,b

stcpdadmar>stepdadcoh3’3

9 .On sports team

stepdadm a^stepdadcoh3,11

stepdadm ar>stepdadcoh3’b

10.MKA aggravation

stepdadcoh>stepdadmar3’b

11 .MKA mental health

stepdadmar>stepdadcoh3,b

stepdadmar>stepdadcoha’3

Note: (1)">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs
are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b"
indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs
are added.
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Table 27. The Presence o f a Stepm other (Regression Results Stratified by Child
Gender)
Cohabiting stepmother vs. single-father fam ilies
Outcomes

Girls

Boys
singledad>stepmomcohb,c

Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity

singledad>stepmomcohb

School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care

stepmomcoh>singledada,b
singledad>stepmomcoha,b

singledad>stepmomcohb

4.W ell-child care
5.Food insecurity

stepmomcoh>singledada’b

6.N o phone
7 .School stability
8.After-school lessons

singledad>stepmomcoha’b

9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

stepmomcoh>singledada’b
singledad>stepmomcoha,b
stepmomcoh>singledadb

Married stepmother vs. single-father fam ilies
Outcomes

girls

Boys

Current health

singledad>stepmommarb'c

Health getting worse
Morbidity

singledad>stepmommarb,c

School
Behavior6-l 1

singledad>stepmommar°
singledad>stepmommarb

Bhaviorl2-17
Inputs
1 .Health insurance

stepmommar>singledada’t

2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4.W ell-child care
5.Food insecurity

stepmommar>singledada
stepmommar>singledada

stepmommar>singledada

6.N o phone
7.School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team
10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

stepmommar>singledada'b

stepm om m a^singledad3,11
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Table 27. (continued)
M a rried step m o th er vs. co habiting stepm other fa m ilie s
Outcomes

girls

Boys

stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b

stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b

Current health
Health getting worse
Morbidity
School
Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17
Inputs
1.Health insurance
2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4. W ell-child care
5.Food insecurity
6.N o phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team

stepmomcoh>stepmommara,b

10.MKA aggravation
11 .MKA mental health

stepmommar>stepmomcoha,b
stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b

stepmommar>stepmomcoha’b

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes or
higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the outcomes/inputs
are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics, "b"
indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and inputs
are added.
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Table 28. Grandparent vs. Other Non-parental Families (Regression Results
Stratified by Child Gender)
Outcomes

Girls

Boys

Current health

others>grandb,c

Health getting worse
Morbidity

grand>othersc

School

grand>othersb,c

Behavior 6-11
Behavior 12-17

grand>othersb,c

Inputs
1.Health insurance

grand>othersb

2.Dental visit
3.Usual source o f care
4.Well-child care

grand>othersb
grand>othersa

5.Food insecurity

others>granda

6.No phone
7. School stability
8.After-school lessons
9.On sports team

grand>othersb

grand>othersb

10.MKA aggravation

others>granda,b

11 .MKA mental health

others>granda,b

Note: (1) ">" indicates the family structure before the sign is associated with more desirable outcomes
or higher level o f inputs than the family structure after the sign, regardless o f whether the
outcomes/inputs are positive or negative.
(2) Subscript "a" indicates dependant variables include basic child, MKA and family characteristics,
"b" indicates that economic resources are added, and "c" indicates that both economic resources and
inputs are added.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Recent economic research has indicated that childhood health not only affects
early human capital acquisition, but also has a lasting impact on adulthood health and
economic status (Case et al. 2002, Case et al. 2003). A life-course developmental model
further broadens the perspective; it suggests that a complex interplay o f factors such as
socioeconomic status and health care contributes to health outcomes during a person’s
lifetime. Disparities in adult health outcomes begin early in life and are displayed and
compounded across the span o f a person’s life (Bartley et al. 1997, Keating and Hertzman
1999, Wadsworth 1999, Halfon and Hochstein 2002, Forrest and Riley 2004, SinghManoux et al. 2004). At the same time, the Census Bureau reported that 11.4 percent of
children— 8.4 million— had no health insurance in 2003. It has been argued that lack of
insurance not only compromises the health o f the uninsured16, but also has serious
economic implications for individuals, families and the nation.17
Given the concern over child health outcomes and the potentially detrimental
effect of being uninsured, the federal government bolstered its commitment to public
health insurance for children in the past 10 years. The State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) was created through Title XXI of the Social Security Act in 1997 to
16 See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2004), the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2004),
Institute o f M edicine (2004), Institute o f M edicine (2002) and the Urban Institute (2004).
17 See Smith (1999), Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2004), Institute o f M edicine (2002), the Henry
J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2003) and Institute o f M edicine (2003).

- 171 -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

further expand public insurance eligibility for children in working poor families beyond
Medicaid levels. SCHIP has now been in force for eight years, and reauthorization o f the
program in 2007 requires a thorough understanding of the effects of expanded coverage
on care utilization and health outcomes.
In this paper I examine the impact o f SCHIP on health insurance, medical care
utilization and health outcomes for targeted children using data from the National Survey
o f America’s Families (NSAF). This study represents an advance on a number o f fronts.
First, the burgeoning literature on SCHIP focuses on eligibility and coverage. Research
on utilization is relatively sparse, and research on health outcomes is even more limited.
Despite new published studies investigating the impact o f SCHIP on care utilization at
the state level, these results are hard to generalize to all SCHIP programs given the
diversity among SCHIP programs across states. However, a complete understanding of
SCHIP requires knowledge o f its effects on coverage, medical care utilization and health
outcomes for targeted children. This study comprehensively assesses the overall
effectiveness o f SCHIP by utilizing two waves o f NSAF data before and after the
enactment o f the program. When combined with sample weights, the NSAF is designed
to yield nationally representative estimates of insurance coverage, medical care
utilization and a wide range o f other health-related and socioeconomic characteristics for
the civilian, non-institutionalized population. Additionally, adopting various estimation
strategies, I make full use of all sources of variation in eligibility, age, income, state and
time introduced by the inception of SCHIP to identify the effects on coverage, care
utilization and health outcomes. Finally with a thorough review and empirical
investigation o f how legislative rules can be translated into coverage, medical care
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utilization and health outcomes in a sequential order, this study attempts to inform policy
making in terms o f where the links are broken if the means (SCHIP legislative rules) and
various ends are disjointed. Public policies such as SCHIP legislative rules are designed
to increase the number o f children covered by health insurance through public health
insurance expansion, and ideally such an expansion can further lead to increase in
medical care utilization and finally translate into improvement in child health outcomes.
Therefore, there are several “steps” linking the legislative rules and improvement in child
outcomes. My empirical results highlight the relationship between coverage, utilization
and health outcomes as well as the reliance on each step to improve health outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows: after presenting background on the Medicaid
expansions and initiation of SCHIP (Chapter 2), I review previous research on each step
in the path leading to improved health in a sequential order Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 , 1
describe the conceptual framework, data and empirical strategies used in this study. In
Chapter 5 , 1 summarize and analyze the empirical results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND — MEDICAID EXPANSIONS AND SCHIP

In recent years there has been an increase in public commitment to promote
public health insurance coverage for children, mainly through the expansion o f the
Medicaid program. Medicaid has been the primary means o f financing health care
services for poor and near poor children in the United States since its inception in 1965.
At first, Medicaid covered only children in families meeting the eligibility requirements
o f the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Beginning in the mid1980’s, a series o f federal laws began to delink Medicaid eligibility from eligibility for
the AFDC program. (Table 29 summarizes the legislation enacted since 1986.) The
expansions substantially increased children’s eligibility for Medicaid. Following the
federal expansions, many states expanded their Medicaid programs further to include
children not covered by the federal mandates.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act o f 1996
(PRWORA) completely severed the link between welfare and Medicaid. Under the new
law, regardless o f their welfare status, eligible families have to apply for Medicaid
separately. For those families that still received public assistance, a great number of
families failed to enroll their children in Medicaid due to the separate and complex
application procedure. Therefore, as an unintended consequence o f breaking the link of
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Medicaid and welfare, many families and children lost their Medicaid coverage.
Additionally, many parents have to accept low-paid jobs in order to satisfy the work
requirement under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. As a
result their family incomes were too high to qualify for Medicaid benefits but too low to
obtain private insurance for their children. All these factors contributed to the decline in
Medicaid enrollment and the increase in the number o f uninsured children between 1996
and 1997.18

In response to declining Medicaid enrollment and the increasing number of
uninsured children in working poor families, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997
was signed into law in August 1997. The BBA of 1997, as part o f title XXI o f the Social
Security Act, provided states with $40 billion over ten years in block grant funding to
further expand public-provided health insurance for children. The BBA of 1997 gives
states a great deal o f flexibility in how far and how fast they expand coverage. For
example, states can use the new grant money to expand Medicaid, develop a new
program or expand an existing state program that provides health insurance for children,
or use a combination o f the two approaches as long as the funds are used to serve
children below age nineteen who are living in families with incomes at or below 200
percent o f the federal poverty level or 50 percentage points above the Medicaid income
eligibility in effect in March 1997. Consequently, there exists wide variation in states’
responses to the changes enacted by the BBA o f 1997 both in terms o f magnitude, timing
and form.
18 For example, Joyce and Racine (2005) find some evidence that TANF resulted in a loss o f Medicaid
coverage for w om en and children w hose cash assistance ended.
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Each o f the 50 states and the District o f Columbia had an approved SCHIP plan in
place by 2000. Eleven states enacted their program in 1997, the majority (33 states and
the District o f Columbia) did so in 1998, and the remaining 6 states implemented it in
1999 or 2000. States also vary in the implementation o f their SCHIP programs. Sixteen
states expanded Medicaid, 14 states and the District o f Columbia created a separate
SCHIP program, and 20 states developed a combination program in 2002. Table 30
summarizes the timing o f SCHIP implementation, types of SCHIP programs, and income
eligibility variation across states and age groups.

As shown in Table 31 and Figure 3, eligibility levels for children have increased
through SCHIP for every age group since 1997. In many states, prior to SCHIP income
eligibility limits were substantially higher for younger children than for older children.
Given the fact that the previous series o f Medicaid expansions had targeted younger
children, generally speaking, the magnitude o f income eligibility increases under SCHIP
is much bigger for older children than for younger children. By increasing income limits
for older children more than for younger children, the SCHIP expansions largely
eliminated this within-state variation in eligibility. For example, over the period from
1997 to 2002, the average income eligibility for infants increased by 27 percentage
points. In contrast, the average income eligibility increases by 115 percentage points for
children aged 14 or older.

There is an extensive literature suggesting low take-up (i.e. low enrollment among
eligible population) during the Medicaid expansions of the late 1980s and early 1990s
(Cutler and Gruber 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1997, Shore-
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Sheppard 1997, Yazici and Kaestner 2000, Blumberg et al. 2000, Card and ShoreSheppard 2004, Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005, Shore-Sheppard 2005). Transaction
costs19, stigma, ignorance about the program and eligibility status, and difficulty in
finding providers willing to accept Medicaid are often cited as significant barriers to
enrollment among those who are Medicaid eligible (e.g. Currie and Grogger 2002, Currie
and Gruber 1996b, Aizer 2003a, 2003b, Currie and Fahr 2005).

Concerns about the Medicaid take-up rate can spill over into concerns about
enrollment in SCHIP. Low take-up might be an even greater problem for SCHIP
compared to Medicaid as many newly eligible families typically have no experience o f
participating in public programs. As a result, the law creating SCHIP included specific
provisions that mandated states to include outreach efforts as a part o f their expansion.
States are using a variety of approaches to reduce the stigma associated with SCHIP and
Medicaid.20

As private insurance coverage increases with family income, and SCHIP income
eligibility levels are higher than those o f Medicaid, crowd-out is potentially a bigger
problem for SCHIP than for prior Medicaid expansions. In response to previous studies
suggesting large crowd-out effects for Medicaid, SCHIP programs were specifically
designed with “anti-crowd-out” provisions to prevent newly eligible families from
dropping private coverage. The most common requirements across states to reduce

19 Transaction costs refer to the administrative burden o f establishing and maintaining Medicaid coverage
include requirements to document residency, income, and citizenship, several meetings with a caseworker,
and requirements that M edicaid eligibility be re-established at least yearly.
20 For example, Arkansas decided to name its Medicaid-SCHIP program ARKids Plus to take advantage o f
the outreach efforts and positive name recognition associated with its ARKids First 1115 demonstration. In
Vermont and several other states, fam ilies that apply only for health care benefits mail their applications to
a centralized processing unit, which has no overt connection to the state’s welfare department.
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crowd-out was that children must be without insurance for some period (typically 3-6
months) prior to enrollment. In addition, a few states used sliding-scale premium
contributions for families with incomes above 150% of the FPL and subsidies to
encourage parents to take-up employer-based coverage when available. Title XXI
specifically states that any already-insured children, including those insured under
Medicaid, are not eligible to enroll in SCHIP.
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CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are some essential issues researchers must address before they study the
effects of public health insurance on coverage, medical care utilization and health
outcomes. Most importantly, expanded health insurance eligibility does not guarantee
improved health outcomes. Several studies trace through the channels by which the
legislative rules o f public insurance expansion are translated into actual improved health
outcomes (Eisenberg and Power 2000, Gruber 2002, Chung and Schuster 2004). These
studies either review the literature or explain the rationale, but none of them provide
empirical evidence. A growing literature documents the effects o f SCHIP on eligibility,
take-up and crowd out, but relatively few studies examine its impact on medical care
utilization, and even less research investigates its effects on health outcomes. I am going
to address each channel individually so that the link between SCHIP legislative rules and
health outcomes can be tracked incrementally, from the transformative means to the
ultimate ends.
3.1 Eligibility

The starting point is to examine the effects of SCHIP on eligibility. How
legislative rules affect eligibility is a function o f child age, family income, parents’
marital status, family structure, and state o f residence. Studies using data from various
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sources all indicate that SCHIP legislative rules have effectively increased the proportion
o f children who are eligible for public insurance (Cunningham 2003, Selden et al. 2004,
Bansak and Raphael 2004). These studies track changes in the eligibility o f children over
the 1996-2002 period and find that the percentage o f U.S. children eligible for public
health insurance has increased roughly from 30 percent to 50 percent.
3.2 Coverage

The next step is to translate eligibility into actual Medicaid or SCHIP coverage.
Low take-up is one big problem. As a matter o f fact, low take-up is not a problem unique
to SCHIP programs, but is common among many public programs (see Remler et al.
2003). Low take-up might be an even greater problem for SCHIP as many newly eligible
families typically have no experience of participating in public programs and, therefore,
may lack good information about the program (LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, Selden et
al. 2004). Moreover, evidence from the Medicaid expansions suggests that take-up falls
as coverage is extended to relatively higher income families (Currie and Gruber 1996b,
Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004). This could also lead to a lower take-up rate o f SCHIP
since SCHIP extends eligibility to relatively higher income families. Furthermore, lower
SCHIP enrollment rates may be due to the fact that enrollment rates decline with age and
SCHIP-eligible children are older on average than Medicaid-eligible children.
A large number of studies have examined the impact o f SCHIP on public health
insurance coverage (Guendelman and Pearl 2004, Selden, Hudson and Banthin 2004,
LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004, Zuckerman et al. 2001, Cunningham et al. 2002, Bansak
and Raphael 2004, Davidoff et al. 2005, Cullen et al. 2005). The estimated marginal takeup rate among newly eligible children ranges from 5 percent to 11 percent among studies
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calculating take-up rate (i.e. Rosenbach et al. 2001, LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004,
Bansak and Raphael 2004, Cullen et al. 2005).
Rosenbach et al. (2001) create a measure of the effect o f the SCHIP program by
dividing the number of children enrolled in SCHIP by the number o f children enrolled in
the traditional Medicaid program for a state. Their approach tends to underestimate the
effect of SCHIP, since outreach efforts for SCHIP may have spill-over effects on
Medicaid enrollment.21 They find that for fiscal year 1999 SCHIP extended federally
financed child health insurance coverage beyond traditional Medicaid by 10 percent
nationally. Using March CPS data from 1997 to 2001, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004)
first compute a child’s public insurance eligibility based on the child’s age, family
income and the income eligibility standards effective in the child’s state o f residence at
that time, a similar approach to the one used by Cutler and Gruber (1996). Then they
regress the child public health insurance status on this computed eligibility indicator
while controlling for demographic characteristics, a full set o f year dummies, state
dummies and health care market characteristics. For their baseline model, they find the
take-up rate (the estimates of coefficient on public insurance eligibility) is 7.8 percent for
whole sample, and 7.3 percent for the lower family income group (family income below
300% of FPL subsample). Also using data from the CPS (1998 and 2002), Bansak and
Raphael (2004) first identify children that are income eligible for SCHIP benefits in 2001
as well as children that would have been eligible in 1997 (under 2001 income criteria)

21 In order to prevent states from shifting enrollees from M edicaid to SCHIP to take advantage o f more
generous Federal matching rates, the legislation requires that children w ho apply for SCHIP be screened for
M edicaid eligibility, and those found eligible can enroll only in Medicaid. Because o f this rule, it is
possible that SCHIP “marketing” may have indirectly increased the M edicaid enrollment o f children who
were already eligible for but not covered by that program (U S GAO, 2000, Selden et al. 2004, Kenney and
Chang 2004.)
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assuming the program had been in existence. The effect o f SCHIP on public insurance is
estimated by calculating the change over time in the proportion o f eligible children
receiving public health insurance benefits. In doing so, they find that the program
marginal take up rates range from 10.1 to 10.5 percent.

Using panel data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten
Cohort (ECLSK), Cullen et al. (2005) adopt several different approaches. Their first
method is a first-difference model regressing changes in coverage on changes in a child’s
eligibility status between any two years. In the second approach, the primary independent
variable of interest is defined as the share o f months eligible for the program since the
beginning of either the kindergarten academic year (July 1998) or the pre-kindergarten
academic year (July 1997). Due to the endogeneity o f eligibility they also simulate
eligibility which is similar to the one used by Cutler and Gruber (1996) and LoSasso and
Buchmueller (2004). Depending on what specification and what methods are used, their
estimation varies. But the authors emphasize the estimates for transitions between first
and third grades, since for these grades they can analyze transitions by type o f insurance.
The coefficient on changes of eligibility is 0.114 for Medicaid/CHIP coverage, which
implies a marginal take-up rate o f 11.4 percent.
Furthermore, previously uninsured persons are not the only group taking up the
new available benefits; substitution from private to public coverage may occur, which is
known as the crowding out of public insurance on private insurance. This results in less
net increase in coverage. Considerable research has been carried out assessing the effect
o f public coverage on private coverage. Cutler and Gruber (1996) demonstrate that
although the expansions increased the fraction o f low-income children enrolled in
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Medicaid, they also led to significant reductions in the fraction covered by private health
insurance, compounding the effect of low take-up rates. Subsequent research finds less
consistent evidence o f crowd-out (Dubay and Kenney 1996, Dubay and Kenney 1997,
Shore-Sheppard 2000, Yazici and Kaestner 2000, Blumberg et al. 2000, Kenney,
Genevieve and Holahan 2003, Card and Shore-Sheppard 2004, Ham and Shore-Sheppard
2005, Shore-Sheppard 2005).

Research based on different national surveys and different estimation strategies
has produced a broad range of estimates of crowd-out under SCHIP from essentially no
crowd-out to 30-50 percent crowd-out (Cunningham et al. 2002, Bansak and Raphael 2004,
Cullen et al. 2005). However, Kenney and Chang (2004) review several state surveys of
SCHIP enrollees and find little evidence that enrollees transfer directly from employer
coverage to SCHIP. Although there is no clear consensus about the precise amount of
substitution between private and public coverage among researchers, various sources
indicate that SCHIP is crowding out private coverage to a certain degree. Even when low
income families substitute SCHIP coverage for private coverage, children and their
families may enjoy a number o f benefits such as more comprehensive coverage, reduced
disparity in access to care and lower financial burdens (Kenney, Genevieve and Holahan
2003, Kenney and Chang 2004).

Given the flexibility o f SCHIP programs, wide variations exist across states in
terms of how the program is implemented, its ease of enrollment, outreach efforts and
anti-crowd-out provisions. Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) find that such variations have an
impact on both take-up and crowd-out. For example, they find that outreach efforts such
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as having a phone line and websites providing information on SCHIP are significantly
associated with lower possibility o f a child being uninsured and higher take-up among
eligible children.
3.3 Utilization

Once covered by public insurance, coverage will not automatically increase
children’s utilization o f medical care due to both financial and non-financial barriers to
care. Since most research examining SCHIP has concentrated on its impact on eligibility,
take-up and crowd-out, there is a scant but growing literature examining SCHIP’s impact
on medical care utilization. As many states implemented SCHIP through expanding their
existing Medicaid program, studies on Medicaid are also reviewed when appropriate.
Generally speaking, research that investigates the impact o f public insurance expansions
on medical care utilization for children falls into three distinct groups. The first strand of
the literature approaches the problem by examining the connection between eligibility
expansions and utilization. It either investigates one single measure o f utilization, such as
immunization (Joyce and Racine 2005), or examines one group o f children (e.g. children
with special needs such as in Davidoff et al. 2005; elementary school students in Cullen
et al. 2005). There are no consistent findings among this group o f research. A major
shortcoming o f this approach is that investigating the link between eligibility expansions
and utilization might overestimate the program’s effect. Public insurance expansions
avail only those who enroll. Children who are eligible but fail to participate in these
programs will not benefit.
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The second body of research compares utilization measures for publicly insured
children to those for uninsured or privately insured children. This method could be more
informative about measuring the efficiency of public health insurance expansions.
Guendelman and Pearl (2004) conclude that insurance coverage increases access to and
use o f care by insured children o f the working poor families in comparison to children
without health insurance.22 More specifically, Currie and Thomas (1995) find that
Medicaid children are significantly more likely to have preventative care than either those
with private insurance or no coverage at all. The methods used in these studies, however,
suffer from several drawbacks. First, inferences drawn from the difference observed
between insured and uninsured children and/or between publicly insured and privately
insurance children may be subject to adverse selection bias, i.e., families with sick
children are more likely to seek coverage. Second, parents who secure health insurance
for their children may be fundamentally different from parents who do not make an effort
or are unable to obtain coverage.

The third group o f research focuses on the experience o f enrollees and compares
their utilization before and after enrollment in SCHIP programs. These studies adopt a
pre-post design in which a single cohort o f SCHIP enrollees is surveyed at two points in
time, one carried out soon after SCHIP enrollment, the other usually one year after the
first survey.23 This thread of research generally indicates that children who enroll in

22 Since under new regulations for M edicaid and the SCHIP programs, states have the discretion to extend
coverage to enrollees’ uninsured parents, Guendelman and Pearl (2004) evaluate the potential impact o f
such extension on health care utilization. They find extending insurance to enrollees’ uninsured parents
seem s to have little marginal effect in terms o f promoting children's access and use o f care.
23 These studies are Dick et al. (2004) for Florida, Kansas, and N ew York., Szilagyi et al. (2004) for N ew
York, Eisert and Gabow (2002) and Kempe et al. (2005) for Colorado, Damiano et al. (2001), Damiano et
al. (2002) a, b, Damiano et al. 2003, Damiano et al. (2005) and M cBroome et al. (2005) for Iowa, Slifkin et
al. (2002) and M ofidi et al. (2002) for North Carolina, Fox et al. (2003) for Kansas, Hughes et al. (2005)

- 185 -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

SCHIP have improved access to care. The obvious drawback with this approach is that it
is difficult to differentiate the effect o f other coexisting policies or secular trends from the
impact of SCHIP.24 In addition, this strand of literature surveys SCHIP impact on health
care utilization for only a relatively small number o f children in one or several states.
Given the diversity o f the SCHIP programs, it is difficult to generalize the results to
national estimates.
3.4 Outcomes

Finally, increases in medical care utilization do not guarantee improved health
outcomes. There are a number o f studies suggesting that much o f the medical care
received by both adults and children is inappropriate and may have little beneficial effect
on health.25 In line with this argument, Kaestner, Joyce and Racine (1999) insist that
effectiveness of Medicaid should be evaluated not only by its effect on utilization, but
also by its effect on children’s health. However, research investigating the impact of
public insurance on child heath outcomes, including earlier Medicaid expansions, is
limited relative to the literature on coverage.26 Studies focusing on eligibility either adopt
a difference-in-difference approach (Kaestner, Joyce and Racine 1999) or use simulated
eligibility as an instrument for actual eligibility (Currie and Gruber 1996a, Cullen et al.
2005). But Lykens and Jargowsky (2002) directly use estimated actual eligibility which
fails to take into account the endogenous nature o f eligibility.

for Indiana, Lave et al. (2002) for Pennsylvania. Two exceptions are Brach et al. (2003) and Shenkman et
al. (2003) which study the experience o f enrollees only before enrollment so that their needs can be better
addressed. Brach et al. (2003) survey SCHIP programs in Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Indiana, and N ew
York; Shenkman et al. (2003) survey SCHIP in Florida for adolescents.
24 Szilagyi et al. (2004) do use a comparison group to detect secular trends but do not find any.
25 See Chung and Schuster (2004) for a recent review.
26 These studies are Currie and Gruber (1996a), Kaestner, Joyce and Racine (1999) and Lykens and
Jargowsky (2002) for Medicaid, Damiano et al. (2003), and Cullen et. al (2005) for SCHIP.
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Damiano et al. (2003) focus on children enrolled in Iowa’s S-SCHIP program and
find that overall health status was rated significantly better (i.e. excellent: 37 percent
before, 42 percent after) and worry about the ability to pay for a child's health care was
substantially reduced (92 percent before, 57 percent after). In addition, ninety-five
percent of families reported a reduction in family stress. Therefore, evidence indicates
that Iowa’s S-SCHIP program not only improved health status but also improved the
family environment for children enrolled during the first year.
In sum, the answer to whether or not an increase in eligibility would lead to
improved health outcomes is inconclusive. While SCHIP represents a significant and
dramatic change to child public insurance programs, to date, to my best knowledge, there
is no research focusing on the effect o f SCHIP on health outcomes for children o f all ages
at the national level. The current study contributes to the literature on several fronts. First,
this analysis not only investigates the effect o f SCHIP on coverage related issues such as
crowd-out, but also addresses its impact on medical care utilization and health outcomes
individually. It therefore contributes to our knowledge o f why SCHIP expansions may or
may not achieve the ultimate goal o f improving child health outcomes, and the results can
inform policy making. Second, with its unique survey design and ideal time span, NSAF
data enables the current analysis to measure the policy impact at the national level for
children of all ages. Third, given that no single technique can perfectly address these
issues of interest, I make full use of exogenous variation o f the SCHIP programs and
develop various empirical strategies to tackle these problems so that crisp and robust
results can be obtained.
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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework follows Currie and Grogger (2000)’s model of
Medicaid participation and the demand for health. The health production function relates
health inputs and health output:

H = f (M )
This suggests that health (H) as a special commodity can be produced by using
inputs such as medical care M but can not be purchased directly from the market. In
particular, H is a “stock” that takes time to change with medical care M. In case of
children, child health outcomes are determined mainly by the decisions of their parents.
Given market price p for medical care, family utility, which is a function of market
purchased numeraire commodity (C) and child health (H), is maximized subject to the
income constraint:
max U - U ( C , H\ X )
C ,M

( 1)

subject to
C + M.p = I

(2)
(3)
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where I is family income, X is a set o f exogenous demographic characteristics that
influence family tastes.
Solving for this maximum problem yields the optimal demands for medical care
and consumption goods:

M* = M * ( p , I; X )

(4)

C* - C * ( p , I ; X )

(5)

The associated optimal parental demand for H is given by:
H* = f ' ( p , I ; X )

(6)

Plugging the demands into the utility function yields the family maximized utility
before SCHIP was introduced:
V* = V(p, /; X ) = U(C * (p , /; X), M * (p, /; X) )

(7)

Upon the introduction o f SCHIP, participation in this program can reduce the
price of medical care by s, which is equivalent to a subsidy to medical care. But
participation in a public insurance program also involves transaction costs and stigma,
which decrease total utility by O . Conditional on participating in this public insurance
program, now the family utility becomes
max USCHIP = U(C, H;X)-<S>
C ,M

(8)

subject to
C + M. ( p - s ) = I

(9)

H =f(M)

(10)

/ ' > 0 ,/ " < 0

Again, solving for this maximizing problem yields demands for C and M and
associated demands function for H:
M* = M * ( p , s , I ; X , O)
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(11)

C* = C * ( p , s,

( 12)

(13)
The corresponding indirect utility becomes:
SCHIP

The family would enroll the child into the SCHIP program only when utility
shown in equation (14) exceeds that shown in equation (7). This model about
participation and demand for medical care and child health yields several implications.
Theoretically speaking, health insurance coverage under SCHIP can have an income
effect by shifting the budget constraint outward for previously uninsured families.
Families that have already been covered by private health insurance may take advantage
of the availability o f public insurance and drop their private health insurance. In this case
public health insurance crowds out private health insurance. It can also have a
substitution effect on the demand for medical care and demand for child health by
reducing the relative cost of medical care if the child used to be uninsured before the
enactment of SCHIP. In line with this argument, Medicaid/SCHIP coverage is expected
to be positively associated with increase in medical care utilization and improvement in
child health outcomes for uninsured children. However, this may not be the case if
transaction costs or stigma associated with participating in SCHIP programs are taken
into account. The disutility caused by transaction costs and stigma may be sufficiently
high to offset the marginal benefit. Therefore families may not enroll their children in
SCHIP despite becoming newly eligible. This possibility might in part explain low takeup rates and reduced crowd-out for SCHIP programs. Furthermore, among SCHIP
enrollees, increase in medical care utilization and improvement in health outcomes may
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not happen either because of crowd-out or because o f the delivery o f service under
Medicaid/SCHIP. For example, the opportunity cost o f seeing a participating physician,
again, may be sufficiently high to countervail the marginal benefit. Even if there is an
increase in utilization o f medical care (M), the quality o f the received service may be too
low to have any positive effect on health outcome, or it may take longer for medical care
to be translated into an improvement o f health outcome, which is a stock.
4.2 Data

The primary sources of data are the 1997, 1999 and 2002 National Survey of
America's Families, which provide detailed information on health insurance coverage,
health status and medical care utilization for children under 18 years old, as well as
information relating to their family settings and the adults who care for them. The survey
was carried out from February to October/November in 1997, 1999 and 2002, and the full
sample for children is composed o f 34,399, 35,897 and 34,292 observations for each
round, respectively. Round 1997 and 2002 correspond roughly to the pre- and post-year
o f the implementation o f SCHIP programs for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
Although SCHIP funding became available on October 1, 1997, as mentioned previously,
only eleven states started their program in 1997; the majority (39 states and the District of
Columbia) did so between 1998 and 2000. There is a partial overlap between 1997 and
1999 samples of NSAF, so that the data is neither a panel nor completely independent
cross-sectional. According to Abi-Habib et al. (2004), the correlation between 1997 and
1999 data is so small that it can be ignored and used as cross-sectional data. Therefore,
although I am using three waves o f NSAF data, the analysis is cross-sectional and not a
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panel study. Adding data from the 1999 NSAF allows for examining the phase-in of
SCHIP programs across states over time.

97

Although the survey focuses on a target group of states28as well as the
experiences o f low-income families (about $33,000 annually in 1998 currency for a
family of two parents and two children), it strives to provide reliable estimates for the
nation as a whole with appropriate sample design. Some questions cover the family's
circumstances at the time o f the survey; others are about the previous 12 months or about
that calendar year. The weights are used to adjust for design features o f the survey,
including oversampling, nonresponse and undercoverage to yield national estimates.29
Child and family demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as family
structure and the Most Knowledgeable Adult’s (MKA) education, are included to
measure parental human capital and family income, when appropriate, to isolate the
impact o f health insurance from income. In addition, the state level control variables
include state TANF participation rate (i.e. ratio of state TANF recipients to state
estimated population), TANF maximum benefit for a family o f three, unemployment rate,
monthly CCDF expenditure per child served and SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility as a
percentage o f FPL. Sources for the state level data are summarized in Appendix A.
The primary outcomes studied are health insurance coverage, medical care
utilization, and health outcomes. Since SCHIP can improve medical care utilization only

27 The results from including all 3 waves o f data are very similar to those obtained from using only the
1997 and 2002 waves.
28 These target states include three eastern states (Massachusetts, N ew Jersey, and N ew York), four
southern states (Alabama, Florida, M ississippi, and Texas), three western states (California, Colorado, and
Washington) and three mid-western states (Michigan, Minnesota, and W isconsin). The 13 target states
represent 51% o f the U.S population. Without weights, the 13 states from N SA F data represent 87% o f the
w hole sample. There is substantial variation in Medicaid and SCHIP income eligibility within the 13 states
(please refer to Table 30).
2 See Brick et al. (1999) for a detailed description o f NSAF weights.
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for those who are enrolled, coverage measures are examined which can shed light on
issues o f low take-up and crowd-out o f public health insurance programs before
estimating medical care utilization and health outcomes. Three measures o f coverage are
included: covered by public insurance30, covered by private insurance, and covered by
any health insurance.
As for measures o f health services utilization, I include number o f doctor visits
(not including dental, emergency or mental health visits) during the last 12 months,
number o f dentist or dental hygienist visits during the last 12 months (for children age 3
and up), number o f well-child care visits during the past 12 months, and number of
mental health visits during the past 12 months including mental health services received
from a doctor, mental health counselor, or therapist (for children age 3 and up).
Well-child care is defined as visits for shots or immunizations, annual and other
periodic check ups, hearing exams, physical and other visits for preventive care. It is
delivered mostly through pediatricians and family practitioners and is considered the
foundation o f child health services. National guidelines recommend at least twenty-six
well-child visits by age twenty one (Green and Palfrey 2002, Committee on Practice and
Ambulatory Medicine 2000). Having health insurance should encourage more utilization
of preventive care, such as well-child care, and protect children from many preventive
diseases and hospitalization. Children without access to well-child care often seek care in
emergency departments. Although emergency departments serve as a safety net for
vulnerable populations, they do so inefficiently (Luo et al. 2003). Therefore, both dental

30 I examine overall public insurance coverage instead o f SCHIP coverage status for three reasons. First
some states take the option to expand Medicaid as a way to implement their SCHIP programs. Second, for
those states initiating a stand-alone SCHIP program or choosing the combination approach, SCHIP may
have a spillover effect on Medicaid. Third, N SA F does not differentiate between M edicaid and SCHIP
participation status, but classifies both as being publicly insured.
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and well-child care visits are considered as active utilization of preventive health care
which can lead to more efficient allocation o f medical care resources. A doctor visit, on
the other hand, could be either due to preventative care needs or due to the fact that sick
children have to be seen by the doctor more often.
Mental health is also an integral and critical component of children’s learning and
general health. A report by U.S. Public Health Service (2000) states that the nation is
facing a public crisis in mental health for infants, children and adolescents: in the United
States, one in ten children and adolescents suffer from mental illness severe enough to
interfere with normal development and functioning. Estimates indicate about one in five
children receive mental health services in.any given year. Yet, unmet need for mental
health services remains as high now as it was 20 years ago (Department o f Health and
Human Services, 2000). In addition, poor children are found to have more mental health
problems than other children (Costello et al. 2003, Howell 2004). Since more low-income
children are now eligible for public health insurance through the new SCHIP programs,
consequently, such programs play a critical role in ensuring access to child mental health
services.31
A key difficulty in evaluating the effect o f Medicaid on health outcomes for
children as opposed to utilization of medical care, is the challenge o f measuring health
outcomes for children. The ideal instruments should be the objective physician
assessment o f child physical health status. Yet, social science, health, and
epidemiological surveys have asked people to describe their health for decades.
Although self-reported physical health might be subject to reporting bias, it has
31 See Lowell and Buck (2000) for a review o f mental health benefits under SCHIP in the United States.
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nonetheless been shown to be predictive o f both mortality and the onset o f several serious
health conditions, even after controlling for various socio-demographic conditions (Hurd
and McGarry 1995, Idler and Benyamini 1997, Knauper andTurner 2000). In many o f the
studies, subjective health was found to be a better predictor of survival than objective
health measures.
The primary health outcomes measure adopted in this study is the focal child’s
current health status, reported by the MKA on a 5-point scale (1 = poor, 5 = excellent).
The scale is dichotomized to excellent/very good versus good/fair/poor health; the latter
category is used as the reference group. This variable concerns MKA’s perception about
the current health status o f the children. Although it is potentially subject to the whims of
all subjective measures, it is attractive as a global measure o f health status and widely
used in social science and health literature. Two other MKA reported measures are also
included to supplement the analysis. One is the focal child’s health status compared to 12
months ago (for children age 1 and up), reported by the MKA on a 5-point scale (1 =
much worse, 2=worse, 3= the same, 4=better, 5 = much better). The scale is also
dichotomized to a dummy variable (1 = worse, much worse; 0 = the same, better, much
better). The other is the physical and mental functionality o f the focal child (i.e. whether
or not the child has a physical, learning, or mental health condition that limits his/her
participation in the usual kinds of activity done by most children).32 These three variables
are the most suitable measures available from the NSAF data for health outcomes.

32 A disability, especially one that meets the criteria for SSI benefits, virtually guarantees access to
Medicaid for the individual with disability.
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4.3 Empirical Strategies

Different estimation strategies might lead to quite different results. Remler et al.
(2004) review the common estimation methods in modeling health insurance expansions
and explain the relationship between different approaches. I am trying to use various
approaches in order to demonstrate the robustness o f my empirical results.

4.3.1

Accounting for Difference Across Income/Ase Groups and Over Time —

Difference-In-Difference Approach. It is obvious from Table 31 that within each state the
pre-SCHIP income eligibility cutoff was more generous for younger children than for
older children. As discussed earlier, prior to SCHIP, states were mandated to cover
children under 6 years old up to 133 percent o f the FPL. States had the option to expand
coverage up to 185 percent and still receive federal matching funds. As o f 1997, several
states had used their own funds to expand eligibility beyond 185 percent o f the FPL.
Consequently income eligibility limits pre-SCHIP were substantially higher for younger
children than for older children in many states.
Therefore, the marginal expansions induced by SCHIP programs are much bigger
for older children than for younger children. To explore the expansion variation across
age groups over time, the following difference-in-difference (DID) reduced form demand
function is specified:
Yol = p a + /?, filderkid, + p n * >^99, + /?13 * yrQ2, + /?14 * (olderkid*yr99t ) + fil5 * (olderkidi*yr02l ) + P2 * X i + e

(15)
where the dependent variables Yoi represents the three categories o f outcomes for the
child (o=health insurance coverage, medical care utilization, or child health outcomes).
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The estimates o f J3U and J3l5 will yield the bigger marginal expansion effect of
SCHIP/Medicaid on coverage, medical care utilization and health outcomes for older
children in comparison to younger children. It is a difference-in-difference estimator to
obtain the effect o f the bigger increase o f SCHIP/Medicaid income eligibility for older
children than for younger children. An important empirical issue arises regarding the
selection o f control group and treatment group. Since Medicaid eligibility increased much
more for older children (age 6-17) than it did for younger children (age 0-5), children
aged 0-5 are selected as the control group and children aged 6-17 as treatment group for
studying the effect o f SCHIP eligibility differentiated expansions across age groups.
Therefore, the control group is also “treated”, i.e. experienced an increase in benefits, but
the increase is much smaller compared to the treatment group. In this sense, this is a
pseudo difference-in-difference approach which should bias my results downward.
One approach to further refine the estimates is to stratify the whole sample into
two sub-samples according to family income, one of which consists o f children who are
believed not to be affected by the SCHIP expansions and using their age-incomeeligibility patterns as a baseline to which the effects on the other targeted group can be
compared. Since most states set their income eligibility below 300% of the FPL33,
children in families with income above or equal to 300% o f the FPL are proposed as a
reference group to which children from income below 300% o f the FPL are compared.
Each model therefore is estimated for the whole sample, for children with family income

33 A s o f 2002, only 5 states set their income eligibility above or equal to 300 percent o f FPL. These states
are CT, MD, M S, N E, NH. A more accurate way to classify treatment and control groups is to use actual
state cutoffs, i.e. define children w hose family incom e is between the 1997 and 2002 cutoffs as the
treatment group and children w hose family income is below the 1997 SCHIP cutoff as the control group.
However, again, N SAF does not contain such detailed information on family income.
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below 300% o f the FPL, and for children with family income above or equal to 300% o f
the FPL, respectively.
Given the fact that older children may use medical care differently from younger
children, especially regarding dental or mental care visits, this method may not capture
the policy impact as it is designed to. Therefore it is necessary to look for other testing
strategies to which we now turn.
As just discussed, SCHIP is projected to provide health insurance coverage to
targeted low-income children, namely children who reside in families with income below
200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) or whose families have an income 50 percent
higher than the state's Medicaid eligibility threshold. However, many states have chosen
to expand SCHIP eligibility beyond 200% o f the FPL limit. Therefore a similar DID
approach can be employed to explore differences in eligibility status across income
groups. As many states increased insurance eligibility up to 300% o f the FPL (some even
increased eligibility up to 350 percent o f the FPL), ideally the upper limit o f SCHIP
income eligibility rules is used to classify treatment and control groups. However, NSAF
data includes income levels above or equal to 300% of the FPL as one single category. It
is therefore impossible to distinguish income groups beyond 300% of the FPL in NSAF
data. Consequently, the treatment group is defined as children with family income
between 150% and 300% of the FPL (including 150%), and the control group consists of
children in families with income below 150% o f the FPL (dubbed the “near poor” and
“poor” families respectively hereafter34). In parallel: the equation to be estimated is:
Yoi = y0 + y u * nearpoor,+yn * y r9 9 + y n * yr0 2 + yl4 *(nearpoorj * y r9 9 i) + y i5 * {nearpoo^* y r0 2 t) + y2 * X t + u oi

34 These are different from the standard definitions used by the Census, and are employed only for brevity.
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While children with family incomes above or equal to 300% of the FPL (i.e.
“non-poor” families) can also be included in the control group, poor and near poor
families are known to access the health coverage and delivery system differently from
more affluent families. Given the heterogeneous nature o f the two control group
candidates, I feel it is more appropriate to separate these two groups instead o f lumping
them together. Therefore when applying the income DID approach, I drop the high
income group from the control group, and the following equation is proposed to obtain
the difference-in-difference estimate of SCHIP on health care utilization.

In doing so, this analysis is confined to the sub-sample o f children in families
with income below 300% o f the FPL only.35 Within the low income sub-sample, parallel
to the practice o f the age DID approach, I first estimate this income DID model using the
complete sub sample. Then I stratify this sub-sample into preschool children (age 0-5)
and school aged children (age 6-17), with the preschool group serving as a baseline to
which the school aged can be contrasted.
The DID approach is appropriate as long as time-varying factors affecting health
outcome/utilizations have the same effect on treatment and control group members. If
there is other ongoing policy variation affecting the treatment and control group
unequally, then DID estimates are biased. When SCHIP was first implemented, the
economy experienced considerable expansion as well, and there were fundamental
changes to the welfare program (the TANF program replaced the AFDC program), both
o f which would affect low income families more significantly as opposed to relatively
high income families. For example, the unemployment rate for a given state and year
35 Regression results with high family income children serving as the control group confirm results
obtained from using low-income children as the control group.
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could affect the availability o f private insurance coverage and would further impact child
Medicaid eligibility and utilization o f care independently.36 In particular, this presents a
problem if treatment and control groups are categorized according to family income.
Furthermore, employment growth increases the demand for preschool-aged child
care. There has been a significant increase in federal and state funds for child care since
the 1996 welfare reform legislation was enacted. Child Care and Development Block
Grant (CCDBG) / Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), created in 1990 and
amended in PRWORA in 1996, is the primary federal child care program. It is aimed to
assist low-income families, families receiving temporary public assistance, and those
transitioning from public assistance with obtaining child care for children up to 13 years
old so parents can work or train. All age groups o f needy children below age 13 are aided
by this program but younger children benefit more than older ones. But as far as I am
aware, no study in the literature has controlled for this policy variable yet. However, this
policy can directly affect utilization o f health care, especially well child visits, because
many states require that children be up to date for numerous vaccines before enrollment
in child care. Hence, without controlling for these trends the results are likely to be
biased. Thus, instead o f estimating the basic function specified in equation (15), I
estimate the following equations to purge such trends by controlling for the
unemployment rate (UNEM), TANF maximum benefits for a family o f three
(TANFMAX), TANF participation rate (TANFRATE), i.e. TANF caseload divided by
population, and child care expenditure per recipient (CCDF). All are state level data (s is
an index for each of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia):
36 Cawley and Simon (2005) find that macroeconomy, measured by state unemployment rate and real gross
state product affects m en’s health insurance coverage but has little impact on the health insurance coverage
o f women and children due to Medicaid and SCHIP.
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Y„i = Pa + P\\ * olderkid, + p n * y r 9 9 + p n * y r 02 + /?14 * {old erk id i * y r 9 9 ) + /?15 * {olderkidi * y r 0 2 ) +

P2 * X f +

P 2 * U N E M S,+ P 4 * T A N F M A X si+ P 5 * T A N F R A T E „ + P 6 * C C D F SI + P .S T A T E + e ol

(16)

Y0, = y 0 + / u * nearpooy + y n * y r9 9 + y u * y r 02 + y u * (nearpoort * y r 9 9 1) + y l5* (nearpoort * y r O l, ) + y 2 * X t +
y 2 * UNEMS, + y 4 * TANFMAXsl + y 5 * TANFRATESI + y 6 * CCDFsl + y 7 * STATE + v oi

(17)

where X is the set o f control variables used in the estimations including child’s age and
gender, MKA’s age, MKA’s education level, family structure. When appropriate, family
income levels are also included. State dummy variables are included in the regressions to
control for local environmental characteristics and local differences in medical care
delivery systems. In doing so, the net effect o f state level characteristics such as state
level policies that were unchanged between 1997 and 2002 are also controlled implicitly.
Time is also controlled in the form o f two dummy variables which are assigned a value of
1 if the observation is from the 1999 or 2002 sample (yr99 and yr02).
4.3.2 Accounting for Differences Across State Programs and Over Time:
Reduced Form Model. SCHIP policy contains arbitrary age-eligibility cutoffs that are
exogenous to potential beneficiaries. These eligibility thresholds measure changes in the
relative generosity of the SCHIP program across states. There is a great deal o f variation
in the magnitude of SCHIP policy treatment across states which the two DID approaches
do not exploit. In order to make use o f the variation in SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility across
states, SCHIP/Medicaid income eligibility cutoffs (as a percentage o f the federal poverty
line) based on age are used to characterize SCHIP. It varies for the following four age
groups over the period 1997-2002: infant, age 1-5, age 6-14 and age 15-17. As before, I
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also use dichotomous indicators for all 50 states and the District o f Columbia to capture
time-invariant differences between states in medical care utilization and health outcomes
that may be related to SCHIP policies. Again, I include the annual state unemployment
rate, state maximum TANF benefit for a family o f three, state TANF participation rate
and annual state CCDF expenditure per recipient to control for business cycle effects on
public assistance participation. Finally, I include an indicator for year 1999 and year 2002
respectively, with 1997 as the reference year to capture national trends in medical care
utilization and health outcomes. The equation to be estimated is:
Yoi = a 0+ a , * CU TO FFstj + a 2 * X , + a 3 * UNEM s, + a 4 * TANFMAX s, + a 5 * TANFS, +
a 6 * CCD Fsl + a 7 * STATE + a t * y r 9 9 + a 9 * y r 0 2 + a>oj

(18)
where CUTOFFj . =income eligibility for a child in age group j at state s at time t, and
subscript “o” indexes outcome.
I estimate the above equations for the whole sample as well as for age-income
sub-samples. That is, I stratify the whole sample according to both age (preschool versus
school aged) and income (poor, near poor and non-poor). As a result I have six groups
ranging from the most likely treated group, (school aged and near poor children), to the
most unlikely treated group (preschool and non-poor children).
4.3.3

Accounting for Difference Across State Programs and Over Time: 2SLS

Model. It is informative to use actual insurance coverage to assess the effectiveness of
SCHIP programs. However, insurance coverage status is endogenous in the sense that it
depends on family income, parental preference for health insurance coverage, etc. To
deal with the endogenous nature of insurance coverage, a 2SLS model is adopted to
directly estimate the effect o f SCHIP/Medicaid participation on medical care
-
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utilization/health outcomes. Some research has used simulated eligibility (e.g. Currie and
Gruber 1996a, Currie and Gruber 1996b, Lykens and Jargowsky 2002) as a proxy for
enrollment to sidestep the endogeneity problem. It is a clever way to deal with
endogeneity, however, as discussed earlier, for the program to be effective, enrollment
must also increase in response to an increase in eligibility. Therefore I use eligibility
cutoffs as the instrument for insurance coverage 37and estimate the following equation:
Yoi = X „+ X t * insured , + X 1 * X i + X ,* U N E M s, + X t * T A N F M A X

s, + X 5 * T A N F t, + X 6 * C C D F st (

19 )

+ X 1 * S T A T E + X s * y r 99 + X 9 * yr 02 + r ol

Therefore, this study uses various approaches to tackle each issue with a view to
obtain robust results.

37 Since considerable evidence exists regarding the crowd-out o f public insurance for private insurance, I
use overall insurance coverage status as opposed to public insurance coverage status.
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CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 32 presents means and standard deviations for variables used in the
analysis. There was a statistically significant increase in the number o f publicly insured
children and a large and statistically significant decrease in the number o f privately
insured children between 1997 and 2002, although there is a slight decrease in the
percentage of publicly insured children in 1999. Consequently there is a modest increase
in the overall percentage of insured children over the 1997-2002 period. The results are
mixed for medical care utilization. For example, the average number o f doctor and dentist
visits decreased, but the average mental visits and well child visits increased. For all three
measures o f health outcome, the simple descriptive statistics show that child health
outcomes deteriorated over this period. By and large, the table indicates similarity of
child, MKA and family characteristics between 1997 and 2002. Substantial differences
for state level variables such as unemployment rate, TANF participation rate and CCDF
over this period confirm the necessity o f including these state level data in all
specifications.
Descriptive DID estimates, which are equivalent to regression DID estimates
without control variables, are presented in Table 33. The fraction o f children with public
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insurance increased both for school aged children (age 6-17) and preschool children (age
0-5) between 1997 and 2002. However, the descriptive DID estimate for public insurance
is a statistically significant 3.1 percentage point increase for older children over this
period. Therefore, the simple DID descriptive analysis shows the positive effect of
SCHIP on increasing eligible children’s enrollment into public health insurance.
However, in order to get an incisive assessment o f the overall effectiveness o f SCHIP on
coverage, as well as on medical care utilization and health outcomes, more rigorous
estimations that isolate the effects o f demographic and economic factors as well as the
impact o f other concurrent policies are warranted.

5.2 Regression Results

5.2.1

Effects o f SCHIP/Medicaid on Children’s Insurance Coverage. Table 34

presents the estimated impact o f the SCHIP expansions on insurance coverage for
children with all estimates obtained via the Linear Probability model.38 The first panel of
Table 34 shows estimates of/?14 and /?l5 in equation (16), which are the coefficients on
the interaction terms o f time and age-based treatment group dummy variables.39 The
likelihood of being publicly insured increased and the likelihood o f being privately
insured decreased significantly more for older children than for younger children over
this period for children of family income below 300% of FPL. For example, over the
1997-2002 period, a school aged child will be more likely to have gained public
insurance compared to a preschool aged child by 4 percentage points, but at the same
time will be less likely to have private insurance by 4 percentage points. In contrast, for
38 Results from the Logit model are generally even stronger. Marginal effects from the Logit model are
reported in Appendix C.
39 Results for the control variables are reported in Appendix B.
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children whose family income is above 300% o f FPL, most should not be eligible for this
program. The likelihood of a child in the 6-17 age group having public insurance is lower
by 1 percentage point than that o f a child in the 0-5 age group. This further strengthens
the results for the children with family incomes below 300% o f FPL. The results also
suggest that the impact of SCHIP programs started since 1999 and become stronger in
2002: both coefficient estimates o f the interaction terms with year dummies usually have
the same sign but the coefficient estimate o f the interaction term with the later year is
bigger. This generally applies to other outcomes such as care utilization and health
outcomes as well as to the results obtained from income DID approaches.
Estimates o f yl4 and y l5 in equation (17), which are the coefficients on the
interaction terms o f time and income-based treatment group dummy variables, are
summarized in the second panel o f Table 34. Results from the income DID approach
reinforce those from the age DID approach regarding private insurance coverage. The
likelihood o f being covered by any insurance decreased for all children with family
incomes below 300% o f FPL as well for school aged children within this sub-sample. But
given the treatment and control group, it can be interpreted literally as “near poor
children (the treatment group) are less likely to be insured than poor children (the control
group)” for these groups of children. This confounding result could result from the anticrowd-out provisions requiring a waiting period, which could lead privately insured
children to drop their health insurance plans and become temporarily uninsured in order
to enroll in SCHIP. Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) find evidence that longer waiting
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periods40 are related to the possibility o f a child being uninsured. In addition, given the
possible spill-over effect o f the SCHIP expansions on Medicaid, this result also makes
sense. Poor families may become aware o f this program due to SCHIP outreach efforts
and, therefore, enroll their children into Medicaid. Consequently there is a greater
increase in the number o f insured children from poor families (with more previously
uninsured children than near-poor and non-poor families) than from near poor families
(many with children who already have coverage and are just switching from private to
public insurance). In addition, within the income below 300% o f FPL sub-sample, near
poor children in the 0-5 age group are 7 percent more likely than poor children to have
public insurance over the study period compared to, but this finding does not apply to
children in the 6-17 age group. These results are not surprising given the difference in
health insurance rates between older and younger children.41
These findings together suggest significant crowd-out o f private insurance despite
the explicit provisions o f the SCHIP programs to prevent the substitution of public
insurance for private insurance. However, this may not be viewed as evidence that the
anti-crowd-out provisions are ineffective. As private insurance coverage increases with
family income, crowd-out is a potentially bigger problem for SCHIP than for earlier
Medicaid. Hence, it is plausible that the magnitude o f crowd-out could be larger in the
absence o f the anti-crowd-out provisions.
The last panel of Table 34 reports the estimates for a x in equation (18), which is
the coefficient on state income eligibility level as a percentage o f FPL. Results for the
whole sample show that SCHIP eligibility expansions effectively increased the
40 “Waiting period” refers to SCHIP regulations that require that a child must have been uninsured for a
certain period, usually 6 months, before they are eligible for SCHIP.
41 W olfe and Scrivner (2005) also find older children are less likely to have insurance coverage.
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probability o f having public insurance as well as being insured. Additionally, there is no
evidence o f crowd-out. Once the sample is stratified, results for school aged children in
near poor families, i.e. the most likely targeted population o f SCHIP programs, follow the
same pattern as results obtained from the whole sample. As hypothesized, they are most
likely to be affected and, by contrast, preschool children from non-poor families were
least likely to be affected. It is also worth noting that the likelihood o f having private
insurance is only negatively associated with SCHIP eligibility expansions for children in
families with income below 300% o f FPL. This suggests that substitution of public
insurance for private insurance occurs for this particular income group.
5.2.2

Effects o f SCHIP/Medicaid on Medical Care Utilization. Corresponding

results for medical care utilization are summarized in Table 35. All except 2SLS
estimates are obtained by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. Overall, they suggest
that SCHIP does seem to increase utilization in general. However, morbidity may
confound access and utilization. For example, an increase in the number o f doctor visits
may suggest deterioration in health status, although it could also reflect proper utilization
of medical care due to improved access. Nevertheless, utilization o f preventative care is a
strong indicator for improved access. With respect to well-child care, younger children
are in general more likely to be taken to receive well-child care such as shots,
immunizations and periodic check-ups for preventive care, while older children may need
only annual check-ups as long as they stay healthy.
The age DID estimate o f /3n in equation (16), reported in the first panel o f Table
35, indicates that the introduction o f SCHIP led to a 0.18-visit increase in the number of
well-child care visits in 2002 for school aged children in poor and near poor families
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which therefore presents some evidence that SCHIP improved medical care utilization.
The average well-child care visits for all children in 1997 are 1.197 visits per year as
reported in Table 32. But the average is 0.78 visits per year for a school aged child. An
increase o f 0.18 visits per year is a 23% increase. The income DID estimates (i.e.
estimates for yu in equation (17) reported in the second panel o f Table 35 ) fails to find
such an impact for well-child care visits, which may not be unexpected once the spill
over effect o f SCHIP on Medicaid enrollment is taken into account.
Estimates from reduced form equations (estimates for a x in equation (18)
summarized in the third panel of Table 35) suggest that income eligibility thresholds are
positively associated with the number o f well-child care visits, doctor visits and dental
visits for the whole sample. In addition, it is noticeable that increased income eligibility
was positively associated with the number o f dental visits for school-aged children in
near poor families as well as with well-child visits for school aged children in poor
families. For example, increasing the income eligibility by 100 percent would increase
the number o f dental visits for a school-aged child in near poor families by 0.28 visits per
year, which represents a 15% increase compared to the average 1.85 visits per year for
this group o f children in 1997.
Results obtained from 2SLS models (shown as \

in equation (19) in the last

panel of Table 35) are similar to those found from the reduced form equation models:
being insured is significantly associated with the increase in number o f doctor visits and
well-child care visits.
5.2.2

Effects o f SCHIP/Medicaid on Child health outcomes. Estimates for health

outcomes are shown in Table 36. By and large, the results present mixed evidence
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regarding the effect o f SCHIP expansions on child health outcomes. For example,
estimates from the age DID model seem to suggest that SCHIP has a detrimental effect
on children’s current health status, but estimates from income DID indicate that SCHIP
improves children’s current health status. With respect to the reduced form models, it is
noticeable that SCHIP is positively associated with the likelihood o f having
excellent/very good health status for school aged children in non poor families (i.e.
treatment 3). In addition, the SCHIP expansions are significantly associated with lower
possibility of health status getting worse for school aged children in near poor families.
A somewhat counterintuitive but common finding in the literature is that there is
no clear link between public insurance expansions and improved health outcomes
(Kaestner, Joyce and Racine 1999, Lykens and Jargowsky 2002, Cullen et. al 2005). O f
course, there is always the possibility that other factors not accounted for by the empirical
approaches obscure the effects of policy on health reporting. In sum, the findings from
this study provide weak evidence that SCHIP expansions improve health outcomes for
those children that had not been reached by earlier Medicaid expansions.
Finally, the appendix tables present results for other concurrent state policy
control variables. Generally speaking, the results show that the unemployment rate tends
to be significantly and positively associated with number of well-child visits and current
health status. Unemployment rates are found to be negatively associated with the
likelihood o f being privately insured or having any health insurance for low income
children as well as for school aged children. Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF)
expenditure per child is found to be positively associated with current health status. By
contrast, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) participation rate seems
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to have little or no impact. Thus, these findings suggest that studies without controlling
for these policies, especially unemployment rate and CCDF, which has been overlooked
by the literature, might yield biased estimates.
5.3 Sensitivity Check

For coverage and other outcome measures which are dummy variables, logit
models are also used. The results are similar and slightly stronger than those obtained
from OLS models. Marginal effects from logit models are reported in Appendix C. For
current health status and compared health status, since the original values have a 5-point
scale, estimates from the ordered logit model are generally consistent with OLS and logit
estimates, which are reported in Appendix D.
In regard to the income-based DID approach, I use the experience of children
from families with income below or equal to 150% o f the FPL (i.e. the poor families) as a
counterfactual for the experience o f children in families with income between 150% and
300% of the FPL (i.e. the near poor families). However, the near poor, defined as families
with income between 150% and 300% o f the FPL, may include too many children who
were already enrolled in public insurance before SCHIP to serve as an appropriate
comparison group. As an alternative, I redefine the poor families as those whose family
income is below or equal to 200% o f the FPL, and non poor families as those with
income between 200% and 300% o f the FPL. The results are similar. In addition, I use
the experience of children from non poor families (income above 300% o f the FPL) as a
counterfactual instead o f using the experience of children from poor families. The results
support previous findings.
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Moreover, Cullen et al. (2005) find evidence that eligible families in states that
enacted their program via Medicaid expansions appear to be less likely to participate in
SCHIP programs, possibly because of stigma associated with participation in the pre
existing public insurance program. Wolfe and Scrivner (2005) also find that a separate
SCHIP seems to be more successful in reducing the probability of being uninsured. They
suggest that this could be due to parents’ preference, physician and providers acceptance
or difference in administration. In contrast, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004) find no
differences between expanding eligibility through Medicaid or through a separate
program. I explore whether expanded eligibility has different effects depending on how
states implemented SCHIP by including a set of dummies indicating the type of SCHIP
programs. I find no difference between different types o f SCHIP programs. As an
alternative, I add the interaction terms o f SCHIP type dummy variables with key SCHIP
variables. I do not find evidence o f differentiated effects o f SCHIP depending on the
state’s option of implementing SCHIP, either.
Finally, since there are three dimensions o f classifying treatment and control
groups: near poor children vs. poor children, older children (6-17 years old) vs. younger
children (0-5 years old), and before (1997) vs. after SCHIP implementation (1999 and
2002), I adopt the triple Difference-in-Difference approach using OLS models. The
results are reported in Appendix E. They suggest that SCHIP eligibility expansions lead
to a decrease in public health insurance which is contrary to general findings in the
literature. Almost every study examining SCHIP and its impact on take-up finds public
health insurance coverage increased due to the implementation of SCHIP programs.
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Therefore, the results from triple DID should be interpreted with caution. I also use logit
models, and the results there are similar.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To my knowledge, this is the first national study investigating the impact of
SCHIP on health outcomes for children o f all ages. I examine (1) SCHIP’s impact on
child health outcomes and (2) each step in the pathway to improved health outcomes
individually and incrementally. The results can inform policy makers about the potential
broken link(s) in the chain connecting the SCHIP eligibility expansions and the ultimate
objective o f improved health. With any link broken, this objective o f improving child
health outcomes can not be fully achieved.
Nonetheless, I do not find consistent evidence that SCHIP programs increased
health outcomes for eligible children. However, the programs were successful in
increasing enrollment in public health insurance, and this increased enrollment did lead to
higher utilization o f preventive care. Taken together, the “broken link” in this case
appears to be between utilization o f care and health outcomes. I can offer several possible
explanations for such findings. First, the medical care utilization received may be
inappropriate or the quality o f care may not be high enough to have any observable
positive effect on health. Second, coverage and care utilization are more like flow
variables which can be changed instantaneously compared to health, which is more like a
stock variable and needs a much longer period to adjust. Hence, more time may be
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needed for the health outcome measures to reflect the health benefits o f increased
medical care utilization. Finally, all measures are self-reported by the MKA (Most
Knowledgeable Adult) o f the focal child, and measures of health outcome are more likely
to contain reporting errors compared to measures o f coverage and care utilization.
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Figure 3. M edicaid/SCHIP Income Eligibility (as Percentage o f Federal Poverty
Line) for Different Age Groups, 1997-2002

2501

1997
Medicaid

■ 2002
SCHIP

Infant

age 1-5

age 6-14

age>14

Source: MCH Update Jan 20, 2000 and MCH Update, 2002. "Data
collected by the NGA Center for Best Practices”
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Table 29. Children's M edicaid (SCHIP) Eligibility Changes (1986-1997)

OBRA 1986 (Effective April 1987)
Option to states to raise the income eligibility thresholds up to 100 percent o f the
federal poverty level for children up to age 5.
OBRA 1987 (Effective July 1988)
Option to states to raise the income eligibility thresholds up to 185 percent o f the
federal poverty level for pregnant women and infants up to age one.

Option to states to extend the income eligibility thresholds up to 100 percent o f
the federal poverty level for children up to age 8.
Medicare Catastrophic Care Amendments of 1988
Mandated states to extend the income eligibility thresholds for pregnant women
and infants up to age 1 to 75 percent o f the federal poverty level by July , 1989
and to 100 percent of the federal poverty level by July 1990.

OBRA 1989 (Effective April 1990)
Mandated states to extend the income eligibility threshold up to 133 percent o f the
federal poverty level for pregnant women and children up to age 6.

OBRA 1990 (Effective July 1991)
Mandated states to extend the income eligibility threshold up to 133 percent o f the
federal level for pregnant women and children up to age 8 and adding 1 year to
the age cap, per year, up to 2002 when all such children up to age 18 will be
covered. (Note that the options still exist for states to cover pregnant women and
children up to 185 percent o f the federal poverty level.)
Balanced Budget Act (BBA) 1997 (Effective October 1997)
Option to state to extend the income eligibility thresholds up to 200 percent o f the
federal poverty level for children up to age 19.
Source: Hill 1990 and MCH Update 2000 from NGA
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Table 30. Sum m ary o f SCHIP Program by State for 1997 and 2002

State
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA

E xpansion
type as o f
2002
COMB
M
S
M
COMB
S
COMB
S
M
COMB
S
M
M
COMB
COMB
COMB
S
M
COMB
COMB
COMB
COMB
COMB
M
COMB
M
S
M
S
COMB
COMB
M
COMB
S
COMB
M
M
S
S

D ate
im plem ented
Mar-99
Feb-98
Oct-98
Oct-97
Mar-98
Apr-98
Jul-97
Oct-98
Oct-98
Apr-98
Sep-98
Jan-00

% F PL E ligibility
C u to ff (age 1 -5 )
1997
2002
133
133
133
200
133
133
185
133
133
133
133

Oct-97

133
133
133

Jan-98
Oct-97
Jul-98
Jul-98

133
133
133
133

N ov-98
Oct-97
Jul-98
A ug-98
May-98
Sep-98

133
133
185
133
150
275
133

Sep-98

Oct-97
Mar-97
Jan-98
Oct-98
Oct-98
May-98
May-98
Feb-98
Mar-99
Oct-98
Apr-98
Jan-98
D ec-97
Sep-98
Jun-98

200%
200
200
200
250
185
300
200
200
200
235
200
150
185
200
200
200
200
200
200
300
200
200
280
200
300

133
133
133
133
185
133
185
133
133
133
133
133
133
133

150
185
200
300
350
235
250
200
140
200
185
170
235

-

% F P L eligibility
cutoff, (age 15 and
older)
1997
2002
15
76
32
200
82
39
185
100
50
28
0
100
29
46
100
39
100
30
100
125
34
133
150
275
34
100
41
34
45
185
41
185
87
100
100
32
48
100
100

200%
200
200
200
250
185
300
200
200
200
235
200
150
185
200
200
200
200
200
200
300
200
200
275
200
300
150
185
200
300
350
235
250
200
140
200
185
170
235
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Table 30. (continued)

State

RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

Expansi
on

M
M
COMB
M
COMB

Date
implem
ented

Oct-97
A ug-97
Jul-98

% FPL eligibility
cutoff, 1-5 year
olds
1997
2002

% FPL eligibility
cutoff, 15 year olds
1997

2002
250
150
200
200
200
200
300
200
250

250
150
133
400
133

250
150
200
200
200

133
225
133
200

200
300
200
250

250
150
100
400
17
100
225
100
200

S
S
COMB
S

Oct-97
Jul-98
Aug-98
Oct-98
Oct-98
Jan-00

S
M

Apr-99
Jul-98

133
185

200
200

100
62

200
200

S

Apr-99

133

133

55

133

*Note: M = M edicaid expansion only, S = separate new insurance
program, COMB = combination program.
Source: http://w w w .cins.hhs.gov/, http://wwvv.nga.org/portal/site/nga
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Table 31. M edicaid Eligibility Changes as a Fraction o f the Federal Poverty Line
1997-2002

Infant
age[l,51
age \6, 14]
age>14

1997
Medicaid
Eligibility
174
154
129
99

2002
Medicaid
Eligibility
177
150
123
115

2002
SCHIP
Eligibility
221
212
213
213

Percentage
Points Change
of SCHIP
Medicaid
Expansion
3
-4
-6
16

Percentage
Points
Change
due to
SCHIP
47
58
84
114

Source: MCH Update Jan 20, 2000 and MCH Update, 2002. "Data collected by the NGA
Center for Best Practices”
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Table 32. Descriptive Statistics o f K ey Variables for 1997 and 2002
V ariables

M eaning
H ealth In surance Coverage

public
private
insured

Has public insurance
Has private insurance
Has health insurance coverage

Mean

Std. Err.

Mean

Std. Err.

Mean

Std. Err.

0.174
0.709
0.882

0.006 0.168
0.007 0.709
0.004 0.877

0.005
0.007
0.005

0.232
0.674
0.906

0.005
0.006
0.004

2.561
1.802

0.040 2.412
0.028 1.831

0.028
0.024

2.438
1.748

0.028
0.019

0.478
1.197

0.042 0.536
0.021 1.228

0.027
0.019

0.647
1.249

0.036
0.014

0.082

0.003

0.089

0.003

0.101

0.003

0.954

0.002 0.876

0.003

0.868

0.003

0.020

0.002 0.020

0.002

0.023

0.001

0.488
8.444
0.156
0.148
0.047
0.664

0.006
0.062
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.005

0.488
8.522
0.153
0.158
0.048
0.671

0.005
0.056
0.005
0.004
0.003
0.004

0.488
8.603
0.159
0.178
0.052
0.678

0.004
0.049
0.005
0.004
0.002
0.004

0.808
36.295
0.278
0.316
0.248
0.684
0.267
0.616
0.765
1.658
0.224
0.237
0.352

0.004
0.106
0.007
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.013
0.018
0.006
0.005
0.006

0.799
36.600
0.254
0.315
0.262
0.697
0.247
0.594
0.751
1.679
0.239
0.241
0.337

0.005 0.820
0.084 37.213
0.005 0.244
0.005 0.303
0.005 0.287
0.005 0.667
0.005 0.250
0.006 0.560
0.012 0.752
0.023 1.670
0.005 0.236
0.005 0.229
0.005 0.356

0.004
0.091
0.004
0,004
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.011
0.017
0.004
0.005
0.005

1.247
4.015
0.042
4.979
3.564

0.007
0.018
0.000
0.014
0.016

2.111
4.069
0.027
4.250
4.208

0.006
0.015
0.000
0.009
0.021

0.003
0.014
0.000
0.009
0.013

M edical C are Utilization

fdoct
fdent
fment
uwellchd

Number of doctor visits last year (excluding any dental,
emergency room, or mental health visits)
No. of dental visits last year (for children aged 3 and up)
Number of mental health visits last year (for children aged 3
and up)
No. of well child visits past 12 months
H ealth Outcom e

disbl
health
worse

Whether has health conditions that limit activity. Dummy
variable. =1 if yes; =0 if no
Current health status: l=very good/excellent; 0=poor, fair,
good
Current health compared to 12 months ago: l=much worse,
somewhat worse; 0=about the same, somewhat better, much
Child C haracteristics

girl
uage
black
hispanic
other
age617

Dummy variable.
child's age
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
child between 6-17 years old

mkafem
umkaage
mkahs
mkasc
mkabd
working
parent 1
pov300b
chldO 5
chld6 17
west
midwest
south

MKA is female
MKA's age
MKA has high school diploma
MKA has some college education
MKA has bachelor or higher degree
MKA is working
Living in single parent family
Family income below 300% FPL
Number of children aged 0-5 years old in the household
Number of children aged 6-17 years old in the household
West
Midwest
South

MKA and Household C haracteristics

Policy and T ren d V ariables

cutoff
tanfmax
tanf
unem
ccdf

SCHIP income eligibility cutoff
Maximum TANF benefit for family of 3
TANF caseload
Unemployment rate
CCDF average expenditure per recipient
Sam ple size
W eighted sam ple size

34,399
71,121,695
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2.199
4.221
0.018
5.808
5.200

34,292
72,543,589

Table 33. Descriptive Income DID Analysis for SCHIP’s Impact on the Probability
of Being SCHIP/Medicaid Insured

Before Expansion of After Expansion of
SCHIP/Medicaid
SCHIP/Medicaid
Eligibility (1997)
Eligibility (2002)
Treatment Group (age 6-17)
(any family income)
Control Group (age 0-5)
(any family income)
Difference in Differences

Difference

14.1% (0.006)

21.0% (0.004)

7.0% (0.007)*

23.8% 65

27.7% (0.008)

3.9% (0.014)*
3.1% (0.012)*

Notes:
1. Numbers are Means and standard errors (in paratheses);
2 “ *” indicates significance at 0.05 [test of last column].
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Table 34. The Im pact o f the SCHIP Expansions on Insurance Coverage
A pproach I: Age DID
|

P u b lic

|

P riv a te

|

In su r e d

W h o le S a m p le
age617*yr99
age617*yr02

0 .0 2

- 0 .0 2

0

( 0 .0 1 )

( 0 .0 1 ) *

( 0 .0 1 )

0 .0 2

- 0 .0 2

0

( 0 .0 1 )

( 0 .0 1 ) *

( 0 .0 1 )

In co m e < 30 0 % FPL
age617*yr99
age617*yr02

0 .0 3

- 0 .0 4

-0 .0 1

( 0 .0 2 )

( 0 .0 1 ) * *

( 0 .0 1 )

0 .0 4

- 0 .0 4

0

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

( 0 .0 1 ) * *

( 0 .0 1 )

In co m e > = 30 0 % FPL
age617*yr99
age617*yr02

-0 .0 1

0 .0 1

0

( 0 .0 1 )

( 0 .0 1 )

( 0 .0 1 )

-0 .0 1

0 .0 1

-0 .0 1

( 0 .0 1 ) *

( 0 .0 1 )

( 0 .0 1 )

A pproach II: Incom e D ID (for incom e < 300% FPL sub-sam ple)
|

P u b lic

|

P r iv a te

|

In su re d

I n c o m e < 3 0 0 % F P L su b -sa m p le
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9
p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2

0 .0 3

- 0 .0 6

- 0 .0 3

( 0 .0 2 ) *

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

( 0 .0 2 ) *

0 .0 2

- 0 .0 7

- 0 .0 5

( 0 .0 2 )

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

( 0 .0 1 ) * *

A g e grou p 6 -1 7
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9
p o v !5 0 p * y r 0 2

0 .0 2

- 0 .0 5

- 0 .0 3

( 0 .0 2 )

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

( 0 .0 2 ) *

-0 .0 1

- 0 .0 7

- 0 .0 8

( 0 .0 2 )

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

A g e g r o u p 0 -5
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9
p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2

0 .0 5

- 0 .0 7

- 0 .0 2

( 0 .0 2 ) *

( 0 .0 3 ) * *

( 0 .0 2 )

0 .0 7

- 0 .0 8

-0 .0 1

( 0 .0 3 ) * *

( 0 .0 2 ) * *

( 0 .0 2 )
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Table 34. (Continued)
Approach III: Reduced form equations
Public
Whole sample
0.03
(0.01)**
Treatmentl: Income 150%-299% FPL. aae 6-17
0.04
(0.01)**
Treatment2: Income <150% FPL. aae 6-17
0.05
(0.02)*
Treatment3: Income >=300% FPL. aae 6-17
0.00
(0.01
Treatment4:Income 150%-299% FPL. aae 0-5
0.02
(0.03
Treatment5:Income < 150% FPL. aae 0-5
0.05
(0.03)*
Control aroup:Income >=300% FPL. aae 0-5
-0.01
(0.01
Stratifying the whole sample by income
Income below 300%
0.05
(0.01)**
Income above 300%
0.00
(0.01
Stratifying the whole sample by age
6-17 age group
0.02
(0.01)**
0-5 age group
0.01
(0.02

Private
-0.01
(0.01)
0
(0.02
-0.03
(0.02
0.01
(0.01
-0.03
(0.03
-0.03
-0.03
0.01
(0.01

Insured
0.02
(0.00)**
0.04
(0.01)**
0.02
(0.02
0.01
(0.01)*
-0.01
(0.02
0.03
-0.03
0.00
(0.01

-0.03
(0.01)*

0.02
(0.01)**

0.01
(0.01

0.01
0.00

0.00
(0.01

0.02
(0.01)**

-0.01
(0.01

0.00
(0.01

Notes:
1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, * at 0.1 level.
2.

Coefficients o f/? 14 ,/? ]5 in Eq. ( 1 6 ) , in Eq. (1 7 ),a ] in Eq. (18) are reported.

3. Estimates are obtained from OLS models, marginal effect o f logit models are reported in
Appendix C.
4. All regressions include control variables such as child and family characteristics, state dummies
and state level variables listed in Table 32.
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Table 35. The Impact o f the SCHIP Expansions on M edical Care Utilization

Approach I: Aee DID
1 Doctor | Dental I Mental 1 Well-child
Whole Sample
0.03
0.19
-0.01
-0.03
age617*yr99
CO.10)*
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.06)
0.22
0.11
0.06
age617*yr02
0.26
(0.06)
10.12)*
(0.06)**
(0.08)
Income < 300% "PL
0.07
0.06
-0.03
-0.06
age617*vr99
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.13)
(0.11)
0.2
0.18
age617*yr02
0.27
0.23
10.14)*
(0.09)**
(0.11)*
(0.09)*
Income >= 300% FPL
age617*yr99
0.37
-0.03
0.05
-0.03
(0.08)
(0.15)**
(0.09)
(0.1)
-0.12
age617*yr02
0.2
0.25
0.06
(0.16
(0.08)**
(0.09)
(0.09)
Approach H: Income DIDIfor income< 300% FPL sub-sample)
I Doctor | Dental I Mental I Well-child
Income < 300% FPL sub-sample
povl50p*yr99
0.07
-0.13
-0.13
0.08
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.08)
(0.13)
povl50p*yr02
0.10
-0.13
0.01
0.06
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.08)*
(0.08)
Age group 6-17
0.07
povl50p*yr99
0.08
-0.08
-0.13
(0.14)
(0.13)
(0.10)
(0.09)
povl50p*yr02
0.05
-0.01
0.08
-0.09
(0.12)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.07)
Age group 0-5
-0.15
0.13
povl50p*yr99
0.05
-0.31
(0.14
(0.14
(0.22
(0.11)**
povl50p*yr02
0.12
-0.21
-0.17
0.19
(0.22)
(0.12)
(0.15)
(0.09)*
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Table 35. (Continued)

Approach III: Reduced form equations
Doctor
Dental
Whole sample
0.19
0.07
(0.04)*
10.06')**
Treatment 1:
(0.02
0.28
Income 150% - 299% FPL. Age 6-17
(0.10)**
(0.09)
Treatment2:
0.34
0.03
Income <150% FPL, Age 6-17
(0.07)
(0.15)*
Treatment3:
0.04
0.05
income >=300% FPL, Age 6-17
(0.07)
(0.1)
Treatments
0.01
0.1
Income 150%-299% FPL, Age 0-5
(0.27)
(0.12)
Treatment5:
-0.32
-0.01
Income < 150% FPL, Age 0-5
(0.14)
(0.23)
Control group:
-0.08
0.02
Income >=300% FPL, Age 0-5
(0.19)
(0.08)
Stratifying whole sample by income
Income below 300% FPL
0.23
0.09
(0.08)**
(0.06)*
Income above 300% FPL
0.14
0.01
(0.08)*
(0.06)
Stratifying whole sample by age
Age group 6-17
0.11
0.12
(0.07)
(0.05)**
Age group 0-5
-0.14
0.04
(0.14)
(0.07)

Mental
0.04
(0.07
0.07

Well-child
0.15
(0.03)**
0.05

(0.11)
0.37

(0.03)
0.23

(0.23)
-0.16

(0.08)**
0.04

(0.11)
0.05

(0.03)
0.21

(0.07)
0.23

(0.12)*
-0.08

(0.18)
-0.12

(0.18)
0.00

(0.10)

(0.10)

0.18
(0.11)*

0.23
(0.04)**

-0.15
(0.10)

0.06
(0.03)*

0.06
(0.09)

0.09
(0.03)**

0.05
(0.06)

0.02
(0.09)
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Table 35. (Continued)
A pproach IV: 2SLS
Whole sample
Treatmentl: Income 150%-299% FPL, A ge 6-17
Treatment3: Income >=300% FPL, A ge 6-17
Treatment4: Income 150%-299% FPL, A ge 0-5
Treatment5:Income < 150% FPL, A ge 0-5
Control group:Income >=300% FPL, A ge 0-5

Doctor
11.86
(4.72)*
(2.50)
(13.70)

Dental
3.84
(2.43)
(3.70)*
(3.48)

Mental
2.42
(4.31)
(3.20)
(17.99)

Well-child
9.45
(2.99)**
(1.10)
(9.74)

3.61
(10.24)
-2.04

5.26
(7.83)
-16.58

-15.95
(15.08)
-5.02

4.1
(4.23)
-36.78

(51.13)
-12.4
(17.24)
-475.93
(20912.63)

(75.18)
0.2
(4.30)
1.65
(6.71)

(15.66)
-14.01
(38.63)
-12.83
(20.35)

(128.76)
-3.01
(8.08)
-2.66
(671.14)

Stratifying whole sample by income
Income below 300%
9.95
(4.05)*

4.24
(2.77)

7.7
(5.87)

9.93
(3.40)**

20.59
(19.16)

1.33
(5.99)

-14.32
(12.21)

8.82
(7.58)

4.85
(3.62)

5.44
(2.45)*

2.75
(4.31)

3.98
(1.79)*

-33.81

-4.21

-8.09

5.17

Income above 300%

Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group

0-5 age group
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, * at 0.1 level.
Coefficients o f /?14 and/?15 in Eq. (16), y l4 and y l5 in Eq. (17), a { in Eq. (18) and \

in Eq.(19) are

reported.
Except for the two-stage least squares m odels, estimates are obtained from OLS m odels. Marginal effect
o f logit m odels are reported in Appendix C.
A ll regression included control variables such as child and fam ily characteristics, state dummies and state
level variables listed in Table 32.
The instruments for the two-stage least squares models include all dependent variables listed in Table 32.
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Table 36. The Im pact o f the SCHIP Expansions on Health Outcomes

Approach I: Age DID
Morbidity
age617*yr99
age617*yr02
Income< 300% FPL
age617*yr99
age617*yr02
Income >=300% FPL
age617*yr99
age617*yr02

Good health

Worse Health

Whole Sample
r 0.01 [
-0.03
r (0.01) 1 (0.01)**
' 0.01 |
-0.04

-0.01
(0.00)
-0.01

k ro.on 1 ro.oiv*

ro.oo)

0.02
(0.01)*
0.02

-0.04
(0.01)**
-0.06

-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01

(0.01)*

(0.01)**

(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)

-0.03
(0.01)**

0.00
(0.01)

-0.01

-0.02

0.00

(0.01)

(0.01)**

(0.01)

Approach II: Income DID(for income < 300% FPL sub-sample)
Morbidity Good health Worse Health
Income <300% FPL sub-sampie
povl50p*yr99
-0.01
povl50p*yr02

0.10

0.00

(0.01)

(0.02)**

(0.01)

0.02
(0.01)

0.07
(0.01)**

0.00
(0.01)

-0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)

0.11
(0.02)**
0.08
(0.02)**

0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)
0.00

0.07
(0.02)**
0.05

0.00
(0.01)
-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)**

(0.01)

Age group 6-17
povl50p*yr99
povl50p*yr02
Age group 0-5
povl50p*yr99
povl50p*yr02
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Table 36. (continued)

Approach HI: Reduced form equations
Morbidity

Cohort
r

Whole sample

Good health Worse Health

-0.02

0.00
(0.01)
0.00

0.00
(0.00)
-0.01

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)*

0.02
(0.02)
0.00

0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)*
-0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)
0.00

0.00

1 (o-oi)
Treatment 1income 150%-299% FPL, Age 6-17
Treatment2: Income <150% FPL. Age 6-17
Treatment3: income >=300% FPL, Age 6-17
Treatments Income 150%-299% FPL, Age 0-5
Treatment5: Income < 150% FPL, Age 0-5
Control group: Income >=300% FPL, Age 0-5

(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
*
o
©

Stratifying whole sample by income
0.00
Income below 300%
(0.01)
Income above 300%
0.00
(0.01)
Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group
0.00
(0.01)
0-5 age group
-0.01
(0.01)
j

[
[
I
1

f
r

(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)

-0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)
0.00

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)

(0.01)
1

A

-229-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 36. (continued)
Approach IV: 2SLS
Morbidity

Cohort

G ood Health W orse Health

W hole sample

-0.18

-0.10

-0.10

Treatmentl: Incom e 150% -299% FPL, A ge 6-17

(0.36)
-0.44

(0 .3 1 )
-0.00

(0.18)
-0.36

(0.40)

(0.27)

(0.22)

Treatment2: Incom e <150% FPL, A ge 6-17

1.12

0.51

0.69

(1.12)
0.50

(1.23)
0.92

(0.64)

Treatment3: Incom e >=300% FPL ,A ge 6-17

(1.26)

(0.73)

(0.55)

-0.04

Treatment4: Incom e 150% -299% FPL, A ge 0-5

-1.37

3.02

0.57

Treatment5: Incom e < 150% FPL, A ge 0-5

14.94)
-0.49

(11 .2 3 )
0.72

(2.1 1)
0.04

(1.05)

(1.30)

(0.19)

Control group: Incom e >=300% FPL, A ge 0-5

-72.53

-27.86

6.37

(32 1 0 .4 5 )

(1 2 3 3 .8 0 )

(284.86)

Stratifying w hole sample by income
Income b elow 300% o f FPL
Income above 300% o f FPL

-0.11

-0.33

-0.10

(0.34)

(0.34)

(0.17)

-0.49

0.28

-0.16

(0.68)

(0.58)

(1.04)
Stratifying w hole sample by age
6-17 age group
0-5 age group

0.21

0.35

-0.01

(0.38)

(0.33)

(0.18)

-1.38

-0.02

-0.10

(4.12)

(2.42)

(0.89)

Notes:
1.

Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.05 level, * at 0.1 level.

2.

Coefficients o f [5U ,f3l5 inEq.

3.
4.
5.

in Eq. (17), Oj in Eq.(18), \

in Eq. (19) are

reported.
Except for the two-stage least squares models, estimates are obtained from OLS models,
marginal effect o f logit models are reported in Appendix C.
All regressions include control variables such as child and family characteristics, state
dummies and state level variables listed in Table 32.
The instruments for the two-stage least squares models include all dependent variables listed
in Table 32.
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APPENDIX A. Data Source for the State Level Variables
Data o f TANF caseloads for each state come from Department of Health and
Human Services, Administration for Children and Families. Data on estimated population
of each state is obtained from the U.S. Bureau o f the Census. Data on TANF maximum
benefit for a family o f three is taken from table prepared by the Congressional Research
Service on the basis o f CRS surveys of state benefit levels. Ratios o f state TANF
recipients to state estimated population in 1997 and 2002 are derived and included in all
regressions. Unemployment rates for each state come from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics
(BLS), U.S. Department of Labor. Data on overall CCDF expenditure and the average
monthly number o f children served by CCDF in each state in 1997 and 2002 are obtained
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child Care Bureau. Data on
SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility rules come from Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Update
Jan 20, 2000 and Update 2002 collected by the National Governor’s Association (NGA)
Center for Best Practices. Sources for the state level data are summarized as follows:
State level data
TANF caseloads
Estimated population

TANF maximum benefit
Unemployment rate
CCDF expenditure and number o f recipients

SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility rules

Source
Department o f Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families
U.S. Bureau o f the Census
From table prepared by the Congressional
Research Service on the basis o f CRS surveys
o f state benefit levels.
Bureau o f Labor Statistics
U.S. Department o f Health and Human
Services, Child Care Bureau
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Update
Jan 20, 2000 and Update 2002 collected by
the National Governor’s Association (NGA)
Center for Best Practices.
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APPENDIX B. SCHIP Eligibility and Health Insurance Coverage, Medical Care
Utilization and H ealth Outcomes (Age DID for W hole Sam ple with All Independent

Variables Reportet )
Public

Private

Insured

Doctor

Dental

age617

M ental

Well-child M orbidity

0.07
-0.06
0.00
-1.63
0.75
0.24
-1.02
(0.01)
(0.12)**
(0.06)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.05)**
(0.11)*
yr99
-0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.21
-0.04
0.03
0.04
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)*
(0.11)*
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.06)
yr02
-0.03
0.05
0.02
-0.15
-0.23
0.02
0.15
(0.02)**
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.13)
(0.10)*
(0.07)*
(0.13)
age617yr99
-0.02
0.02
0.00
0.19
-0.01
-0.03
0.03
(0.01)
(0.01)*
(0.01)
(0.10)*
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.09)
age617yr02
0.02
-0.02
0.00
0.22
0.26
0.11
0.06
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.12)*
(0.06)
(0.01)*
(0.06)**
(0.08)
girl
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
0.08
-0.16
0.01
(0,00)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.02)**
(0.04)**
(0.02)
(0.00)
black
-0.16
-0.01
-0.49
-0.27
0.32
0.15
-0.26
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)*
(0.06)**
(0.04)**
(0.07)**
(0.04)**
hispanic
0.08
-0.17
-0.09
-0.46
-0.27
0.01
-0.20
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.05)**
(0.03)
(0.04)**
(0.05)**
other
0.04
-0.08
-0.03
-0.35
-0.03
-0.19
0.14
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.11)**
(0.07)
(0.08)*
(0.07)**
parent 1
0.18
-0.18
0.00
0.18
-0.02
0.10
0.51
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.00)
(0.05)**
(0.03)
(0.05)**
(0.03)**
mka female
0.05
-0.05
0.00
0.51
-0.08
0.21
-0.04
(0.00)**
(0.01)**
(0.00)
(0.04)**
(0.04)*
(0.04)**
(0.02)*
m kaage
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.02
0.01
0.02
-0.02
(0.00)**
(0.00)**
(0.00)
(0.00)**
(0.00)**
(0.00)**
(0.00)**
mka HS
-0.16
0.27
0.11
0.09
0.14
-0.07
-0.05
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0,06)
(0.05)**
(0.01)**
(005)
(0.04)*
mka SC
-0.21
0,34
0.13
0.25
0.25
-0.07
O il
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.06)**
(0.04)**
(0.06)*
(0.04)*
mka college
0.44
-0.27
0.17
0.45
0.41
0.03
-0.06
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)**
(0.06)**
(0.05)**
(0.06)
(0.04)
chi 1dO 5
0.06
-0.06
0.00
-0.17
-0.13
0.03
-0.07
(0.01)**
(0.00)**
(0.00)
(0.03)**
(0.02)**
(0.02)
(0.02)**
chlld6 17
0.02
-0.03
-0.15
-0.01
-0.01
0.04
-0.09
(0.00)**
(0.00)**
(0.00)**
(0.02)**
(0.01)**
(0.01)
(0.02)*
west
0.03
-0.06
-0.03
0,78
0.10
-0.83
-0.27
(0.08)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.72)
(0.93)
(0.19)
(0.82)
midwest
0,00
-0.05
-0.05
-0.23
-0.79
-0.57
-1.14
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.39)
(0.42)*
(0.74)
(0.19)**
south
-0.01
0.05
0.03
0.92
-0.34
0.00
-1.03
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.42)*
(0.53)
(0.75)
(0.24)
TANF max
-0.02
0.00
0.10
-0.01
0.03
0.03
0.08
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.06)
TANFrate
-0.33
-0.21
-0.54
4.79
-3.85
3.23
-3.32
(0.55)
(0.64)
(0.48)
(4.10)
(3.54)
(4.59)
(2.37)
Unem rate
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.04
-0.01
-0.05
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)**
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)*
(0.05)
CCDF
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
-0.02
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
age617ccdf
0.00
-0.01
0.00
0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.01
(0.00)*
(0.00)**
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.01)*
(0.02)
(0.02)
103860
Observations
103860
103860
103860
89069
103860
86978
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicate significance at 0.01 level, * at 0.05 level.
2. All coefficients in Eq. (16), Eq. (17) and Eq. (18) except those on State dummies are reported.
3. Estimates are obtained from OLS models.

0.06
(0.01)**
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.00)**
0.00
(0.01)
-0.02
(0,01)**
0.00
(0.01)
0.04
(0.00)**
0.03
(0.00)**
0.00
(0.00)**
-0.04
(0.01)**
-0.05
(0.01)**
-0.07
(0.01)**
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.00)**
-0.05
(0.06)
-0.14
(0.04)**
-0.10
(0.04)**
0.00
(0.01)
-0.18
(0.34)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
103860

-241 -

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Good
health

0.02
(0.01)**
-0.04
(0.01)**
-0.06
(0.01)**
-0.03
(0.01)**
-0.04
(0.01)**
0.00
(0.00)
-0.05
(0.01)**
-0.09
(0.01)**
-0.02
(0.01)*
-0.05
(0.00)**
-0.03
(0,00)**
0.00
(0.00)**
0.11
(0.01)**
0.13
(0.01)**
0.17
(0.01)**
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.10
(0.05)*
0.12
(0.04)**
-0.03
(0.07)
0.02
(0.01)
0.86
(0.45)*
0.01
(0.00)*
0.01
(0.00)**
0.00
(0.00)
103860

W orse
health

0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.00)**
0.01
(0.00)**
0.00
(0.00)*
0.00
(0.00)*
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.03
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.16)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
103860

APPENDIX C. SCHIP Eligibility, Health Insurance Coverage and Health Outcomes

Marginal Effects from Logit Models
A pproach I: A ge D ifferen ce-In -D ifferen ce
Good
Public

Private

Insured

W hole sample
age617*yr99
0.013
-0.024*
-0.003
age617*yr02
0.029** -0.028*
-0.005
Incom e below 300% PFL
age617*yr99
0.025
-0.043** -0.009
age617*yr02
0.049** -0.043** -0.004
Incom e above 300% FPL
age617*yr99
-0.005
0.014
0.006
age617*yr02
-0.001
0.004
-0.008
Approach II: Incom e D ifferen ce-In -D ifferen ce (for incom e

povl50p*yr99
povl50p*yr02
A ge6-17
povl50p*yr99
povl50p*yr02
A ge0-5
povl50p*yr99
povl50p*yr02

health

0.004
-0.007

-0.022**
-0.026**

-0.005
-0.006*

0.012
0.006

-0.023
-0.033

-0.007*
-0.006

Public
0.066**
0.139**

Private
-0.090**
-0.105**

-0.011
-0.029*
-0.028*
-0.019
< 300% F PL sub-sam
Good
Morbidity health
Insured
-0.032*
-0.001
0.007
-0.042** 0.021*
-0.017

0.067**
0.142**

-0.085**
-0.107**

-0.041*
-0.067**

-0.007
0.025

0.067*
-0.099** -0.019
0.008
0.144** -0.105** 0.002
0.005
A pproach III: R educed Form Equations

W hole sample
Treatmentl:
Incom e 150%-299% FPL, A ge 6-17
Treatment2:
Income <150% FPL, A ge 6-17
Treatment3:
Income >300% FPL, A ge 6-17
T reatm ents
Income 150%-299% FPL, A ge 0-5
Treatment5:
Income < 150% FPL, A ge 0-5
Control group:
Income >300% FPL, A ge 0-5
Stratifying whole sample by income
B elow 300% FPL
Above 300% FPL
Stratifying whole sample by age
6-17 age group
0-5 age group

Worse

Morbidity health

0.001
-0.002

3le)
Worse
health
0.004
0.003

0.012
-0.015

0.001
0.005

-0.001
-0.012

0.002
-0.003

Public
0.027**

Private
-0.013

Insured
0.014**

Good
Morbidity health
-0.004
0.006

Worse
health
-0.002

0.040**

0.001

0.035**

-0.014

0.012

-0.004

0.051

-0.035

0.014

0.0197

0.0118

0.003

-0.0012

0.017

0.018**

0.004

0.017**

-0.000

0.017

-0.027

0.002

0.007

-0.005

-0.003

0.062*

-0.039

0.025

-0.007

0.028

-0.000

-0.006

0.01

0

-0.011*

-0.001

0.000

0.050**
0

-0.032**
0.015

-0.019**
0.012*

-0.004
-0.003

0.004
0.008*

-0.002
-0.001

0.023**
0.013

0.001
-0.014

0.029**
0.006

0.004
-0.004

0.012*
-0.009

-0.000
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0.001

APPENDIX D. The Impact of the SCHIP Expansions on Health Outcomes: Ordered
Logit Model
Approach I: Age Difference-In-Difference
C urrent H ealth
Status

C om pared H ea lth
Status

W ho e S a m p le
age617*yr99
age617*yr02

-0 .1 5

-0 .0 9

(0 .0 6 )*

(0 .0 8 )

-0 .2 5

0.01

(0 .0 5 )* *

(0.07)

In com e < 3 0 0 % FPL
age617*yr99

age617*yr02

-0 .0 5

-0 .1 5

( 0 .0 8 )

(0.09)*

-0 .2 7

0 .0 2

(0 .0 7 )* *

(0.10)

In com e > = 300% FPL
age617*yr99

age617*yr02

-0 .3 5

0 .0 3

(0 .1 0 )* *

(0.14)

-0 .2 2

-0 .0 2

(0 .1 1 )* *

(0.13)

Approach II: Income Difference-In-Difference (for income < 300% FPL
sub-sample)
C urrent H ealth
Status

C om pared H ea lth
Status

In co m e < 300% F PL su b -sam p le
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9

p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2

-0 .1 5

0 .0 3

(0 .0 8 )*

(0.12)

-0 .1 7
, (0 .0 8 )*

0 .1 0

(0.09)

A g e group 6 -1 7
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9

-0 .2 0
0 .0 3
(0 .1 0 )*

p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2

(0.16)

-0 .2 1

0 .1 2

(0 .1 0 )*

(0.13)

A g e group 0 -5
p o v l5 0 p * y r 9 9

p o v l5 0 p * y r 0 2

-0 .0 4

0 .0 7

(0 .1 3 )

(0.13)

-0 .0 8

0 .0 9

(0 .1 2 )

(0.13)
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APPENDIX E. The Im pact of the SCHIP Expansions on Coverage, Medical Care
Utilization and Health Outcomes: Triple Difference-in-Difference from OLS M odel
Public
povl50p_age617_yr9902

p o v l5 0 p

y r9 9 0 2

a g e 6 17

p o v l 5 0 p y r9 9 0 2

p o v l5 0 p _ a g e

age y r9 9 0 2

O b s e rv a tio n s

P rivate

Insured

Doctor

Dental

M ental

W ell-child

M orbidity

Good
health

W orse
health

-0.06

0.02

-0.04

-0.01

0.13

0.09

-0.13

-0.01

0.04

0.01

(0.02)**

(0.02)

(0.02)*

(0.23)

(0.12)

(0.16)

(0.15)

(0.02)

(0.02)**

(0.01)

-0 .3 4

0 .3 9

0 .0 5

-0 .0 8

-0.01

-0 .0 2

-0 .1 8

-0 .0 2

0 .0 0

0 .01

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 1 )* *

(0 .1 8 )

(0 .0 8 )

(0 .0 8 )

(0 .1 1 )

(0 .0 1 )*

(0 .0 1 )

(0 .0 0 )

-0 .0 2

0.01

-0 .0 1

-0 .1 3

0 .0 3

0 .0 6

-0 .0 8

0 .0 0

-0 .0 9

0.01

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .1 8 )

(0 .0 8 )

(0 .1 4 )

(0 .1 2 )

(0 .0 1 )

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 0 )

-0 .1 4

0 .1 0

-0 .0 4

-1 .5 3

0 .4 3

0 .2 4

-1 .0 2

0 .0 7

0 .03

0.01

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 ) *

(0 .1 8 )* *

(0 .0 9 )* *

(0 .1 5 )

(0 .1 0 )* *

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 1 )*

(0 .0 1 )

0 .0 6

-0 .0 8

-0 .0 1

0 .0 9

-0 .2 3

-0 .1 4

0 .1 6

0 .01

0 .0 6

0 .0 0

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .2 2 )

(0 .0 9 )* *

(0 .1 1 )

(0 .1 4 )

(0 .0 1 )

(0 .0 1 )* *

(0 .0 0 )

0 .1 0

-0.03

0 .0 6

-0 .0 3

0 .3 0

-0 .0 6

0 .0 2

-0.01

0 .0 2

-0 .0 2

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .2 0 )

(0 .1 0 )* *

(0 .1 2 )

(0 .1 2 )

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .0 1 )

(0 .0 1 )*

0 .0 6

-0 .0 4

0 .0 2

0.1 5

0 .0 1

0 .0 0

0 .1 8

0 .0 2

-0 .0 8

-0.01

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )* *

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .1 9 )

(0 .1 0 )

(0 .1 4 )

(0 .1 3 )

(0 .0 2 )

(0 .0 1 )* *

(0 .0 1 )

103860

10 3 8 6 0

103860

103860

89069

86978

103860

103860

103860

103860

N o te:

1. Standard errors in parentheses, ** indicates significance at 0.01 level, * at 0.05 level.
2. Estimates are obtained from OLS models.
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PART III: GRANDPARENTS RAISING GRANDCHILDREN:
THEORY, REALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The most recent estimate by the U.S. Census Bureau (2004) shows that nationally
there are 5.76 million children under the age of 18 living in households with a
grandparent present (7.8 percent o f all children).42 This represents a 50 percent increase
since 1990. The Census estimates that the percentage o f children under 18 living in a
grandparent-headed home was 6.3 percent in 2000, compared with 5.5 percent in 1990,
3.6 percent in 1980 and 3.2 percent in 1970.
About 1.5 million o f these children nationwide are living in grandparent headed
households with neither parent present, which represents 2.05 percent o f all children.
This family form occurs in all racial groups: 40% o f these grandparents are white, 39 %
are African American, 16% are Hispanic and 1% are Asian. However, this living
arrangement is least common among Asian Americans and most common among African
Americans: only 0.5% o f all Asian American children were living in grandparent
households with neither parent present, while 5.1 percent o f African American children
are living in such households. The corresponding estimates are 1.5 percent for nonHispanic white and 1.8 percent for Hispanics. In addition, children living in grandparent

42 Data are retrieved online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdem o/hh-fam /cps2004.htm l.
The percentage is calculated by the author.
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households with neither parent present are more likely to live in poverty compared to all
US children (61 percent vs. 40 percent) (2004 U.S. Census Bureau).43
The public policy significance o f the rapid growth in grandparent households can
be fully understood in the context o f underlying factors contributing to the ongoing trend.
Substance abuse is one o f the most common reasons for the increased number o f children
living with grandparents. A number of studies have shown that the crack-cocaine
epidemic has increased the number of African-American grandparents caring for their
grandchildren (Minkler et al. 1992, Minkler et al. 1993, Minkler et al. 1994, Roe et al.
1994). An increase in the incarceration rate o f women over the past three decades has
also contributed to this trend (Acoca 1998, Barnhill 1996, Dressel and Barnhill 1994,
Kurshan 1999, Ruiz 2002). In addition, the AIDS epidemic also plays a role in this
increasing shift o f responsibility for child rearing to grandparents (Levine 1995, Joslin
and Brouard 1995).
Finally, divorce and abuse or neglect o f children are also among the most cited
reasons for grandparents to become primary caregivers for grandchildren (Minkler and
Roe 1993, Chalfie 1994, Dressel and Barnhill 1994, Minkler and Roe 1996, Minkler and
Fuller-Thomson 1999, Pebley and Rudkin 1999). Given the risk factors associated with
these social issues and the vulnerability o f those families, a number o f public policies
may target these households or might have consequential implications for them.
A pragmatic and philosophical shift in public policy is also likely to have
contributed to the increase in the number o f grandparent caregivers (Ingram 1996,
Berrick et al. 1998). Child welfare policy makers began to view grandparents as a safety

43 Again, raw data are retrieved online at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdem o/hhfam/cps2Q04.html and all percentages are calculated by the author.

-247-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

net for grandchildren in the early 1980s. Consequently, several policy changes during the
1990s, including welfare reform, led the government to shift the burden o f family
problems to family members, mainly to grandparents (Mullen 1996, Bonecutter and
Gleeson 1997, Pebley and Rudkinl999). These federal policies influence both state
policies and the practice o f local welfare agencies. They also create specific incentives
for grandparent household formation.
In sum, concurrent demographic changes and public policy shifts have lead to an
increase in the number o f grandparent headed households in the United States. However,
a careful examination of the literature reveals that there are no economic studies that
investigate how public policies have influenced the number o f grandparents caring for
their grandchildren. This study specifically examines the impact of welfare reform on
grandparent household formation. I use data from the 1997, 1999 and 2002 waves o f the
National Survey o f America’s Families (NSAF), in conjunction with other state level
data, to empirically investigate how state TANF choices have influenced the formation of
grandparent headed households while controlling for other related contemporary public
policies, such as state kinship care policies and the State Children Health Insurance
Programs (SCHIP).
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

To my knowledge, although there are many existing studies on grandparent
households, none are designed to examine effects o f welfare reform and other public
policies on grandparent household formation. Thus, to a large extent I must look at more
general studies o f grandparent households and examine what gaps remain in the
literature.
Most o f the existing research on grandparent households focuses on documenting
the socio-demographic characteristics o f grandparents raising grandchildren in the United
States (Chalfie 1994, Fuller-Thomson et al. 1997, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler, 2000)
and problems faced by grandparent caregivers (Minkler and Roe 1996, Minkler, Berrick
and Needell 1999, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler, 2000). For example, Chalfie (1994)
finds that the vast majority (68%) of grandparent caregivers are white, but grandparent
caregivers are disproportionally represented by African Americans (29%); grandmothers
are more likely than grandfathers to be parenting their grandchildren (60% are
grandmothers and 40% are grandfathers). Even when both grandparents are present,
grandmothers usually assume the lion's share o f caregiving duties. Grandparent
caregivers are heavily (57%) concentrated in the South. According to Fuller-Thomson et
al. (1997) custodial grandparents in the 1990s were less likely to be married, to be non-
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Hispanic whites, to be male, and to have completed high school than noncaregiving
grandparents.
Health problems, economic hardships, lack o f government support, social
isolation and problems of raising children with special needs are among the problems
faced by grandparents who are parenting their grandchildren (Burton 1992, Minkler and
Roe 1996, Casper and Bryson 1998, Scarcella et al. 2003, Fuller-Thomson et al.1997,
Dressel and Barnhill 1994). It is possible that grandparents in these households already
faced these problems before caring for their grandchildren. But taking in and caring for a
dependent child (or many dependent children) exacerbates the hardship. These findings
reinforce the significance of public policies addressing the needs o f these most vulnerable
families.
Relatively fewer studies focus on the child outcomes when investigating
grandparent caregiving. Dubowitz et al. (1994) is the first comprehensive assessment of
the physical and mental health and educational status of children in kinship care; it also
compares children in informal kinship care44 with children in foster care45, children in
poverty and children from the general population. The study finds that children in kinship
care have substantial health care needs relative to children living with their parents. Many
of the children’s health problems had not been identified by their caregivers, and even
when they had been, follow-up care was often lacking; many children also had substantial
school-related problems. However, this study consists o f a sample o f 524 kinship care
44 Kinship care generally refers to the provision o f full-time nurturing and protection o f children by persons
w ho have a family relationship bond with the children (other than their own parents).
45 Foster care involves services from child welfare agencies where the child is placed in the custody o f the
state by a court. Foster care refers to the care o f children on a full-time, temporary basis by persons other
than their own parents. Foster care is intended to offer a supportive family environment to children whose
natural parents cannot raise them because o f the parents' physical or mental illness, the child's behavioral
difficulties, or problems within the family environment, e.g., child abuse, alcoholism, extreme poverty, or
crime.
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giving households under the supervision o f the Baltimore City Department o f Social
Services in 1989, where 47 percent o f caregivers are grandmothers. Therefore their
results cannot be generalized to all grandparent caregiving. In addition, this study is a
simple descriptive analysis and is not a multivariate study.
Casper and Bryson (1998) conduct a multivariate analysis which focuses on
comparing different family structures within grandparent maintained families. Using
1997 Current Population Survey (CPS) data, they find that children living in grandparent
households without either parent present do not fare as well economically as their
counterparts living in their parents’ homes. In particular, they find that grandchildren in
both-grandparents, no-parents-present families are much more likely to be lack health
insurance than grandchildren living in grandmother only, no parent present households or
grandchildren living in grandfather only, no parent present households. Casper and
Bryson also find that grandchildren in grandmother only, no parents present families are
more likely to be poor and receive public assistance. Their analysis is the only
multivariate analysis on this topic to the best o f my knowledge.
As noted by Scarcella et al. (2003), children cared for by grandparents may
already have a variety of behavioral and emotional problems due to the trauma o f being
separated from a parent as well as the experience o f abuse or neglect. This study reports
that about one-fifth of children cared for by their grandparents and other relatives have
either a health condition that limited their activities or are in fair or poor health. Roughly
one-tenth of 6-17 year-old children living with grandparents or other relatives have
elevated levels o f behavioral or emotional problems. Twenty-six percent of children
living with their grandparents have low levels o f school engagement. This study also uses
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data from NSAF, but only from the 1999 round. In addition, the study presents only
bivariate comparisons o f characteristics of grandparent households with no parent present
versus households headed by other relatives, as well as the characteristics o f children
living in them. Lack o f multivariate analysis limits our ability to assess the relative
importance o f various factors contributing to the disadvantage o f different groups o f
grandchildren.
No studies in the literature have empirically investigated why and how
grandparent households form. By using 1997, 1999, 2002 data from the National Survey
o f America’s Families, this preliminary study represents the first effort in the literature
that investigates the factors influencing grandparent household formation, with a focus on
TANF related policies. Next I am going to discuss these policies, with a focus on their
implications for grandparent household formation.
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CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC POLICY RELATED TO GRANDPARENT HOUSEHOLDS

Public policies usually target relative caregivers as one group instead of aiming
specifically at grandparent caregivers. This is despite the fact that many studies have
found that a majority o f kin caregivers are grandparents (Berrick et al. 1994, Burnette
1997, Chalfie 1994, Harden et al. 1997, LeProhn 1994, Macomber and Geen, 2002, Jones
2003). In this section I will discuss the primary public assistance programs available to
kinship care families. Then I will explain the major policy implications in the context of
grandparent caregiving, depending on the type o f kinship care arrangements. For the
purpose o f this study, I will focus on the impact o f the 1996 welfare reform on
grandparent household formation while at the same time discussing other relevant
policies, such as state kinship care policies and SCHIP programs.

There are many different ways to categorize kinship care. One common way is to
divide it roughly into informal kinship care and formal kinship care. Most kinship care is
private and informal: the decision that a child lives with a relative is made within a family
and no child welfare agency is involved. In contrast, when a child is placed in the
custody o f a child welfare agency by a court, and then the child is arranged to be cared
for by a relative by the child welfare agency—this is foster care. Such an arrangement is
public and formal. Hence, the decision to become a grandparent caregiver and therefore
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to form a grandparent household is indeed a multinomial choice model, i.e. to choose
between informal versus formal kinship care. In this essay, empirically, I am primarily
interested in examining whether or not a grandparent household is formed, instead of
investigating what type o f grandparent household is formed. The relatively small sample
size o f grandparent households limits the feasibility of further classifying grandparent
households into different family structures.
Although I will not empirically differentiate various types o f grandparent
households, it is important to distinguish between formal and informal kinship care since
public assistance eligibility and receipt vary for the different kinship arrangements (refer
to Figure 4). Generally, income assistance from Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) is the most common and important public assistance received by
informal kinship care families. All kin who are not receiving foster care payment or
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)46 for the child in care are eligible to receive TANF
cash assistance. In contrast, only kin caring for a child who is in state custody (foster
kinship care or formal kinship care) are eligible to receive child welfare services
including foster care payments. Foster care payments are generally more generous than
TANF cash assistance. I will discuss the details later.47

46 If the relative child in their care meets disability guidelines such as blindness, relative fam ilies are
eligible to receive supplemental security payments, unless they are already receiving foster care payments
or AFDC payments.
47 Children in kinship care may receive Food Stamps ( if the family is incom e-eligible) and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC), which w ill not be discussed here given the focus o f the current study.
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3.1 Informal Kinship Care, TANF and Its Implication for Grandparent Household
Formation

Now I will discuss TANF and its implications for informal kinship care. Between
195 048 and 1996, Title IV of the Social Security Act and its regulations authorized
relative caregivers to receive the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
grants for taking care of dependent children in their extended families. Eligible relative
caregivers could apply and receive payment as a family unit if they themselves met
income and assets eligibility guidelines, or they could apply to receive welfare benefits
for only the related child regardless of their own income (i.e. an AFDC child-only grant).
The 1996 welfare reform act officially encouraged states to give relatives first priority in
providing care for foster children. Under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) o f 1996, states are required to “consider
giving preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver when determining a
placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant state child
protection standards” (Leos-Urbel et al. 2000). After the TANF program replaced the
AFDC program in 1996, states were given the option to continue providing child-only
grants to non-needy relatives.49
Although welfare reform was expected to primarily impact the lives o f children
living in single-parent households, a growing number of children residing with relatives

48 A 1950 Social Security Act amendment offered eligible relative caregivers financial assistance for
children in their care through the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which was renamed the Aid
to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) program in the 1960s.
49 A ll states except W isconsin have continued this benefit. In W isconsin, the child must be at risk o f harm if
living with biological parents in order for the relative caregivers to be eligible for a TANF child-only
payment.
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were also likely to have been affected due to the new features o f the welfare program
such as time limits and work requirements. For example, Berrick, Needle and Minkler
(1999) offer an overview of welfare reform legislation in California and its implications
for elder caregivers; Mullen and Einhom (2000) elaborate the policy implications o f
welfare reform on grandparent headed households specifically. Like Mullen and Einhom
(2000), my study also focuses exclusively on grandparent-headed households where
neither parent is present. This is an important definition o f grandparent household with
regards to TANF. The presence o f a parent in the grandparent household (whether the
parent is a teenager or an adult) triggers different eligibility standards under TANF, and
thus presents different policy implications (Mullen and Einhorn 2000).
In households with parents present, it is the parents’ circumstances that determine
eligibility, not the circumstances o f the grandparents. A grandparent can, and may wish
to, decline to be part o f the assistance unit, or may even be ineligible to be part o f it, and
still obtain benefits on behalf of a grandchild. That option—to obtain a grant on behalf of
the child only— is not available to parents. For example, grandparent-headed households
can have income and resources that exceed eligibility standards and still receive TANF
on behalf of a grandchild, while parent-headed households with identical income and
resources would not quality for TANF.50
TANF is different from the previous AFDC program due to several features
including time limits on aid and work requirements. These changes may create incentives

50 The limited circumstances where a parent receives a child-only grant on behalf o f a child include families
where the parent is disabled and receives SSI benefits, fam ilies where the parent is an ineligible immigrant,
and families where a parent has been removed from the grant due to a sanction. In such cases, the time
limits do not apply either. What distinguishes parents who receive the child-only grant from grandparents is
that parents cannot elect to be removed from the grant.
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for forming grandparent households. For example, a grandparent may have an incentive
to apply for a TANF child-only grant even if she/he is eligible due to two important
conditions of program participation: time limits and work requirements. The PRWORA
prohibits the use of any federal TANF dollars in a household where an adult has received
benefits for more than 60 months, and allows states to impose even shorter time limits.
States may exempt up to 20 percent o f their TANF recipients from this time limit on the
basis of hardship.51 In every state, grandparents who are part o f the assistance unit can
avoid the lifetime loss o f benefits for their grandchildren by removing themselves from
the TANF grant anytime up to receiving 59 months o f benefits. Parents do not have this
option. Once grandparents exhausted their 60-month lifetime limits, nine states explicitly
do not allow them to convert to a child-only grant. Another 33 states permit grandparents
to withdraw from the assistance unit and continue to receive benefits on behalf o f their
grandchildren even after reaching 60-month time limits. Some o f those states choose to
provide benefits for the grandchildren using state dollars or funds available under a preTANF AFDC waiver (Mullen and Einhom 2000).
In addition, absent an exemption for good cause, PRWORA requires any
grandparent who receives TANF assistance for him/herself to participate in work
programs. However, work requirements do not apply when grandparents are not part of
the assistance unit. More specifically, states are allowed to exempt grandparents who
receive child-only grants from the work requirements and to exclude those cases in
calculating their work participation rates. All states that offer child-only grants take
advantage of this exemption.

51 Some states exempt caretakers who are over age 60.
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Therefore, both time limits and work requirements do not apply to grandparents
who elect not to be part o f the TANF assistance unit. In every state, a grandchild who
receives aid for 60 months at a parent’s home and then goes to live with a grandparent is
able to obtain additional benefits. Grandparents in the assistance unit who leave the
TANF grant before the 60th month themselves, can continue to receive benefits for their
grandchildren until the grandchildren reach age 18 or 19, depending on state law. This
policy creates an incentive for grandparents to care for their grandchildren due to the
TANF child-only grant.52
3.2 Formal Kinship Care, State Kinship Care Policy and Its Implication for
Grandparent Household Formation

Formal kinship care is also called foster kinship care. Foster care payments are
usually available to kin who are caring for children in state custody and who become
licensed by the state. In general the requirements o f licensed foster homes include parent
training, medical exams and background checks, standards for physical space in the
house, caregiver age, family income, length of marriage and total number of children in
home. With limited federal guidance, the licensing requirements for kin differ from state
to state. But most states either modify or waive certain licensing requirements for kin.53
According to Boots and Geen (1999), kinship families in most states (40 plus the District

52 However, the child support enforcements by states may substantially reduce the possibility o f such fraud.
States are required to try to recover the costs associated with their cash assistance programs by collecting
child support from non-custodial parents. A ll states imposed cooperation requirements on grandparents
who are part o f the assistance unit. With regard to a grandparent receiving child-only grant, 3 states do not
im pose a cooperation requirement, and 13 states impose one but did not sanction the child for the
grandparents’ failure to cooperate. Cooperation meant providing information about the identity and location
o f the absent parent or parents, making the child available for blood tests, and appearing at interviews and
court hearings (Mullen and Einhom 2000).
53 See Leos-Urbel, B ess and Geen (2000) for a detailed discussion o f state licensing requirements for kin.
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of Columbia) are held to a less stringent standard54 for foster family eligibility than nonrelative foster families.55
As welfare reform takes shape in states across the U.S., state kinship care policies
continue evolving in terms o f identifying, licensing, and financially supporting kinship
care families as well as moving kinship care families to permanency. Federal policies
allow states great discretion in determining how to license and support kinship foster
parents. When the Adoption and Child Welfare Act o f 1980 was passed, forming the
basis of U.S. federal foster care law, it was rare for a child’s relative to act as a foster
parent. Available evidence suggests that rates of formal kinship care increased
substantially during the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1997, approximately 200,000 children
were in formal kinship care (foster kinship care), which represent 29 percent of all foster
children and about 10 percent of all children living in kinship care arrangements (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).
As mentioned earlier, the average foster care payment is notably higher than the
average TANF payment, especially if there are multiple children in care. This is because
the marginal foster care payment rate does not decline as the number o f children in care
increases, and foster care payment rates also depend on the age o f the child. For example,
although foster care payments differ from state to state, foster care payments averaged
$356 per month for a 2-year-old, $373 per month for a 9-year-old, and $431 per month
for a 16-year-old child in 1996. In contrast, in 1996, TANF payment amounts averaged

54 The least stringent states have few or no requirements for kin caregivers. In contrast, the most stringent
states require full standards for licensing-the same as non-kin. In between the tw o extremes there are states
that have a separate approval process for kin or w aive some o f the full standards’ requirements.
55 However, about half o f these states do not provide foster care payments to the kinship families meeting a
lower standard. Those fam ilies, if seeking financial help, have to apply for welfare or other government
assistance, which typically provides lower payments.
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$207 per month, with a range from $60 to $452 for one child per month. Moreover,
TANF payment amounts increase at a declining rate for each additional child and do not
vary depending on the age of the child. These payment differences result in sharp
differences in the assistance provided to kinship care families within and across states.56
All else equal, the higher foster care payments compared with TANF provide an
incentive for informal kinship care givers to become part o f the child welfare system.
In sum, variations in TANF programs and state kinship care policies may create
certain incentives for grandparents or other relatives to care for dependent children, either
by encouraging them to enter the formal kinship care system (i.e. child welfare system in
the form o f foster care arrangement) or choosing an informal kinship care arrangement.
As welfare reform continues, parents are increasingly likely to exceed time limits, be
subjected to sanctions and suffer welfare income loss, creating an incentive to shift their
children to the grandparents’ homes. State kinship care policies are also continuing to
evolve. Using data from the NSAF in conjunction with other state level data, the goal of
this paper is to empirically examine how welfare reform affects grandparent household
formation. Next I will analyze grandparent households’ decisions in an economic
theoretical framework, with a view to gaining insights into motivations underlying
grandparent caregiving behaviors.

56 See Boots and Geen (1999) for a detailed discussion.
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CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, I set up a theoretical framework for analyzing grandparent caregiving
behaviors. I consider a society in which a grandparent57 is confronted with the decision of
whether or not to take in a grandchild. The discussion will start with analyzing different
motives of grandparent caregivers. This is because the primary goal o f the current study is to
investigate whether public programs, such as TANF, may influence grandparent household
formation. The decision to form a grandparent household may indeed depend on the
motivation underlying grandparent caregiving behaviors.58
4.1 Grandparent Caregiving Motivations

In the studies o f both inter-vivos transfers and bequests, altruism and exchange are
the two commonly explored competing hypotheses for private intergenerational transfers
(Bemheim, Shleifer and Summers 1985, Wilhelm 1996, McGarry 1999, Cox 1987, Cox and
Rank 1992, Cox and Jakubson 1995). This study applies the theories explaining private
intergenerational transfers to discuss motivations o f grandparent caregiving behaviors. In
addition to altruism and exchange, there may be another distinctive motive that sets

57 It is likely that many households have both grandparents. But I w ill assume only one grandparent in my
model in order to simplify the analysis.
58 Thomas (2000) discusses theories contributing to understanding o f the grandparenting role from other
disciplines.
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grandparents apart from other non-parental caregivers: the legacy effect.59 A grandparent
chooses to take care of the grandchild so that the “family values” or heritage can be carried
on. This motive is more similar to the altruism motive than to the exchange motive because
the older the grandparent, the higher the likelihood that the grandparent may pass away in
the near future and, therefore, the stronger his/her motive o f helping the grandchild out so
that family values can be preserved.60 Thus, next I will elaborate the altruism and exchange
motives without discussing the legacy effect separately. In addition, even for a grandparent
who cares for the grandchild because she/he mainly expects future service from the child
(the exchange motive), she/he may still have some altruism towards the grandchild. But for
the sake o f simplicity, I just consider two extreme cases: one is pure altruism and the other is
pure exchange motive.
While evolutionary biology can explain the altruistic behavior o f grandparents,
there are no specific economic theories tailored to explain the reasons why grandparents
take care o f their grandchildren. Since different methods and focuses o f different fields
lead to different perspectives on altruism which can arise from using narrow or broad
definitions o f self-interest (at one extreme, self-interest is limited to material benefits for
the altruist, while at the other extreme, self-interest includes only psychological rewards),
it is imperative to define altruism in this analysis.
"Imagine a world where people give o f themselves simply
because they want to. Not out o f a sense o f debt. Or because they want
something in return. No ulterior motives. No guilt feelings. Just a desire
to give for the sake of giving. Now instead o f imagining this kind of

591 would like to thank David Mitch for suggesting this effect and for his other valuable comments.
60 However, the legacy effect may be different from the altruism motives. Altruism might lead to a different
distribution o f resources across grandchildren (to m aximize the sum o f the individual grandchild utilities so
that the least successful grandchild gets most) whereas the legacy effect might encourage investment in the
grandchild most likely to succeed in the future). It’s not very relevant for the purpose o f the current study,
but with the right data sets, one might be able to empirically differentiate these tw o motives.

-
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world, do your part in making it happen. Make a charitable donation.
Volunteer your time to improve your community. Give back to the world
that gives so much to you. And if it happens to make you feel good, that's
all right. Feeling good is the one ulterior motive that's acceptable." --Bill
Daniels61
That is what I mean by referring to altruism in this analysis, which is so-called
‘real altruism’ or ‘psychological altruism’. In contrast, “if parents anticipate that
children will help out in old age— perhaps because o f guilt or related motivations, — even
parents who are not very loving toward their children would invest more in the children’s
human capital, and save less to provide for their old age” (see Becker 1992, p50). The
parental behaviors Becker described could again apply to grandparent caregiving. The
reason that a selfish grandparent who purely expects returns from the grandchild is
willing to care for the grandchild is that the return from investing in the grandchild is
higher than the returns from her/his other available options.

In fact, no matter what the underlying goal motivating the grandparent to care for the
grandchild is, the observed behaviors of the grandparent may be similar. This is due to the
fact that she always wants the grandchild to be better off in order for her/his own utility to
be maximized. For example, if the grandparent is altruistic, then her/his utility is higher
when the child fares better. If the grandparent is motivated instead by the exchange motive,
she/he still wishes that the grandchild accumulates enough human capital so that the
grandchild can help her/him out later.

61 B ill Daniels (1920-2000) is the "Father o f Cable Television" and a philanthropist w ho formed the
“Daniels Fund”, a foundation that supports issues relating to aging, alcoholism and substance abuse,
amateur sports, disabilities, education (early childhood, K-12 reform, and ethics and integrity)
hom elessness and disadvantaged, and youth development. (Source o f quote:
http://www.danielsfund.org/PDFs/2005_Grant_Guidelines.pdf)
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However, there are a few subtle ways that the altruistic grandparent may be different
from other grandparents. Within the utility maximizing framework o f resource allocation,
the difference between different motivations may originate in at least three distinct ways.
First, the grandparent may respond differently to the age difference between her/himself and
the grandchild. For an altruistic grandparent, the greater the age difference between her/him
and the grandchild, the more resources may be allocated to the grandchild. This is because
due to altruism, the grandparent realizes that she/he should invest more in the grandchild so
that the grandchild should be independent in case she/he passes away in the near future
(although the ability to leave bequests should mitigate this somewhat.) In contrast, for a
grandparent who expects returns from the grandchild, the opposite may be true; that is, the
bigger the age difference between her/him and the grandchild, the fewer resources will be
allocated to the grandchild because she/he anticipates that she/he will receive less return
from the child before she/he dies, as services do not begin until the child reaches a certain
age. For instance, an 80-year old grandparent may receive less service from a 1-year-old
grandchild than she/he could get from a 15-year-old grandchild, all other things being equal.
In addition, services from young children would be discounted by the amount o f time until
they would be actually provided.
Second, the grandparent may respond to the grandchild’s capacity differently under
different motives. The initial grandchild quality may be used as an indicator o f child
capacity. For the altruistic grandparent, the lower the initial child quality, the more resources
may be invested in the grandchild so that the grandchild can catch up to his peers more
quickly. This also follows the “equalizing” hypothesis o f bequests and intergenerational
transfers (Tomes 1981). But for a grandparent who is selfish in the sense that she/he cares
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about the grandchild mainly because she/he expects to be helped out by the grandchild in the
future, then the less lower the initial child quality, the less may be invested in the grandchild
or the less likely the grandparent would be to care for the child in the first place. This
happens because the child might be viewed as a less promising and profitable investment
option compared to other available investment alternatives to an exchange oriented
grandparent.
Third, the grandparent may treat the grandchild quality and her/his adult child
quality differently if the underlying motives differ. For an altruistic grandparent, she may
treat the grandchild quality and the adult child quality as complements. In contrast, an
exchange motivated grandparent may view grandchild quality and the adult child quality
as substitutes. If her/his own adult child is a failure, she/he anticipates the grandchild will
help out in old age instead. Therefore, how grandparents change the resources allocated
to their grandchildren in response to changes in the age differential, changes in the
grandchild quality and changes in adult child quality may shed light on the underlying
motivation o f grandparent caregiving behaviors. With the right data, it might be possible
to identify empirically which motivation the grandparent has when taking the primary
responsibility o f raising their grandchildren.

4.2 Grandparent Household Formation

The decision is a binary choice where a grandparent compares the utilities
between taking care o f the grandchild (U ) and not stepping forward for such a
commitment ( U s). To become a grandparent caregiver, the grandparent must derive
greater utility from doing so than from not being a caregiver. This decision is similar to,
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yet different from a parent’s fertility decision. (For economic analyses o f fertility, see, for
example, Becker 1960, Ben-Porath 1973, Schultz 1973, Willis 1973.) For example, for
both grandparents and parents, they decide to “have” children either because they derive
utility from doing so (children are compared to durable goods) or because they expect
services from the children in the future (children are compared to investment goods).
There are also some differences. For a parent’s fertility decision, the choice is made
between having the child (bom) vs. not having the child (unborn). In contrast, for a
grandparent, since the child is already bom and she/he knows the child, the choice is
either she/he cares for the child, or the child is living in an alternative arrangement such
as a foster home. Another difference between a grandparent’s decision o f caring for a
grandchild and a parent’s fertility decision is age. For most grandparents, it is unusual for
them to have the primary responsibility o f parenting a child at their age. In contrast, it is
normal for most parents to raise children at their age. In line with this argument, the age
differential between the child and grandparent may matter more for a grandparent’s
decision than for a parent’s decision.
Without taking care o f the child, grandparent utility is a function o f market
purchased numeraire commodity (C),62 which is maximized subject to the income
constraint:
max/75 =U(C)

(1)

C =Y

(2)

subject to

where Y is family wealth/endowment.
62 Even without taking care o f the child, the grandparent can still derive som e utility from having a
grandchild. But this utility is assumed to be exogenous, and I assume it is zero to simplify the analysis.
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Solving this optimization problem yields the optimal demands for consumption
goods:
C* = C* ( 7 )

(3)

Plugging the demand into the utility function yields the grandparent’s maximized
utility before taking in grandchildren:
VS* = V(Y) = US( C*( Y) ) 64

(4)

Upon the formation o f a household with the grandchild, the caregiving
commitment can reduce resources available to the grandparent and therefore decrease
her/his total utility. However, it also improves grandparent utility by producing H(x),65
which is a special commodity that is available only through grandparent caregiving. It
must be produced by market goods x purchased at price p. Public programs can increase
resources available to the grandparent household with a cash transfer W or by reducing
the price o f some commodities like health care. Conditional on taking care o f the child,
now the grandparent utility maximizing problem becomes
ma x U = U ( C , H ( x ) )
c

(5)

®

subject to
C + px = Y + W

(6)

Solving this maximizing problem yields demands for C and x:

63 In order to simplify the analysis, I do not include time allocation in the model. This is a reasonable
assumption as time can also be view ed as an endowment.
64 For the purpose o f simplicity, and given that the ultimate choice is between tw o utility levels, this is a
deterministic model - C must equal Y - and there is no real choice at this level.
65 H(x) represents different things under different motives. For example, for altruistic grandparents it means
child quality, but for exchange motivated grandparents, it means expected future service from their
grandchildren.
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C* = C * ( p , W , Y )

(7)

x* = x * ( p , W , Y )

(8)

The corresponding indirect utility is:
Vg* = V(p, W, Y) = Ug(C* (p, W, Y), H * { x * (p, W, 7)))

(9)

The grandparent will take care o f the child only when the utility shown in
equation (9) exceeds that shown in equation (4). This can be written as
V=Vg *-Vs * = Ug( C * ( p , W , Y ) , H * ( x * ( p , W , Y ) ) ) - U s( C*( Y)) > 0.

(10)

This model regarding grandparent household formation and demand for the
special commodity H yields some implications regarding the impact o f public policies on
grandparent household formation. According to Gary Becker, “Parents help determine the
values o f children— including their feelings o f obligation, duty, and love—but what
parents try to do can be greatly affected by public policies and changes in economic and
social conditions.” (Becker 1992 p. 51) In the case o f grandparents serving as surrogate
parents, grandparents’ behaviors can also be influenced by public policies. Theoretically
speaking, government programs such as TANF can have an income effect by shifting the
budget constraint outward. In line with this argument, TANF programs are expected to be
positively associated with grandparent household formation and child investment x as
well.66

66 However, regarding x, some complication may arise i f the impact o f public assistance on grandparent
consumption is taken into account as w ell. For example, if the grandparent increases her own consumption
in response to a receipt o f public assistance, then the actual child investment by the household may
decrease instead. In other words, public assistance may have a crowd-out effect on private child
investment.
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CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES

5.1 Estimation Strategies

As discussed in the theoretical framework, a grandparent decides whether or not
to care for the grandchild by comparing utilities in caregiving and non-caregiving
scenarios. To empirically examine what factors, especially public policies, influence
grandparent household formation, the following decision equation corresponding to
equations (4) and (9) is estimated:
FVs= a Y lls+pGlis+ YEm + r1NFljs+YWs + v ijs

(10)

where F is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the child is living in a grandparent
maintained household without either parent present. Y represents family income, G
contains child characteristics such as gender o f child and race, E includes the Most
Knowledgable Adult’s (MKA) characteristics such as the M KA’s age and education, NF
denotes household characteristics such as living in the South, and W includes the vector
of policy variables. Subscript i indicates for individual i, and j indicates for outcomes j
and s for state s.
5.2 Data and Variables

The primary sources of data are the 1997, 1999 and 2002 waves of the National
Survey o f American Families (NSAF). The three rounds o f the survey were carried out
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from February to November of 1997, February to October o f 1999, and February to
October o f 2002 respectively. The NSAF provides information on the economic, health,
and social characteristics of children, adults caring for the children, and their families. In
each round, interviews were conducted with over 40,000 families, yielding a sample size
o f 2241 grandparent households.
There is one caveat about the data. Since the child is the unit of observation, both
the household and the MKA are linked to the child by a household identification number.
Therefore, I do not have information on grandparents who are not the MKAs o f the
children. Or to put it another way, a grandparent’s characteristics are obtained only if the
grandparent is the Most Knowledgeable Adult (MKA) o f the child, so I do not have
information on grandparents who are not the MKAs. As a result, I have to use the MKA’s
characteristics to proxy for the grandparent’s information in such a case. This approach
might not be ideal but could roughly represent grandparent characteristics. In most cases,
the MKA is the child’s parent. Numerous studies show intergenerational correlation and
transmission regarding behaviors, parenting, earnings, wealth, labor market status, and
welfare receipt (Serbin and Karp 2003, Thornberry et al. 2003, Saltaris et al. 2004, Grawe
and Mulligan 2002, Couch and Dunn 1997, Goldberger 1989, Behrman and Taubman
1990, Antel 1992 ). In addition, these variables are control variables - not the variables
o f interest. Next I will discuss the primary measures used for grandparent household
status, public policies, and basic demographic characteristics.
5.2.1

Grandparent Households Defined. There is a lack o f consensus on how to

classify grandparent households, and various approaches have been used by previous
researchers. This study focuses exclusively on grandparent-headed households with
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neither parent present. Although this definition excludes almost two-thirds o f the
grandparent-headed households as defined by the Census Bureau67, it is a crucial
definition of grandparent household in relationship to TANF. As noted by Mullen and
Einhom (2000), the presence o f a parent in the household triggers different eligibility
standards under TANF, and thus raises different policy considerations. In the current
study, grandparent households are identified by two variables jointly: 1) the child is in a
kinship care arrangement (i.e. neither parent is present in the household) and 2) the
relationship o f the MKA to the focal child is grandparent. If the grandparent is the MKA
but the child is not in kinship care, then the household where the focal child lives will be
not classified as a grandparent household by this study because at least one parent is
present in such a household.
5.2.2

Measures o f Public Policies and Public Assistance. As suggested by the

theoretical model, public assistance can influence grandparent household formation by
increasing family income or by reducing the relative prices o f inputs and consumption
goods. I consider three key public policies/programs that could have a significant impact
on grandparent households: TANF, kinship care policy and SCFIIP.
As discussed earlier, after the 1996 federal welfare reform law replaced the
AFDC entitlement program with the TANF block grant program, a distinctive feature of
TANF is the time limit. Under TANF, families that include an adult are generally limited
to 60 months o f lifetime assistance. States may impose a shorter limit. The 5-year time
limit on TANF benefits may prompt some parents to turn over custody o f their children

67 The Census Bureau defines grandparent households as households headed by a grandparent
(grandparents) with at least one co-resident grandchild. Therefore, such households may include only the
child’s mother, only the child’s father, both the child’s parents, or neither parent.
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to grandparents. It is unclear whether there is increase in the number of grandparent
headed households after parents exhaust their eligibility for benefits. In order to test this
possibility, it is hypothesized that the closer the family is to approaching the time limit,
the more likely that a grandparent household might be formed, ceteris paribus.
Because all three rounds o f the NSAF survey started in February, I calculate the
time difference between February and the date that families in each state first could
exceed the time limit for each survey year for states that impose time limits. The welfare
reform law also allows states to choose not to impose time limits at all by using state
funds to pay for assistance beyond 60 months. In such cases I just put in an arbitrary large
number (1000 months). A difference with a positive value indicates the months left
before the family would exceed its lifetime limit if it has been continuously on TANF
since 1996. A difference with a negative value indicates the number o f months since
such a family would have exceeded its lifetime limit.68 The smaller the value, therefore,
the more potentially binding is the state’s time constraint. Here I am not trying to actually
calculate whether a family has exceeded its time limit. Instead I am trying to capture
TANF time limit policy variation across states and the fact that the time limit is likely
becoming more binding over time.
As discussed earlier, children living with grandparents with neither parent present
can receive TANF child-only grants, and the grandparents are not subject to work
requirements and time limits for these child-only grants since they are not in the
assistance unit. Therefore, this aspect of TANF has an unintended consequence of

68 For example, families from Florida first exceeded their tim e limit on 10/1/1998. The 1997 NSAF survey
began as early as February, 1997. Therefore I calculated the month difference for Florida families in the
1997 N SAF as the difference between 10/1/1998 and 02/01/1997, which is 20.2 months.
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creating a welfare loophole by encouraging children to live with their relatives after their
families exceed state time limits. In order to test this possibility, it is hypothesized that
the bigger the TANF cash assistance, the more likely that grandparents may take in their
children and form grandparent households. The maximum TANF benefit varies
dramatically from state to state. In addition to the basic choices states make with regard
to benefit levels, the other factor that determines the maximum benefit amount a
grandparent can receive is the number o f people in the TANF assistance unit. With the
exception o f Idaho, states base the amount o f cash assistance on the number of people in
the assistance unit; the presence of more people in the assistance unit results in more cash
assistance.
The monthly payment o f TANF cash assistance could therefore be an important
factor when creating such incentives. Here I create a measure of TANF cash assistance
by taking the difference o f the state TANF maximum benefit69 for a family of two
('Cash2), and state TANF maximum benefits for a family of one (C ashl), divided by the
sum o f the two amounts, i.e.:
. i ,. . „ „ . Cash, - Cash
TANF Benefit Ratio=
---------- Cash2 + Cash{
In this case, Cashl represents the maximum benefit for a TANF child-only
grant70. Intuitively, the bigger the TANF Benefit Ratio, the less the cash assistance a
grandparent would receive from a TANF child-only grant compared to the amount a
family assistance unit o f two persons would receive. Therefore, this ratio measures the

69 There are som e variations over time on TANF maximum benefits.
70A s a sensitivity check, I also use C a sh l instead o f this TANF benefit ratio measure. The results are
similar.
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financial incentive for a grandparent to care for his/her grandchild and is hypothesized to
be negatively associated with grandparent household formation decision.
Because families in formal kinship can receive foster care payments, which are
higher than TANF payments, it is important to control for state foster care payments.
Foster care basic monthly maintenance payment rates vary by a child’s age in care, so the
ideal variable would be actual state basic monthly maintenance payment for children at
their age. As I could not find the foster care payment rates data for all age groups for all
three years, I use state foster care basic monthly maintenance payment rates for children
age 2 to proxy for children from 0-5 age group and the average o f state foster care basic
monthly maintenance payment rates for children age 9 and 16 to proxy for the 6-17 age
group. It is hypothesized that the higher the basic monthly maintenance payment rate, the
more likely a grandparent is to care for his/her grandchild, all other things being equal.
In addition, kinship care has been viewed more favorably than non-kin placement
by state child welfare agencies since the 1980s, and state kinship care policies have also
changed over time. In order to capture state kinship care policies, I adopt the five-point
scale developed by Jantz, Geen, Bess, Andrews and Russell (2002) to measure states’
flexibility in terms o f working with kinship foster parents. This index contains one
variable early in the service process (definition), two in the middle (options and payment)
and two at the end (long-term foster care and subsidized guardianship). The flexibility
criteria, reported in this order, are as follows:
(1) Definition o f kin is broad — beyond those related by blood, marriage, or
adoption (i.e. to include family friends, neighbors);
(2) Waived or separate assessment standard o f licensing is offered for kin;
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(3) Foster care payment is provided to kin who meet a waived or separate
standard;
(4) Children are permitted to remain in long-term foster care with kin;
(5) Subsidized guardianship is offered to kin.
On one extreme, if a state implements all five policies, the index score for that
state is five; on the other extreme, if a state has none o f the above policies, the index
score for such a state is zero. Therefore, the index score ranges from zero to five, with
higher scores indicating more generous states in terms o f treating kinship care families. It
is hypothesized the higher the score is for a state, the more likely the residents in that
state are to form grandparent households. In a secondary specification, I also use the five
individual measures instead o f the index score to better understand the effect of each
individual kinship care policy on grandparent household formation.
Children in most states are eligible for Medicaid or SCHIP if their family income
is at or below the minimum income eligibility level defined by the state. The eligibility
process and types o f coverage vary among states. Children in formal kinship care are
categorically eligible to receive Medicaid assistance regardless o f family income or
TANF/SSI receipt. For children in informal kinship care, if the family is receiving a
child-only TANF payment for that child, then the child is also eligible for
Medicaid/SCHIP. As for Medicaid/SCHIP programs, I use state minimum income
eligibility as a percentage of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) for different age groups as a
measure o f Medicaid/SCHIP programs. It is hypothesized that Medicaid/SCHIP income
eligibility is negatively associated with grandparent household formation by reducing the
cost of raising a child from the parents’ perspective.
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Moreover, in order to control the business cycle impact on family income and
earnings, I also include state unemployment rates. Finally, two dummy variables
indicating year 1999 and 2002 are also included. Details on sources o f state level
variables are discussed in Appendix A.
5.2.3

Other Control Variables. The set o f control variables used in the estimations

include the child’s characteristics such as gender and race, the MKA’s characteristics
such as age, marital status, education, and labor force status, and household
characteristics such as family income level compared to the official poverty level,
number o f children under age 6, number o f children between age 6 and 17, and region.
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CHAPTER 6

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The complex sampling design o f the NSAF involves clustering, multistage
sampling, and stratification. All means and regression results presented have been
adjusted for the complex sampling design o f NSAF, as well as adjusted for non-response
and over-sampling, by using proper weights, Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) and Strata to
ensure that the estimates are representative o f the US population in general and that the
standard errors are correctly calculated. (See Brick et al. 1999 for a more complete
discussion o f weights in the NSAF.)
6.1 Descriptive Statistics

Before reporting the regression results, I first present some basic descriptive
statistics (refer to Table 37). According to the classification discussed earlier, there are
2,241 children (2.15 percent o f the total sample) living in grandparent households, and
1,530 children (1.46 percent o f the total sample) living in other kin households which
include all other relative caregiver families.
Comparing grandparent-headed households to the whole sample reveals that
grandparents are much more likely to be non-Hispanic black (47.5% vs. 15.6%), which is
consistent with the estimates by the Census Bureau; children in their care are relatively
younger (9.4 vs. 10.6 years old), and grandparents are older than the average MKA of the
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sample (54.9 vs. 36.7 years old), which is not surprising given the fact that most MKAs
in the NSAF data are children’s parents. Compared to the average MKA of the whole
sample, grandparent caregivers are also more likely to be female (89.2% vs. 80.9%), are
less likely to be married (47.3% vs. 71.1%), and are less likely to be working (46% vs.
68.3%). In addition, grandparent caregivers are less likely to have a degree o f Bachelor
or higher (12.9% vs. 26.6%) and are more likely to live in poverty (61.3% vs. 56.7%).
Therefore, it is likely that grandparents may apply for a TANF child-only grant to support
the child. Furthermore, grandparent caregivers are also more likely to concentrate in the
South (52.6% vs. 34.8%), a finding which is consistent with Chalfie (1994).
Comparing grandparent-headed households and other kin households shows
similar patterns: grandparents are more likely to be non-Hispanic black (47.5% vs.
39.0%), children in their care are relatively younger (9.4 vs. 10.6 years old), and
grandparents are older than other kin caregivers (54.9 vs. 39.2 years old). Compared to
other relative caregivers, grandparents are less educated, are less likely to work (46% vs.
61.7%), and are more likely to live in poverty (61.3% vs. 56.7%). In addition,
grandparent caregivers are also more likely to concentrate in the South (52.6% vs. 37%).
All the differences discussed are statistically significant.
6.2 Regression Results

The first column in Table 38 presents the results based on estimating the decision
equation (10) on the entire sample. The dependent variable measures whether the child is
living in a grandparent maintained household without either parent present. The estimates
on both TANF related variables (i.e. “number of months before/after the family exceeds
TANF time limit” and “TANF maximum benefit ratio”) do not yield the expected sign,
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and neither is significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, I do not find evidence that
welfare reform has influenced grandparent household formation.
As for the kinship care policy index, the estimate o f the coefficient on this index
variable is 0.10 and the associated odds ratio, as reported in Table 38, is 1.109, which is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. That is, if a state increases the kinship care
generosity index by 1 point, for example, by introducing a new kinship care policy, the
likelihood o f forming a grandparent household is increased by 10.9% on the margin. This
finding presents some evidence that the generosity o f state kinship care policies may
encourage grandparent kinship household formation. However, the sign o f the estimate
on foster care payment is negative, yielding an odds ratio that is less than one. But it is
not statistically significant. Likewise, the estimate on state SCHIP income eligibility also
does not have the expected sign and it is not statistically significant either. Therefore, I do
not find evidence that policy variables, other than state foster kinship care policies, have
an influential impact on grandparent household formation.
Turning to the coefficients on control variables, the results are consistent with the
findings from the descriptive statistics in general. For example, the results from
regression show that non-Hispanic blacks are more likely than non-Hispanic whites (the
reference group) to form a grandparent household. Grandmothers, older grandparents and
grandparents living in the south are more likely to care for their grandchildren
independently compared to grandfathers, younger grandparents and people living in other
regions. Grandparents’ education also makes a difference: more educated people are less
likely to serve as surrogate parents for their grandchildren.
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6.3 Sensitivity Checks

State kinship care policies do not target grandparents but apply to all kin, although
grandparents are more likely than other kin to take care o f those children. Therefore, I
repeat the estimation for the decision to be a kin caregiver in general, instead o f being a
grandparent caregiver only, for the whole sample. (Results are reported in the third
column o f Table 38.) The results are generally consistent with those obtained from
predicting the possibility of being a grandparent household. This exercise serves as a
robust check and provides further evidence that state kinship care policies may encourage
children to be in kinship care. Although still statistically insignificant, the sign o f the
time limit coefficient estimate now becomes positive.
For kinship care policies, instead o f using the index measure, I also include all
five individual state kinship care policy variables in one specification and each o f the five
individual variables separately in five different specifications. Subsidized guardianship
kin is found to be positively associated with grandparent household formation in
particular, regardless of whether this policy variable is used along with the other four
kinship care policies or is the only kinship care policy in the model. However, the policy
that permits children to remain in long-term foster care with kin is positively associated
with the general kinship care arrangement when only this policy variable is used. (Refer
to Table 39 for a summary o f the results.) All other public policy variables, such as
TANF and SCHIP variables, once again do not have any statistically significant effect.
As I assign an arbitrary large number (1000 months) as the time limit for states
that do not impose time limits on their TANF cash assistance, I also test the sensitivity of
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this assumption by using two other arbitrary numbers (800 months and 1200 months).
The results (see the second and the third columns of Table 40) are similar to each other
and are also similar to those reported in Table 38.
I use the number of months left before a family exceeds the time limit as a
measure of how binding the time limit is for a family that have not exceeded its time
limit. A negative value of this variable indicates the number o f months after a family has
exceeded its TANF time limit. However, it might make no or little difference once a
family exceeds its lifetime limit. Therefore, I replace negative values o f this measure with
zero. The results are, as reported in the fourth column of Table 40, similar to those
presented in Table 38.
In order to check the collinearity between the kinship care index and foster care
payments, I also include only one of these two variables one at time. There is no evidence
o f collinearity between these two policy variables. The results are reported in the last two
columns of Table 40.
Finally, as another sensitivity check, I also add state dummy variables. This
exercise renders all o f the policy variables insignificant on grandparent household
formation as well as on general kinship care arrangements. This might be due to the fact
that the time period examined is short and too few changes took place within states and
over time to allow for a fixed-effects specification.
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CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

The 1996 welfare reform raised concerns about potential unintended
consequences o f the welfare reform legislation that could influence kinship care.
Specifically, child welfare advocates pointed out that one particular type of welfare
payment for which kinship care families were eligible, i.e. TANF child-only grants,
would not necessarily be subject to the new work requirements and time limits. There is
an incentive for parents to leave their children with relatives including grandparents to
avoid the new welfare requirements but still receive assistance in the form of child-only
grants. There was also concern that kinship care providers, who used to care for children
informally and receive cash assistance through welfare, would seek assistance from the
child welfare system due to the generous foster care payment compared to TANF cash
assistance. Especially if they are forced to meet welfare requirements, kin caregivers may
switch to the formal kinship care arrangement.

Households made up o f grandparents and their grandchildren are just one of the
new diverse family structures with which welfare administrators learn to work. Welfare
reform must be understood not only in the context o f grandparenthood, but also in the
context of the interplay between kinship care policies and welfare reform. A cautious
examination of such interplay on grandparent household formation is warranted as
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welfare reform unfolds and state kinship care policies evolve. This study seeks to
understand how welfare reform impacts grandparent household formation, and at the
same time takes into account the interplay of other concurrent public policies such as
state kinship care policies and SCHIP programs. In contrast to the widespread concerns
about potential unintended consequences o f welfare reform, this study does not find
convincing evidence that welfare reform leads to more children living with their
grandparents. Nevertheless, I find that generosity o f state kinship care policies is
positively related to grandparent household formation specifically and kinship care
arrangements in general.
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Figure 4. Public Assistance Available to Grandparent H ouseholds

All Needy Families: SSI, Food Stamps,
Medicaid/SCHIP, EITC

Grandparent
Household

F orm al
K in s h ip

Core

E!

'~ . D \

C h O C ' J O l.’.'S

: O f . 1!-:

C a re

Payment

TANF family
assistance unit:
Time limits, w o rk
l i..■.,!!.

-284-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 37. Descriptive Statistics for Grandparent H ouseholds, Other Kin Households
and the W hole Sam ple
Grandparent
Mean
Child's gender, equal to 1 i f the child is a girl
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity

Std. Err.
0.019

0.492
0.475
0.150

0.023
0.015
0.004

W hole sample

Std. Err.

Mean

0.484
0.390

0.025
0.026

0.488
0.156

0.158

0.020
0.012

0.161
0.049

0.299
0.015

8.523
0.809

0.026
0.002

Std. Err.
0.003
0.003
0.002
0.002

0.192
0.012

0.056
10.635
0.862

54.920

0.377

39.194

0.581

36.706

0.049

0.473

0.021

0.499

0.711

MKA has HS diploma

0.212

0.016

0.258

0.003
0.004

M KA has some college
M KA has a Bachelor's degree or above

0.253
0.129

0.015
0.014

0.296
0.284

0.027
0.024

0.182

0.311
0.266

0.003

MKA is working
Family is below 200% o f FPL

0.460
0.613

0.020
0.021

0.617
0.567

0.028

0.683
0.392

0.003
0.004

Number o f children 0-5 years old
Number o f children 6-17 years old
West

0.640
1.676

0.060
0.060

0.852
2.194

0.080
0.098

0.756
1.669

0.181
0.154

0.225
0.219
0.370

0.025
0.022

0.526

0.016
0.015
0.020

0.022

0.233
0.235
0.348

0.006
0.011
0.003

Year dummy, equals 1 ifyear=1999
Year dummy, equals 1 if year=2002

0.336
0.352

0.020

0.371

0.003

0.337

0.003

Months after/before exceeding TANF time
limit
TANF monthly maximum benefits o f one and
two nersons ratio
Foster policy generosity index

0.996

0.108

0.366
1.192

0.025
0.024

0.334

0.023

0.116

1.309

0.016

0.214

0.005

0.210

0.004

0.208

0.001

3.012

0.032

2.996

0.053

2.931

0.007

0.396
0.748

0.026
0.021

0.350
0.782

0.028

0.382

0.004

0.023

0.729

0.003

0.551

0.023

0.571

0.025

0.524

0.004

0.710

0.021

0.703

0.025

0.678

0.003

0.540

0.016
0.032

0.021

0.552

0.059
0.032

4.074

0.028

0.527
4.189
1.894

1.860

0.003
0.006
0.004

0.053

5.080

0.057

5.016

0.008

Child's age
M KA is female
MKA's age
M KA is married

Mid-west
South

Definition o f kin is broad
Waived or separate assessment standard is
offered for kin
Foster care payment is provided to kin who
meet a waived or separate standard
Children are permitted to remain in long-term
foster care with kin
Subsidized guardianship is offered to kin

0.021
9.413
0.892

Other kin
Mean

Monthly basic foster payments
SCH1P income eligibility as percentage o f FPL

4.118
1.845

State unemployment rate
Number o f O bservations

5.078
2241

0.020
0.022
0.024

1530
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0.003

0.003
0.003

104588

Table 38. Logit Model Predicting the Probability of Being in Grandparent Kinship
Care for the Whole Sample: Using Kinship Care Policy Index

Number o f M onths before/after Exceeding TANF Time Limit

Grandparent

A ll Kin

1.001

0.991
(0.72)

(0.07)
TANF M aximum TANF Benefit Ratio

1.214
(0.33)

Kinship Care Policy Index
M onthly Foster Care Payment
SCHIP Income Eligibility as Percentage o f FPL
Gender o f The Child, Equals to One for Girls
N on-Hispanic Black
Hispanics
Other Race/Ethnicity
Child's Age
M KA is Female
MKA's A ge
M KA is Married
M KA has a High School Diploma
M KA has Some College
M KA has a Bachelor D egree or Above
Family Income is B elow 200% o f FPL
MKA is Working

-286

1.151
(0.42)

1.109

1.073

(2.07)*

(1.88)*

0.974

1.011

(0.42)

(0.20)

1.061

1.018

(0.44)

(0.19)

0.979

0.984

(0.20)

(0.25)

2.773

3.066

(6.03)**

(10.58)**

1.191

1.215

(1.05)

(1.54)

0.500

1.210

(2.24)*

(0.99)

0.867

0.980

(9.45)**

(1.99)*

4.336

2.170

(7.90)**

(7.74)**

1.286

1.171

(28.68)**

(25.91)**

0.765

0.600

(1.63)

(5.61)**

0.516

0.766

(4.24)**

(2.03)*

0.528

0.631

(3.97)**

(3.70)**

0.300

0.432

(6.13)**

(5.83)**

1.191

1.183

(0.93)

(1.64)

1.052

0.900

(0.40)

(1.34)

-
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Table 38. (continued)
Number o f Children Aged 0-5
Number o f Children Aged 6-17
West
Mid-West
South
Year=1999
Year=2002
Unemployment Rate
Number o f Observations

1.055

1.537

(0.58)

(7.15)**

0.971

1.104

(0.47)

(2.42)**

1.350

1.081

(1.64)

(0.61)

1.152

1.049

(0.68)

(0.36)

1.903

1.286

(4.22)**

(2.41)**

0.972

1.196

(0.14)

(1.24)

0.800

1.032

(0.94)

(0.23)

0.991

1.029

(0.10)

(0.51)

103860

103860

Note:
1. Odds ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
2. * indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level and *** at 0.01 level.
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Table 39. Alternative Specifications o f State Kinship Care Policies

All Five Policies together Each o f the F'ive Policies in
in one specification
5 individual s deifications
All kin
Grandparent
Alikin
Grandparent
Broad Definition o f Kin
0.972
1.075
0.989
1.075
(0.24)
(0.48)
(0.16)
(0.46)
Waive/Separate Assessment for Kin
0.848
1.163
0.953
1.120
(0.72)
(0.80)
(0.35)
(1.15)
Foster Payment for Kin
1.224
1.075
1.213
0.981
(1.22)
(1.13)
(0.45)
(0.59)
Long Term Foster Care for Kin
1.104
1.143
1.101
1.140
(1.71)*
(0.93)
(1.63)
(0.70)
Subsidized Guardianship for Kin
1.441
1.054
1.376
1.027
(3.04)**
(2.84)**
(0.37)
(0.67)
Notes:
1. Odds ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
2. * indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level and *** at 0.01 level.
3. These specifications include the same other control variables as regressions in Table 38.
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Table 40. O ther Sensitivity Checks

Key policy variables
Number o f Months before/after
Exceeding TANF Time Limit
TANF Maximum Benefit Ratio
Kinship Care Policy Index
Monthly Foster Care Payment
SCHIP Income
Percentage o f FPL

Eligibility

TANF time limit policies
A
B
C

Kinship care policies
D
E

1.002
(0.06)
1.213
(0.32)
1.109
(2.08)*
0.974
(0.42)

1.002
1.001
(0.07) (0.07)
1.215
1.215
(0.33) (0.33)
1.108
1.108
(2.07)* (2.06)*
0.974
0.974
(0.42) (0.42)

1.001
(0.07)
1.196
(0.30)
1.108 |
(2.04)*

1.061
(0.44)

1.061
(0.44)

1.062
(0.44)

1.010
(0.50)
1.340
(0.50)

0.979
1 (0.34)

as
1.061
(0.44)

1.061
(0.43)

Notes:
1. Odds ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported.
2. * indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level and *** at 0.01 level.
3. Specifications A and B use 800 months and 1200 months respectively as time lim its for states
that do not impost tim e limits. Specification C replaces negative values o f number o f months left
before exceeding TANF time limits (i.e. fam ilies have exceeded their lifetime tim e limits) with 0.
4. Specification D drops the foster care payment variable and E drops the kinship care policy index
variables to check collinearity o f these two variables.
5. All these specifications include the same other control variables as regressions in Table 38.
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APPENDIX A. Data Source for State Level Variables

Three surveys on state kinship care policies were conducted in 1997, 1999 and
2001 by the Urban Institute (Janz et al. 2002). It is hard to find data with similar
information for the year 2002. Therefore, the 2001 index measuring the generosity o f
state kinship care, taken from Jantz et al. (2002), is used directly to proxy data for 2002.
For 1997 and 1999,1 combined data taken from Jantz et al. (2002) and from Leos-Urbel
et al. (2000), which summarize state kinship care policy changes between 1999 and 2001,
and between 1997 and 1999 respectively, to create a similar index for 1997 and 1999.
I was able to find data on foster care basic monthly maintenance payment rates
only for children ages 2, 9 and 16 for 1996, 1998 and 2000 from the 1996, 1998 and 2000
Greenbook. Since it may take some time for the targeted population to learn and respond
to any new policies or changes in public programs, it is reasonable to use the available
three year data to proxy for 1997, 1999 and 2002.
Likewise, data on TANF maximum benefits as o f January 1996, as of January
1997 and as of January 2000 are therefore used as a proxy for 1997, 1999 and 2002
respectively, so that data on foster payments and TANF cash assistance will be roughly
consistent. Data on TANF maximum benefits for a family o f one and two persons are
also taken from 1996, 1998 and 2000 Greenbook.
As various sources of data on time limits reveal discrepancies71, data on time
limits such as lifetime time limits (months) and dates families first exceeded time-limits

71 For example, data from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database (2002) show there are no life limits
for N ew York, Maine and Washington D.C. In contrast, data from Administration o f Children and
Families, Department o f Health and Human Services and data from the State Policy Documentation Project
show 60-month lifetime limits for all three states. Again data from the SPDP shows families in Texas first
exceeded time limits in January 1998. However, the date shown by data from Administration o f Children
and Families, DHHS, is June 1997.
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are obtained by referring to several data sources from the Department o f Health and
Human Services, the Urban Institute's 1999 and 2002 Welfare Rules Database and State
Policy Documentation Project (SPDP). Since no data on time limits for the year 1997 is
found and there is little variation in time limits during this time, I use data for 1999 to
proxy that o f 1997.
The unemployment rate for each state comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), U.S. Dept, o f Labor. Data on SCHIP/Medicaid eligibility rules come from
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Update Jan 20, 2000 and Update 2002 collected by
the National Governor’s Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices.
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation consists o f three separate essays. Essay One (Part X) investigates
broadly how family environment, especially family structure, affects child outcomes,
with a focus on less typical family structures and the interplay o f parent-child gender.
While extensive research exists about the effects o f family structure on child outcomes,
this study contributes to the literature on several fronts. Foremost, this essay presents a
more complete picture of the diversity o f family structures and its association with child
outcomes. For example, this study includes single-father households and households
headed by grandparents, both o f which have grown tremendously since 1990, and yet
relatively little is known about them. Second, with a clear distinction between “inputs,”
such as well child care visits, and “outputs,” i.e. child outcomes, this study isolates the
role that critical ‘inputs’ play in producing child well-being after controlling for
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Third, this study examines a wide array
of child outcomes including both developmental and health outcomes. Fourth, the careful
examination o f gender/race interactions sheds light on the underlying mechanisms that
lead to disparities in child outcomes.

Although state and federal governments leave the responsibility o f raising
children primarily to families, they intervene in a variety o f ways to ensure favorable
outcomes for the national future. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) o f 1997 was signed
into law in August 1997, creating the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
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(SCHIP) to help reduce the number o f children without any health insurance. A
burgeoning literature documents the effect o f SCHIP with respect to eligibility, take-up
and crowd-out. However, research investigating the impact of SCHIP programs on
improving medical care utilization and health outcomes o f children is relatively sparse,
especially at the national level. In Essay Two (Part Two) I rigorously examine how
SCHIP programs affect insurance coverage, health care utilization and health outcomes
by employing four different estimation strategies including the difference-in-difference
approaches, reduced form estimation and 2SLS. This study represents the first effort that
examines how SCHIP programs affect medical care utilization and child outcomes for
children in all age groups at the national level.
The TANF program is another government program that may have significant
impact on many lower income households. Although the welfare reform primarily affects
single-parent households, it has important implications for grandparent households. The
Census Bureau (2002) estimates that the percentage of children under 18 living in a
grandparent-headed home has nearly doubled since 1970. Despite the ongoing trend, no
economic studies have examined how public policies influence grandparent household
formation. The third essay contributes to the sparse existing economic literature in three
different ways. First, this study thoroughly reviews the literature and provides an
overview of different public policies related to grandparent households. Second, it
empirically addresses the potential impacts of welfare reform on grandparent household
formation while at the same time controlling for other contemporary public policies such
as state kinship care policies and SCHIP. Third, the third essay builds a theoretical
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framework that explores the motivations underlying grandparent household formation
and caregiving behaviors through the lens o f an economist.
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